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ABSTRACT
MEDICAID EXPANSION IN THE UNITED STATES: A STATE COMPARATIVE STUDY
EXAMINING FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE STATE DECISION-MAKING
Tiffany J. Henley
Old Dominion University, 2016
Director: Dr. John C. Morris
Since the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) and a
Supreme Court ruling that the federal government cannot compel states to expand Medicaid, a
policy window has opened for states to change Medicaid policy. States are now faced with the
option to expand Medicaid. Although the literature on Medicaid expansion indicates that politics
plays a determining role on states’ decisions on Medicaid expansion, comprehensive analyses of
dominant factors that affect these decisions on Medicaid is lacking in the field of Medicaid
policy. This study will explore the decision making process of state level policies and the effect
of relevant state characteristics on Medicaid expansion.
This dissertation examines prominent factors that influence state decisions on Medicaid
expansion. Although the literature on Medicaid expansion post the ACA is limited in scope, this
study is informed by a range of other disciplines, such as education, political science,
intergovernmental management, and economics. A conceptual framework is developed based on
the interdisciplinary nature of the literature and five models are created: political, economic,
needs-based, state capacity, and state innovation and diffusion. A state comparative crosssectional research design is utilized to test the five models and a combined model of state
decision making on Medicaid expansion using multinomial logistic regression analysis and
descriptive statistics.
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The results of this study reveal that when all of the models are combined, state needsbased factors are more influential than political, economic, state capacity, and state innovation
and diffusion factors. However, the political model has the most explanatory power when the
individual models are tested separately. This research demonstrates that the five models utilized
in this study play a significant role in the decision making process of states on Medicaid
expansion. In addition, this research addresses a gap in the literature that elucidates influential
factors that affect the decisions of states on not only Medicaid policy, but also general state
policies.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The expansion of Medicaid is a topic that is worthy of study for the 21st century in
America. While states are charged with overseeing this program, the advent of healthcare reform
is forcing states to make policy-related health care decisions that will have long-standing impacts
on residents, state funding and budgets, intergovernmental relationships, and state resources.
With a system marked by great latitude in state discretion, wide variations in the delivery and
care of patients, and rising health care costs, the opportunity to examine the effects or factors
influencing state decision making on the adoption of Medicaid expansion has arisen. In effect, a
policy window has opened with the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA) and changed the landscape of health care in the United States (U.S.) by allowing states to
expand Medicaid eligibility to additional adult beneficiaries. Moreover, federal funding at 100%
for expansion is provided for the first 3 years starting with the year 2014; thereafter 90% of
Medicaid expansion costs are covered by 2020 (Medicaid.gov, 2015). With increasing federal
oversight and less state control of the U.S. health care system (Sparer, France, & Clinton, 2011),
there are multifarious implications affecting the delivery, administration, and implementation of
health care services.
The factors influencing states to adopt Medicaid expansion under the auspices of the
ACA is the focus of this study. The choice to adopt or expand a policy from a state perspective
is fraught with many competing thoughts, theories, and changes in administration over time.
Beginning with the Constitution, the prevailing governance arrangement or structure for public
policies in the U.S. is a system of dual sovereignty between the federal government and state
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governments. Under this system, policy decisions, choices, and questions are handled at the
state-level unless the federal government can establish that a policy is within its scope or
jurisdiction for action at the national level (Adler, 2011). While the roles of the states and
federal government are clearly defined, the factors that influence state decisions and actions
concerning policy problems are varied. The literature on state policy choices primarily focus on
state-level internal determinants such as social, political, and economic factors; and external
determinants involving federal pressure, state competition, and emulation in regards to policy
adoption or state action (see Berry & Berry, 2007; Gray, 1973; Olive, Gunasekara, & Raymond,
2012; Koski, 2007; Rom, Peterson, & Scheve, 1998; Soss, Schram, Vartanian, & O’Brien, 2001;
Walker, 1969).
In the arena of health care policy on Medicaid, the explanations for why states make
health-related policy decisions are largely ignored, misunderstood, or shown as irrelevant. An
earlier generation of scholars examining health care policy (Key, 1949; Lockard, 1959) found
that the provision of welfare services was largely influenced by political dynamics. However,
later studies revealed the results as premature and inconclusive (Kousser, 2002). The next
generation of scholars (Dye, 1966; Hofferbert, 1966; Dawson & Robinson, 1963; Winters, 1976)
presumed that demographic and economic circumstances dictated policy decisions on state-level
spending for health care expenditures. Later studies found mixed results on the effect of
political parties (Kousser, 2002). The current literature on state policy choices, while limited,
considers the expertise of states, levels of conflict and cooperation, and alignment of goals with
joint federal welfare programs (Esterling, 2009, Gormley, 2006; Zimmerman, 2001).
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Problem Statement
For many decades, health care in the United States has been progressively shifting
towards an unsustainable state as the result of rising health care costs, an aging population, and
the advancement of medical technology (Porter, 2009). In 2009, the U.S. Social Security
Advisory Board reported that the rising cost of health care expenditures would affect the wellbeing and economic security of retirees and workers due to high rates of out-of-pocket costs
affecting personal income (Schieber, Bilyeu, Hardy, Katz, Kennelly, & Warshawsky, 2009).
Moreover, rising health care costs have led to reductions in health care coverage and access to
health services (Chernew, Hirth, & Cutler, 2003). The enactment of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2010 addresses several of these issues that plague the delivery of health
care services. The problems affecting the health care system include a high proportion of
uninsured adults and children, expensive health care plans, barriers associated with pre-existing
conditions and loss of health insurance coverage for individuals with a serious illness, and
inaccessibility to health care services for select populations such as U.S. born children of
immigrants and underprivileged individuals (Rich, Cheung, & Lurvey, 2013).
The major aims of the ACA include universal coverage for U.S. citizens, affordable
health care coverage, quality-based care, access to health care services with special emphasis on
preventative and primary care, and strategic investments through the expansion of health care
services to strengthen the health of the public (Rosenbaum, 2011). With the major aims of the
ACA in mind and the problems affecting the health care system, this study seeks to examine why
states are choosing to adopt Medicaid expansion and to identify the explanatory factors that are
driving state responses to expand Medicaid.
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The expansion of Medicaid is an important phenomenon of study because it is a largescale program that affects many stakeholders including states, citizens, physicians, hospitals,
etc., and the cost of expanding Medicaid accounts for 45% of expenditures in overall costs
relating to the ACA (Jacobs & Skocpol, 2010). Medicaid is jointly funded by the federal
government and each state within the U.S., and states are tasked with the responsibility to
administer health care services for Medicaid recipients (Landers & Leeman, 2011). Medicaid
expansion would provide health insurance coverage to individuals below or up to 133% of the
federal poverty level (Sommers, Tomasi, Swartz, & Epstein, 2012). A 2014 report by the
Council of Economic Advisors commissioned by the Executive Office of the President states that
5.7 million individuals are affected by states choosing to opt-out of Medicaid expansion.
Furthermore, the report declares that states choosing to opt-out will also lose billions of dollars in
federal funds that could otherwise boost their economy (The Council of Economic Advisors,
2014). Out of 50 states, 30 have chosen to adopt Medicaid expansion, and despite additional
funding from the federal government to expand Medicaid, 20 states have chosen to either delay
expansion or refuse to adopt Medicaid expansion (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2015; The Council
of Economic Advisors, 2014).
While there is much speculation as to the reasons why a state may choose to adopt or
decline expanding Medicaid such as politics or the cost of expanding services, scholarly research
is lacking in regards to the consequences, implications, and explanation of such decisions in the
health care arena. Moreover, the choice to expand Medicaid is an on-going issue that states are
still considering even though there are available appropriations for expansion (Perkins, 2013).
This research is important because it will test various factors that have been studied and shown to
influence state actions. Moreover, we will test five models derived from a body of literature that
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spans a multitude of disciplines with special emphasis on state policy choices and decisions, and
ultimately offer a model that predicts drivers of state decisions for Medicaid expansion under the
ACA.

Research Questions
The research objectives of this study are to examine the factors that influence the decision
making process of states in the expansion of Medicaid. As implementation efforts of the ACA
unfold, there will be a plethora of opportunities for states to participate in initiatives that could
revolutionize the provision and delivery of health care services. Every decision or non-decision,
choice or non-choice, and action or non-action has a consequence. An examination and
understanding of factors that influence state decision making will allow states, policymakers, and
researchers make informed decisions.
The research question that will guide this study is: What are the factors that influence
states to adopt Medicaid Expansion? Corollary questions include the following: (a) Do
economic factors influence the decision of states to adopt Medicaid? (b) Do political factors
influence the decision of states to adopt Medicaid? (c) Do state population needs influence the
decision of states to adopt Medicaid expansion? (d) Does state capacity influence the decision of
states to adopt Medicaid expansion? (e) Do innovation and diffusion influence the decision of
states to adopt Medicaid expansion?
This study will test five models derived from the literature on state policy choices and
decision making. The first model is the political model. The proposition with this model is that
a state’s legislative composition and party competition affect the adoption of new programs
(Walker, 1969). The economic model suggests that the fiscal health of a state influences the
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adoption of a new program (Lowry, 2005). The needs-based model presupposes that new
approaches to an existing problem may stimulate the adoption of a new program (Nice, 1994).
The state capacity model presumes that states have the capacity to “(1) respond effectively to
change, (2) to make decisions efficiently, effectively, and responsively, (3) to manage conflict”
through institutional arrangements (Bowman & Kearney, 1988, p. 343). Last, the state
innovation and diffusion model assumes that policy choices are influenced by both internal and
external factors. Moreover, the policy choices of states are driven by tendencies to gravitate
toward innovation, which is demonstrated through state actions (Berry & Berry, 2007; Gray,
1973; Soss, Schram, Vartanian, & O’Brien, 2001).

Methodology
This study uses a state comparative cross-sectional research design to test five models
using multinomial logistic regression analysis. The five models consist of established variables
known to influence the decisions of states in policy research. The corollary questions are
indicative of the proposed models: the economic model, the political model, needs-based model,
state capacity model, and the innovation and diffusion model. The unit of analysis for this
research is states and each model will be tested to determine the relationship between the factors
within each model and the decision to adopt the expansion of Medicaid using statistical analysis
mechanisms.

Significance of this Study
The passage of the ACA in 2010 has transformed the U.S. health care system on many
levels. In accordance with the law, individuals are mandated to purchase health insurance, the
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insurance industry is required to follow state and federal guidelines for the provision of health
care services, medical providers are tasked with following a number of regulations specified by
the ACA, and states are given the option to expand Medicaid (Manchikanti, Caraway, Parr,
Fellows, & Hirsch, 2011). The choice given to states to expand Medicaid was not a part of the
original health care plan; however, a Supreme Court ruling determined that “it was unduly
coercive to require states to expand coverage as a condition of continuing to participate in the
federal Medicaid program” (Brecher & Rose, 2013, p. s62). This controversial ruling has
upended the intended aims of the ACA and has created an additional financial burden to millions
of low-income individuals. As a result, states must decide to either opt-in or opt-out of Medicaid
expansion while considering a myriad of policy alternatives, consequences, and opportunities.
This research is important for several reasons. First, one area of particular concern is the
effect of state policy decisions on health disparities and inequality amongst low- income
individuals. Since the enactment of the ACA in 2010, 30 states and the District of Columbia
have chosen to adopt Medicaid expansion (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2015). It is estimated that
5.7 million uninsured individuals who would meet the eligibility requirements under Medicaid
Expansion are affected by states that have not opted to expand Medicaid (Kaiser Family
Foundation, 2014; The Council of Economic Advisors, 2014). The decision to opt out of
Medicaid expansion creates a considerable gap in health care coverage for low-income and
permanent residents (Crowley & Golden, 2014). Hypothesis testing of the Needs-Based Model
may shed light on certain characteristics that may lead a state to adopt Medicaid expansion based
on the composition of the total population of the state, because the Needs-Based Model includes
demographic variables.
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Second, this study is important because the extant research is limited in the areas of
Medicaid expansion and state decision making pertaining to policy adoption. Two studies that
were conducted prior to the ACA explored certain aspects of Medicaid expansion and policy
adoption, diffusion, and innovation. One study analyzed the Children’s Health Insurance
Program (CHIP) and examined the diffusion path of similar states using a dyad-year event
history analysis (Volden, 2006). The other study analyzed the probability of states adopting
managed care programs through Medicaid also using an event history analysis (Satterthwaite,
2002). The last two relevant studies pertaining to this research were conducted after the ACA.
One study focused on the variation of states implementing Medicaid expansion and real-time
decision making of states adopting Medicaid expansion with the creation of a measure that
assessed Medicaid Expansion based on state legislative documents (Jacobs & Callaghan, 2013).
The other study, conducted by Barrilleaux and Rainey (2014), examined the decisions of
governors in opposition of Medicaid expansion and theorized that the needs of citizens and
politics affected gubernatorial decisions. This research is different from the studies mentioned
above because there will be an examination of factors that influence the policy adoption of
Medicaid expansion by testing established explanators found in the literature on state policy
adoption and health care.
This study is pertinent to the fields of health care, public policy, and public
administration because it examines the interaction of many factors influencing policy adoption
and it allows the researcher to compare the proposed models explaining the adoption of Medicaid
expansion. Moreover, a multinomial logistic regression will be utilized for this study and an
analysis of summary statistics will be employed to observe the likelihood that a state will adopt
Medicaid in accordance with the independent variables.

9

This research is important because it adds understanding to what drives states to make a
decision to adopt a policy when given the choice. Understanding the factors that influence states
to expand Medicaid could have several implications. (1) The crafting of policies could be geared
toward state preferences instead of perceived needs or issues. The alignment of evidence-based
research and state preferences will allow researchers and policymakers to make decisions that are
customized towards actualized state needs. (2) Competition among state concerns could be
sorted based on an understanding of the drivers of state responses to policy adoption. (3) The
ability to predict factors that may influence the adoption of Medicaid expansion may assist
policymakers recast or re-frame policies or policy objectives in order to achieve purposeful
optimal outcomes.

Plan of this Dissertation
This dissertation explores the expansion of Medicaid and the influence of state decision
making. Chapter 1 provides an overview of Medicaid and the policy window that has opened
due to the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Research questions and the
significance of this study are also outlined in this chapter. Chapter 2 provides a detailed review
of the Medicaid program and the ACA, and develops the five models employed in the study.
Chapter 3 details the methods used to conduct this study and offers a comprehensive description
of the variables, statistical tests used, and data sources. Chapter 4 provides an analytical
discussion of the results of the study. Chapter 5 concludes with insights from this study,
limitations and delimitations, and implications for future scholarly research
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY

The implementation of Medicaid expansion is at a standstill. Presently, 30 states have
adopted Medicaid expansion, 17 states have chosen to decline expansion, and 3 states are
undecided (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2015). While the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (ACA) was formulated with an expectation of participation from the states; political
conflicts, court proceedings, and changes in governmental leaders across all levels of
government have contributed to disjointed portions of the law and variations in the adoption of
Medicaid expansion among states (Jones, Bradley, & Oberlander, 2014; Jost & Rosenbaum,
2012; Leonard, 2012. This chapter seeks to understand what factors influence states to adopt
Medicaid expansion by reviewing the literature on Medicaid expansion in addition to relevant
studies on the adoption of Medicaid policies and programs by states.
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the research approach to the literature
review and a historical account of Medicaid and the ACA in order to understand the
circumstances surrounding and leading up to Medicaid expansion and the role of states. A
discussion is presented on state policy choices and decisions to explain certain components of the
decision making process and pressures facing states on public policies. A conceptual framework
of the process of state decision making is introduced to depict the inner workings of state policy
decisions on Medicaid expansion. A review of the literature is analyzed and summarized with
remarks and inferences on the influencers of state decisions on Medicaid expansion and previous
policies and programs followed by a summary of the chapter.
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Approach to Research
The literature on Medicaid expansion in the 21st century is limited in scope and detail due
to the enactment of the ACA in 2010, challenges to health care reform, and changes in political
leaders at the state-level. As a result, this research is informed by other disciplines such as
education, intergovernmental management, political science, economics, and welfare policy.
The conceptual framework of state decision making on Medicaid is borne out of an analysis of
relevant state characteristics and Medicaid policy.
The search criteria for this research focused on topics such as Medicaid expansion,
Medicaid policy, state decision making, state policy choices, and adoption of state policies. The
following databases were used: Google Scholar, Academic Search Complete, JSTOR,
ScienceDirect, and ProQuest. Theoretical and empirical articles were analyzed to guide the
literature review. For the empirical articles spanning multiple disciplines, a chart was made for
personal use detailing the operationalization of variables used to explain the state adoption of a
particular policy of interest. An examination of the chart revealed the common indicators of
state policy adoptions, which were then categorized and selected to represent the five proposed
models in this study after an iterative process of reviewing the literature (political model,
economic model, needs-based model, and state capacity model, and state innovation and
diffusion model).
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Historical Overview of Medicaid
The Road to Medicaid
Preceding the enactment of Medicaid in 1965, the provision of medical care for
disadvantaged individuals was sporadic, ad hoc, or nonexistent (Stevens & Stevens, 1974). The
depression era of the late 1920s served as an impetus for what some call the American Welfare
State with the passing of the Social Security Act in 1935. By means of this Act, individuals were
given financial assistance from the government during times of hardship (Weikel & Leamond,
1976). As a mechanism for income protection, the Social Security Act shielded the elderly,
disabled, widowed, and children from financial ruin by adopting and codifying into law state
eligibility guidelines for deserving, low-income individuals (Huberfeld, 2011).
The Social Security Act of 1935 established two types of social programs: Social
insurance for working individuals such as worker’s compensation and pension plans, and
unemployment insurance and financial assistance from the states for those deemed needy
(Weikel & Leamond, 1976). The determination of need was not defined just by professional
standards of care according to medical practice, but included socially defined needs based on
cultural norms and economic considerations (Kronebusch, 1997). Due to the conceptions of the
policymakers following the Social Security Act of 1935, the benefactors of financial assistance
were one-parent families, the elderly, and disabled individuals. Although medical insurance was
not provided to recipients meeting eligibility requirements, allotted monthly payments took into
consideration medical expenses. State participation was optional, but the federal government
provided matching funds (Weikel & Leamond, 1976).
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After the passage of the Social Security Act, several amendments were passed to expand
the scope of the program with special emphasis on providing sufficient benefits to individuals
and families rather than financial independence and equitable distribution (Kollmann, 2000).
However, the most historic amendment serving as a catalyst for the establishment for Medicaid
came in the form of the Kerr-Mills legislation in 1960 (Smith & Moore, 2008). States received
federal funding for impoverished individuals aged 65 and older for medical expenditures under
Kerr-Mills through the Medical Assistance to the Aged (MAA) program (Moore & Smith, 2004).
Following the implementation of Kerr-Mills, proposals for a comprehensive bill on
Medicare was gaining attention at the national level and was supported by the public. In 1964,
the President-elect, Lyndon Johnson, welcomed extended benefits for the elderly because it
complimented his agenda on developing a Great Society. Wilbur Mills crafted the legislation
that included care for inpatient hospital stays and nursing home services under Medicare Part A
and outpatient services under Medicare Part B. In 1965, these provisions were amended to the
Social Security Act Title XX (Olson, 2010). The services under Title XX centered on lifesustaining and self-maintenance care. As a result, Title XX benefits provided basic supportive
services for the elderly (Nelson, 1982). In 1975, a federal block grant was authorized to allow
states to determine their own benefits based on state-specific priorities (Schram & Hurley, 1977).
The design of the new amendments to Medicare was carefully planned and it appealed to many
stakeholders including opponents of changes to the MAA program because it focused on an
insurance plan rather than a collectivist approach to managing health care (Olson, 2010).
Medicaid on the hand was, “the third piece of what Mills labeled a ‘three-layer cake,’
Medicaid (Title X1X of the 1965 Social Security Act) was more hastily devised, emerging after
only minimal debate” (Olson, 2010, p. 25). The bill created by Mills and other members of the
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House Ways and Means committee included three separate and competing proposals or layers,
which became known as Medicare Part A, Medicare Part B, and Medicaid (Stevens & Stevens,
1974). While most of the congressional debates focused on Medicare, the formulation of
Medicaid lacked clear goals, a projection of current and future program costs, and the insight to
handle programmatic problems (Weikel & Leamond, 1976). The enactment and implementation
of Medicaid were further overshadowed by major events such as the Civil Rights movement, the
Vietnam War, and Watergate (Smith & Moore, 2008).
Although Medicaid was conceived as an afterthought, many states implemented the
program within the first few years of enactment, eventually leading to full participation of all
states within the U.S. (Huberfeld, 2011). Currently, Medicaid is a program that services lowincome Americans through a joint partnership between the states and the federal government.
States are given a great deal of discretion to consider or make administrative policy choices and
decisions (Kronebusch, 1997). There are basic statutory guidelines established by the federal
government that each state must adhere to in order to ensure essential health services and access
to Medicaid and services, irrespective of “the state’s ability to pay for the medical assistance”
(Huberfeld, 2011). Members meeting the requirements of a deserving group included poor
mothers and children or families, pregnant women, the elderly, the disabled, and the blind with
incomes below state poverty levels. However, individuals seeking such benefits had to meet
eligibility at the state poverty level and be deemed a member of a deserving group (Tanenbaum,
1995).
Since the inception of Medicaid, there has been a multitude of amendments to the
Medicaid Act. The major changes included the following. In the 1960s, Medicaid was governed
by the Social Rehabilitation Administration and costs were curbed by setting eligibility
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requirements through asset and income determinations. Other changes included providing
coverage for certain populations such as the blind, disabled, and families with dependent
children (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2008; Moore & Smith, 2004). Additionally, states were
limited by federal rules in implementing Medicaid (Ferguson & Leddy, 1999). In the 1970s,
states were allowed to reduce spending on Medicaid with the abolishment of the “maintenance of
effort” (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2008). As health expenditures increased, many states
responded by imposing strict eligibility requirements and cutting benefits (Brown & Sparer,
2003)
In the 1980s, the Omnibus Reconciliation Act allowed for a reduction in federal matching
funds to states (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2008). Federal reductions in aid, a depressed
economy, and changing views on providing cash assistance to the needy contributed to the
diminution of poverty level thresholds (Brecher & Rose, 2013). Additionally, many states
contracted with private insurance companies to provide managed care to use state resources
efficiently (Oberg & Polich, 1988). In the 1990s, the Clinton administration encouraged state
expansion of Medicaid using section 1115 waivers, which allowed states to experiment with new
programs and policies with exemption from federal Medicaid requirements (Kaiser Family
Foundation, 2008; Schneider, 1997). During this era, the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Act of 1996 was enacted, which replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children cash assistance program with a block grant program under Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2008). Modifications to federal law in regards to
Medicaid expanded state discretion and allowed great flexibility in implementing Medicaid
policies (Cantor, Thompson, & Farnham, 2013). In the 2000s, regulations were put in place to
crack down on upper payment limits and the Bush administration supported the use of section
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1115 waivers (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2008). As changes in Medicaid occurred over time,
the next transformation in Medicaid transpired with the passage of the ACA.

The History of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
The Current State of Health Care in the United States
Prior to the enactment of the ACA, the United States experienced a recession with a
national unemployment rate of 5% in 2007, ending at 10% in 2009 (U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 2012). A Kaiser Family Foundation poll, assessing the attitudes of Americans, found
that 54% of the population considered health care a priority and 50% indicated rising health care
costs contributed to postponing care for a medical need (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2009).
Although previous presidential administrations have advocated for health care reform, endeavors
were met with much resistance to change by opposing political parties and constituent groups.
Nonetheless, extreme rhetoric, steadfastness, cooperation, tremendous organizational efforts, and
voting along party lines changed the course of health care in the United States, thus leading to
the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Beaussier, 2012).
The formulation of the ACA was riddled with many hindrances and differences of
opinion in how the current health care system should be restructured. Three proposals were
drafted with the perception that the process was occurring in a transparent and open manner to
influence the public and stakeholders in supporting universal health insurance (Frakes, 2012).
The first proposal was led by senators through a bipartisan partnership. The plan included
subsidies to economically disadvantaged citizens, an individual mandate, and decreased spending
in Medicare (Hayes, 2011; Jacobs & Skocpol, 2010). The senators in the bipartisan partnership
disbanded over ideological differences and party conflicts, and the proposal was disregarded
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(Jacobs & Skocpol, 2010). The second proposal was created by the House of Representatives
and revised to maintain party support (Beaussier, 2012). The proposal consisted of a public
option, an employer mandate for corporations with 50 employees or more, a national health
insurance exchange, and subsidies for both middle and low-income individuals for the purchase
of health insurance (Jacobs & Skocpol, 2010). The third proposal was developed by the Senate
and passed with support from both Republicans and Democrats; it included an individual
mandate and state-based health insurance exchanges (Hayes, 2011; Jacobs & Skocpol, 2010).
During the merger of both the Senate and the House of Representative proposals, the
Democratic Party lost a Senate seat and a filibuster-proof majority due to the death of Senator
Ted Kennedy (Flint, 2014; Hayes, 2011). A bipartisan summit was instituted to settle
differences and to garner an agreement on the finalized proposal for health care reform. The call
for cooperation through the summit reached an impasse with refusals to reach common ground
on the legislation (Jacobs & Skocpol, 2010). Although there was much opposition in passing the
ACA, the Senate bill was approved without the vote of the new republican Senator Scott Brown
(Farley, 2010). Two days later, President Obama signed PPACA on March 23, 2010 (Quadagno,
2014).
The Current State of Medicaid in the United States
Many factors contributed to the passage of the ACA: politics, interest groups, and policy
entrepreneurs. Opponents of the ACA objected to many aspects of the bill, and some parts of the
law were challenged. Republican leaders and governors called for the repeal of the ACA (Jones,
Bradley, & Oberlander, 2014). Commentators suggested that opponents appealed to political
theatrics, antics from the Tea Party, and midterm election gamesmanship (Leonard, 2011).
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Proponents argued that the ACA would improve the provision and delivery of health care
services and supply necessary services to millions of uninsured Americans (Manchikanti,
Caraway, Parr, Fellows, & Hirsch, 2011).
In the case of Medicaid, the states challenged Medicaid expansion and the mandate that
required all individuals to buy health insurance (Leonard, 2012). The state of Florida filed a
lawsuit in conjunction with 25 additional states that challenged the constitutionality of Medicaid
expansion under the Spending Clause (Cohen & Blumstein, 2012). The Spending Clause is a
doctrine that is established under the U.S. Constitution. In the Supreme Court ruling; United
States v. Butler1, the Court determined that “Congress is free…to condition the receipt of federal
funds upon compliance with federal statutes and administrative directives” (Binder, 2001, p.
150). In further support of the Spending Clause, in South Dakota v. Dole2, the Supreme Court
ruled that “Congress could condition the receipt of federal highway funds upon states raising the
minimum drinking age to twenty-one” (Binder, 2001, p. 150). In sum, the Spending Clause
gives the federal government authorization to compel states to adhere to conditional grants to
ensure accountability while providing for the general welfare of the public (Bagenstos, 2012).
Although Congress has the ability to attach conditions to federal programs through funding
mechanisms, the court has recognized and accepted this form of exchange between the states and
the federal government (Jost & Rosenbaum, 2012). However, the challenge to Medicaid
expansion highlighted an inherent issue within the law that violated the Constitution:
Federal conditions must be unambiguous, ensuring that states are given clear notice of
their obligations when they accept federal funds so that they can knowingly exercise their

1
2

297 U.S. 1 (1936)
483 U.S. 203 (1987)
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choice (which is protected under the Constitution) about whether to participate; and the
federal government may not employ the spending power in such a way as to ‘coerce the
states into compliance with federal objectives.’ (Cohen & Blumstein, 2012, p. 104)
The states that opposed the expansion claimed that the ACA crossed the line through coercion to
participate in Medicaid expansion (Perkins, 2013). The Supreme Court heard the case and
decided that the “coercion doctrine is fundamental to federalism and that brandishing federal
funding to coerce states to participate in federal programs threatens the states’ independent
sovereignty” (Jost & Rosenbaum, 2012). The Court made a distinction between Medicaid
expansion and the existing Medicaid program and determined that Medicaid expansion was a
new program (Hall, 2012). This ruling eliminated the possible threat of losing federal funding
for existing Medicaid programs for failure to adopt Medicaid expansion (Jost & Rosenbaum,
2012). As a result, the mandate was rendered unenforceable, but states were given the option to
adopt Medicaid expansion with a munificent amount of federal funding (Hall, 2012; Jost &
Rosenbaum, 2012).
The Supreme Court decision marked a historical moment in time for Medicaid policy and
public policy, because it limited the power of the federal government in garnering the
compliance of states and the ability of Congress to impose monetary constraints on joint federalstate programs based on state actions or choices (Rosenbaum & Westmoreland, 2012). As a
result, states were given the choice to refuse Medicaid expansion without fear of losing federal
funding or face penalization. Conversely, states that had made the choice to adopt Medicaid
expansion were able to take advantage of the federal funding that is available, which included
100% of expansion costs until the year of 2016 and gradual reductions thereafter (Perkins, 2013).
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Understanding State Policy Choices
The partnership between the states and the federal government in Medicaid policy
encompasses two major components. The first component involves federal matching funds,
which first encouraged states to establish Medicaid and now incentivizes states to maintain
Medicaid coverage (Rossi, 2014; Schneider, 1997). The second component includes general
guidelines set forth by the federal government, which serves as an overarching umbrella that
allows states the freedom and flexibility to operate a Medicaid program in accordance with the
needs and capabilities of each state (Schneider, 1997). In the realm of health care, states are
responsible for financing, delivering, and coordinating health care services (Adler, 2011;
Huberfeld, 2011; Kronebusch, 1997). More specifically, they must control health care costs,
regulate medical providers and the sale of health insurance, set health care rates, determine
benefits, define eligibility standards, and provide licensing services (Kronebusch & Elbel, 2004;
Weissert, 2004).
The management of Medicaid involves many choices. The choice to expand Medicaid or
adopt any new changes is limited by a variety of “pressures and realities in the environment”
(Bachman, Altman, & Beatrice, 1988, p. 248). Furthermore, limitations create a range of
available policy choices, thus affecting the selection of proposed policy changes (Bachman,
Altman, & Beatrice, 1988). Policy choices in the arena of Medicaid policy are most affected by
state regulations, policy instruments, and barriers and perceptions.
Regulatory policy choices at the state-level typically follow a consistent pattern or policy
direction (McGinnis, 2002). This type of policy controls private and market behavior and is
often technically inclined (Gerber & Teske, 2000). Health insurance coverage for low-income
individuals is heavily impacted by state choices. Regulatory choices faced by states considering

21

Medicaid policy changes include decisions on determining eligibility requirements, premiums,
cost-sharing mechanisms, accepting federal funds with attached strings, and managing third
party insurers (Cromwell, Hurdle, & Schurman, 1987; Holahan, Uccello, Feder, & Kim, 2000).
While policies are the product of regulation, policymakers can choose to use regulation as a tool
to mitigate market failure, deliver a service, or finance a program such as Medicaid (McGinnis,
2002).
Policy instruments are tools such as regulations, grants, certifications, and contracts used
by the government to implement public policies (Howlett, 1991). State-based policies on
Medicaid use tools that are redistributive in nature and allow states to have an active role in
determining program features (Barrilleaux & Brace, 2007). States may pursue policy
instruments that offer flexibility and autonomy, such as block grants and waivers. As Kronbusch
(1997) noted, states have enjoyed greater flexibility and discretion over Medicaid using waivers
to expand program services. On the other hand, a market-based approach to managing Medicaid
may focus on minimizing moral hazard and increasing economic development (Barrilleaux &
Brace, 2007). With market-based policies, states may seek contractual agreements with
managed care organizations. The selection or non-selection of policy instruments depends upon
state preferences and choices that in turn affect the administration and implementation of
Medicaid (Ewalt & Jennings, 2004). While policy instruments provide a means to obtain policy
objectives, their outcomes differ and states are given the opportunity to choose their instrument
of choice, which might not serve a large population of low-income and/or uninsured individuals.
Multiple barriers and perceptions also affect state policy choices. The cost of Medicaid
reform is highly expensive and states must dedicate staff, time, and resources to a program that
has sometimes produced uncertain and undesirable results. Action at the state-level for Medicaid
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reform will often require a real or perceived crisis (Bachman, Altman, & Beatrice, 1988).
Perceptions of Medicaid needs may differ among policymakers. Medicaid considers both
medical and social needs, but some needs are believed to be more important than others
(Kronebusch, 1997). Last, barriers such as financial, political, legal, and managerial issues limit
the ability of states to tackle problems effectively while serving the Medicaid population
(Barrilleaux & Brace, 2007). Perceptions and barriers can place constraints on state policy
choices and thus affect state decisions. State policy choices are an important component of
decision making because they serve as an antecedent to the adoption of public policies. While
states are responsible for the welfare of its residents, they must decide on complex issues and
also be a good steward of their finances and resources while operating within their defined
jurisdiction.

Rationalization of State Decision Making
The role of states in Medicaid policy is important because they decide how to control
health care costs, improve quality, and increase efficiency and access while attending to a
multitude of functions in the management of Medicaid (Miller, Wang, Feng, & Mor, 2012).
Decisions at the state-level are influenced by competing institutional and environmental
circumstances. Political pressures from state leaders, political parties, interest groups, and
industries infiltrate the policy making process thus impacting state decisions. Economic
constraints force states to prioritize their objectives and determine the best method for allocating
resources (Kronebusch, 1997). As states consider the expansion of Medicaid, deliberations
concerning adoption are contextualized to state-specific issues, such as the population of lowincome uninsured adults and children, state resources and budgeted expenses, industries that will

23

be affected by the adoption or nonadoption of Medicaid expansion, the will of the people they
serve, and impending state elections (Frakt & Carroll, 2013). Other considerations that affect the
decision making process of states include state priorities, the amount of discretion afforded by
federal and state policies, and the ability to respond to a problem (Barrilleaux & Brace, 2007;
Kronebusch, 1997; Leider, Resnick, Kass, Sellers, Young, Bernet, & Jarris, 2014).
The delivery of health care services is very expensive and states are burdened with
balancing their budgets and making determinations as to how much they will spend on Medicaid
relative to their overall expenses (Greipp, 2002). Just on health care spending, states are making
resource allocation decisions based on priorities. State agencies have found that while public
needs and adhering to mandates are top priorities; political interests and scarce resources can be
challenging (Leider, Resnick, Kass, Sellers, Young, Bernet, & Jarris, 2014). As federal policy
changes have occurred over time, allowing states to have more discretion and flexibility in
operating Medicaid, state priorities have shifted. States are able to select their own social
services programs, redefine mandated programs, reduce program benefits, and eliminate
administrative personnel all of which are actions reflective of state priorities (Agranoff &
Pattakos, 1984).
As states have gained more control over Medicaid policy, state discretion has increased,
leading to a more flexible Medicaid program, but also wide variations in the delivery, financing,
and coverage of health care services across states (Schneider, 1998). State discretion has its
strengths and weaknesses. For instance, states could utilize discretion to create innovative
programs with the aim to decrease health disparities and inequities. In contrast, decreased
federal oversight and direction may lead to an unbalanced use of state discretion spurring
negative consequences, such as funding cuts and unmet health care needs (Budetti, Butler, &
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McManus, 1982). In principle, increased state discretion and authority allows states to adopt
policies, but to avoid the mistakes of previous welfare reforms, states must move beyond
proscribed federal guidelines and punitive consequences in order to be responsive to the needs of
Medicaid beneficiaries (Lee, 2009; Soss, Schram, Vartanian, & O’Brien, 2001).
State responsiveness can occur through “policy liberalism,” in which policymakers
determine program features and guidelines or actions taken by state agency administrators in
implementing enacted laws (Fossett & Thompson, 2006). Through policy liberalism, some of
the factors that have compelled states to respond to Medicaid expansion include financial
inducements and public and industry support. On the other hand, countervailing forces include
economic constraints, political resistance, and limited administrative and infrastructure capacity
(Brecher & Rose, 2013).
Since state representatives lack the resources and expertise to implement complex public
policies, policy making authority is delegated to government agencies. Depending upon the
severity of the public problem (whether real or perceived), the delegation of authority can be
expansive or limited. As a result, there can be situations where state representatives set policy
directions, government agencies such as state Medicaid agencies that operate with a great
amount of autonomy, or circumstances where there is a struggle between political control and
agency command (Potoski, 2002). In the case of Medicaid expansion, the refusal by state
officials to adopt expansion has overridden enticements such as a generous federal funding
scheme and programmatic latitude (Callaghan & Jacobs, 2014). Nonetheless, state participation
is voluntary and states have a great amount of leverage in deciding upon the adoption of
Medicaid expansion (Dinan, 2014).
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The Utilization of Medicaid Expansion: Serving as the Dependent Variable
The full impact of health care reform cannot be realized if all states do not participate or
believe in the objectives of the ACA. As decreed by the ACA, access to health care services for
millions of Americans is mostly dependent upon two programs: Health insurance exchanges and
Medicaid expansion (Callaghan & Jacobs, 2014). However, there are differences that exist that
involve governance. Although States can decide whether to operate an exchange, the
implementation of the ACA is not affected by the state’s refusal to manage an exchange because
the federal government provides a federally operated health insurance exchange. The fallback
system in place for state-based exchanges does not extend to Medicaid.
State participation in the expansion of Medicaid is voluntary. Prior to the ACA, states
had the flexibility and discretion to tailor Medicaid to fit their needs and budgets. With the
ACA, directives to increase eligibility to 138% of the federal poverty level for all individuals
under the age of 65 regardless of whether they have a disability or children did not fare very well
with all of the states (Sullivan & Gershon, 2014). Many states refused Medicaid expansion
based on the grounds that expansion would be too costly due to the new eligibility standards
(Landers & Leeman, 2011). However, recent scholarship on the progress of Medicaid expansion
for states that have chosen to expand show that states are projecting budget savings in Medicaid
for the next decade. Additionally, the majority of states are optimistic about the benefits that will
be gained by the beneficiaries in regards to better health, financial protection, and access to
health care services (Sommers, Gordon, Somers, Ingram, & Epstein, 2014).
State decisions concerning the adoption of Medicaid expansion have many implications.
The same problems that have persisted across states such as variability in Medicaid policies,
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rates of uninsured individuals, health disparities, and spending will still remain with almost half
of the states refusing to expand Medicaid. Moreover, these state differences and coverage gaps
will widen as implementation of Medicaid expansion and the ACA progresses (Richardson &
Yilmazer, 2013). For these reasons and more, Medicaid expansion is the dependent variable of
significance. This variable is measured by analyzing the decisions of states for the year 2012
and grouping state decisions in the following categories: Adopt Medicaid expansion, support
Medicaid expansion, undecided, and decline Medicaid expansion. The year 2012 is used in this
study as the cross-sectional year because states are given the option to expand Medicaid as the
result of the Supreme Court decision, National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) v.
Sebelius3 in 2012.
This study will examine the factors that drive states to expand Medicaid. The forces
driving states to adopt Medicaid expansion will be analyzed through five models as follows: The
political model, the economic model, the needs-based model, the state capacity model, and the
state innovation and diffusion model. The literature review of the models is centered on studies
that discuss the adoption of Medicaid policies by states. The assumptions of each model are
explicitly stated at the beginning of each model and hypotheses are provided based on the
success or promising theories of prior studies. The full model of state decision making in
Medicaid expansion can be seen in Figure 2.1 below.

3

132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)
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Figure 2.1. A Model of State Decision Making in Medicaid Expansion

Political Model
Political explanators permeate the literature on state decision making and Medicaid
policy. While a political model is not established within the literature on Medicaid policy, this
research proposes a model that is based on established exegetic variables. The political model
assumes that the composition of the state’s legislative body and the competition of major parties
influence the adoption of new initiatives or programs (Walker, 1969). Moreover, this model
assumes that state legislators consider the concerns of its constituents; however, the degree of
consideration depends upon the responsiveness and actions of voters and interest groups
(Grogan, 1999). The Political model comprises variables that demonstrate an effectual change in
state decision making. The agents of change include electoral politics, race, ideology, and
governorship. Figure 2.2 depicts the Political model below.
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Figure 2.2. Political Model
Electoral Politics
Major parties represent the political will of states shaping the scope of policy designs and
“structuring the control of implementation” (Koski, 2007, p. 414). Previous studies involving
welfare policy postulated that political factors were secondary to socioeconomic factors in policy
making (Kousser, 2002, Key, 1949, Lockard, 1959, Fenton, 1966; Hanson, 2004). Dawson and
Robinson (1963) analyze the relationship between the adoption of state welfare policies and
political processes and determine that state wealth and socioeconomic forces play more of a role
in shaping public welfare policies than politics. Furthermore, they conclude that inter-party
competition is not a significant factor in determining the scope and nature of public policies
concerning welfare. In a study analyzing the redistributive impact of the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) welfare program, Plotnick and Winters (1985) find that there is not
a link between liberal party control and redistribution policies. They conclude that party control
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may serve as an indirect factor or an interaction variable when there is party competition or a
change in party control. Buchanan, Cappelleri, and Ohsfeldt (1991) find that state Medicaid
spending levels are heavily influenced by social factors as opposed to political forces. The
authors conclude that one of two possible explanations could account for their findings. The first
explanation consists of the idea that the measure used to assess political underpinnings did not
encapsulate the ideology of politicians. The second explanation suggests that state spending on
Medicaid is unaffected by politics.
Due to further research and refined instruments, scholars have established a link between
politics and welfare benefits. Scholarship on the power of the major parties has shown that the
influence of Republican control is linked to reductions in welfare benefits and restrictive welfare
policies (Kim & Jennings, 2012; Rom, Peterson, Scheve, 1998). However, Grogan’s (1999)
examination of the effect of party control on AFDC benefits shows mixed results. Democratic
control supports the expansion of financial eligibility as expected. On the other hand,
Republican control did not appear significant for policies on benefits and coverage for those
considered medically needy. Nonetheless, Grogan’s (1999) study did find a negative association
between Republican control and payment policies. This difference in support for Medicaid
policies suggests that context and degrees of support for different policies within a singular
program should be considered. As Grogan (1999) mentioned, “this finding supports that
Republican control does not lead to retrenchment in welfare benefits due to pressure put on the
party not to appear mean-spirited” (p. 28). Brown’s (1995) analysis on the impact of political
parties on state policy reveals that party control is a significant factor in influencing state welfare
efforts when examined in context and partisan divisions exist.
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While studying state variations on Medicaid spending, Kousser (2002) tests the theory
that party control is a driver of health policy. He mentions that, “controlling more than 50
percent of legislative seats is the ‘magic number’ for Medicaid policy making” (Kousser, 2002,
p. 650). Through testing the strength of a party and party control, Kousser (2002) discovers that
there is evidence to support the notion that party control shapes policy, especially when specific
policies such as spending, are isolated to control for rival causal explanations. In a study
analyzing the influence of party control on Medicaid programs and the uninsured based on state
population, Cummins’ (2011) is surprised to find that there is an association between unified
Republican control and a reduction in the uninsured population for average sized states. On the
other hand, for average-sized states, Cummins also finds that a majority control of Democratic
legislative seats led to an increase in an uninsured population. Cummins (2011) suggests that
Republicans may be more effective in reducing the uninsured rate due to the adoption of more
policy reforms and implementation of established and successful programs than Democrats.
However, Cummins (2011) warns that the policy reforms that were analyzed for the purposes of
his study were adopted during times of a divided government.
Shifting to current studies, Kim and Jennings (2012) analyze state variations in Medicaid
managed care and conclude that states with a unified Democratic Party tend to have more
extensive primary care case management programs. They also have fewer managed care
programs based on risk. In contrast, Kim and Jennings (2012) did not find a statistically
significant relationship with a unified Republican party in regards to either managing care
programs (risk-based models or primary care case management models). Jacobs and Callaghan
(2013) also find that there is a strong correlation between Medicaid expansion and party control
while examining variations in Medicaid expansion. In states with Republican control, the
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expansion of Medicaid is rejected or involves a slow process of implementation. In contrast, for
states under Democratic control, Medicaid expansion is implemented very quickly. Jacobs and
Callaghan (2013) point out that the opposition or support for the ACA among party lines crosses
over to Medicaid expansion, which in turn affects state adoption and implementation decisions.
Interparty competition is also an important component of electoral systems within each
state (Soss et al., 2001). The pluralist view of party competition holds that in states with
electoral competition, officials that are elected are more responsive to median voters (Jenkins,
Leicht, & Wendt, 2006). In describing V.O. Key’s (1949) analysis on southern politics and
interparty politics, Soss et al. (2001) note that “the policy process is more likely to respond to the
needs of the disadvantaged when political parties are more evenly matched and, hence, forced to
contend with one another by mobilizing and swaying voters” (p. 383). While analyzing the
differences between state and market strategies for health reform in the 1990s, Barrilleaux and
Brace (2007) characterize electoral competition as “the closeness of races in terms of votes” (p.
668), versus the dissemination of legislature seats among parties. They conclude that more
health reform policies are adopted when there is a high degree of electoral competition, health
insurance coverage issues, high resident incomes, and a history of policy adoptions.
Bernick (2001) tested the notion of partisan competition while examining policy diversity
and state variation for managed care programs using a measure developed by Holbrook and Van
Dunk (1993). The measure includes several factors at the legislative district level such as the
proportion of popular votes, margins of victory, contested elections, and the safety of legislative
seats occupied by a major party (Bernick, 2011; Holbrook & Van Dunk, 1993). Bernick (2011)
finds that states with a greater degree of partisan competition tend to have more liberal policies.
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Additionally, Bernick (2011) suggests that noncompetitive states are those that know what they
want or need politically from policies in relation to managed care in welfare reform.
The influence of party control could be linked to a school of thought that suggests
Medicaid policies are reflective of the values of the controlling party in office. This reasoning
stems from a decisional aspect of policy making where Medicaid policies are typically made by
fiscal and health committees, and members of the committees are appointed by an elected
official of a controlling party (Kousser, 2002). This line of thought presumes that the party in
control has longevity and very little competition. Traditional measures of party control do not
take into account interparty competition. Many studies analyze party control using a
dichotomous measure and evidence that demonstrates a link between a particular policy and the
dominant political party under study (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 2014; Kim & Jennings, 2012;
Kousser, 2002; Satterthwaite, 2002; Volden, 2006). Other studies utilize additive scales to
measure party control employing a continuum from republican to democrat or vice versa
(Callaghan & Jacobs, 2014; Jacobs & Callaghan, 2013). While there are a variety of methods to
measure party control, the environment surrounding health care reform requires a system of
measurement that takes into account the contentious nature of Medicaid expansion. Thus, in
relation to the dominant two-party political system in the U.S., we will investigate the influence
of interparty competition on Medicaid expansion.
Interparty competition is a subject of debate among scholars of American politics because
of its potential to influence policy outputs (Holbrook & Van Dunk, 1993). The prevailing
thought raised, by Key (1949) is that competition among political parties produces liberal
policies versus conservative policies enacted by noncompetitive systems of government.
Although Ranney (1976) developed an index to measure interparty competition, the index
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focuses on measuring the influential power of the Democratic Party. Building on Ranney’s
index, Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993) create an index that measures the competitiveness of state
legislative elections at the district level using the following components: the victor’s percentage
of popular votes, margin of victory, “whether or not the seat is safe,” and whether the race was
contested (p. 956). Shufeldt and Flavin (2011) analyze both the Ranney index and the Holbrook
and Van Dunk measure of interparty competition from 1970-2003 and find that Holbrook and
Van Dunk’s measure is more stable over time because electoral competition does not vary much
across state elections. Due to the stability of Holbrook and Van Dunk’s interparty competition
measure, we will test the following hypothesis:
H1: States with a high degree of interparty competition are more likely to adopt Medicaid
expansion.
Race
Redistributive policies, such as, welfare can be thought of as a pulley system in the
context of a politicized process. In this sense, public policies are pushed and pulled in a
multitude of directions. Political parties compete for votes by appealing to the interests of
constituents, whether they are poor or rich. Promises are made and money or benefits are
extracted from the uninformed or wealthy (Downs, 1957; Plotnick & Winters, 1985;
Schumpeter, 1947). While there are limits to this process, many factors influence the
development and progression of public policies. Brown (1995) finds that the population of
African-American residents impacts state welfare efforts. Brown’s (1995) empirical analysis
reveals that as the proportion of African-Americans multiplied, welfare efforts decreased. Kim
and Jennings (2012) also test the impact of race on state Medicaid policy making, because
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previous studies have demonstrated that African-Americans are negatively affected by welfare
policies (see Grogan, 1994; Soss et al., 2001). However, Kim and Jennings (2012) realize that
racial politics is insignificant in relation to implemented policies on the receipt of cash
assistance.
The findings of many studies demonstrate that Medicaid politics are shaped by race
(Brown, 1995, Kim & Jennings, 2012; Soss et al. 2001). Additionally, scholarship on this topic
repeatedly reveals a consistent link between the proportion of American Americans on Medicaid
and welfare generosity (Soss, 2001). To measure the effect of race on Medicaid expansion, we
use the percentage of African-American voters as a proxy. Prior research suggests that states
with a high population of African-Americans are more likely to provide minimal welfare benefits
(Howard, 1999; Soss et al, 2010). We assume that African-American voters represent the
interests of minorities and that states’ responses to welfare policies are predicated on community
engagement. Therefore, we expect states to decline Medicaid expansion when there are a low
proportion of African-American voters.
H2: States with a low proportion of African-American voters are more likely to reject
Medicaid Expansion.
Ideology
The motivations driving legislators to adopt certain policies coincide with ingrained
ideologies. Republicans tend to favor policies that reduce uncompensated health care and
decrease health expenditures. On the other hand, Democrats support policies that increase access,
improve continuity and quality of care, and curtail stigmas on welfare recipients (Pracht, 2007).
Moreover, states with a liberal ideology have provided strong fiscal support for welfare programs
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(Barrilleaux & Miller, 1988; Miller, Harrington, Ramsland, & Goldstein, 2002; Schneider, 1993,
1997). Political philosophies are infused in public policies because the policy making process is
not easily translated and enacted based on the interests of advocacy groups and the electorate
(Grogan, 1999).
There is a plethora of research that demonstrates that ideology influences public policy
and health policy. Soss et al. (2001) find that conservative governments are more likely to enact
restrictive Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) policies. Volden (2006) discovers
that government ideology is significant among all different types of policy changes tested in
relation to eligibility requirements, types of programs, premiums, waiting periods, and co-pay
benefits for the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). Bernick (2011) finds that liberal
states have diverse Medicaid managed care programs, but moderate states have the most diverse
Medicaid programs. Mayer, Kenter, and Morris (2015) determine that state decisions in regards
to public policies are not fueled by policy needs, but instead by ingrained ideological beliefs.
Ideology has been considered a significant determinant in the shaping of public and
health policies (Berry, Fording, Ringquist, Hanson, & Klarner, 2010; Coggburn & Schneider,
2003; Fossett & Thompson, 2006). When examining ideology and the consideration of the
adoption of a policy by states, Grossback et al. (2004) point out that there is an assumption that,
the policy can be described along some dimension (which we refer to as liberalconservative, although it need not be) and that the preference of the government can be
described as a point on this continuum. The implication is that if ideology were all that
mattered to the state government, a state would adopt a policy if its placement on this
continuum were closer to the state’s ideal point than the status quo. (p. 524)
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Following the logic of this basic assumption, we will examine the influence of state government
ideology on Medicaid expansion.
H3: State governments with a conservative ideology are more likely to oppose Medicaid
expansion.
Governorship
Governors are considered key actors in promoting policy change and influencing
Medicaid policy (Soumerai, Ross-Degnan, Fortress & Walser, 1997). Barrilleaux and Rainey
(2014) examine the decisions of governors in support or opposition of Medicaid expansion and
find that Republican governors are more liable to resist Medicaid expansion than Democrats.
Moreover, there is a strong indication that Republican control of state legislatures is associated
with opposition to Medicaid expansion. This finding supports Barrilleaux and Rainey’s (2014)
hypothesis that “governors should be more likely to oppose the funds when they can expect their
decision to oppose expansion to be supported by the state legislature” (p. 443). Although there is
evidence that demonstrates that the decisions of governors in supporting or opposing Medicaid
expansion are influenced by the support of state legislatures (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 2014), the
constitutional power of state governors is worthy of examination.
The role of governors in state decision making and policy making is dependent upon state
constitutional powers and policy arenas (Randall & Parente, 2012). Woods (2004) posits that
governors utilize their formal powers to influence policy. Institutional power varies by state;
some governors are able to exercise their power through appointments and line-item vetoes.
Alternatively, other governors are constricted by constitutional strongholds (McLendon, Heller,
& Young, 2005). Kousser (2002) mentions that the power to veto items is granted to some
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governors to reduce wasteful spending. Kousser (2002) adds that following this logic; the power
to veto items leads to a diminution of Medicaid expenditures. Therefore, we expect states to
decline Medicaid expansion when governors have high institutional powers.
H4: Governors with a high level of institutional powers are more likely to oppose
Medicaid expansion.

Economic Model
The Economic model assumes that the wealth of a state impacts the adoption of new
programs as a result of the availability and accessibility of resources (Walker, 1969; Gray, 1973).
Additionally, the model presupposes that larger states with greater financial freedom are able to
adopt new programs faster than smaller states or financially burdened states with less capital.
Moreover, the choices states make are dependent upon state resources (Goggin, 1999).
Hanson (1984) argues that economic factors constrain the behavior of policymakers and
place limitations on policy options. While this model analyzes economic forces, the other
models in this study observe a variety of internal and external forces that influence the decision
making process. Consequently, this model will examine state wealth, tax effort, state budgets,
health care expenditures, and federal aid. Figure 2.3 represents the economic model below.

38

Figure 2.3. Economic Model
State Wealth
Wealth is an important criterion that affects the actions of decision makers. The
availability of resources and relative wealth are considered determinants of innovation, which
represents the willingness of decision makers to adopt new policies (Walker, 1969). There is a
notion that progressive states, also known as liberal states, have generous welfare benefits and
tend to be richer states with great economic wealth (Gray, 1973). However, it should also be
noted that wealthier states also have the ability to pay for Medicaid services (Buchanan,
Cappelleri, & Ohsfeldt, 1991).
Walker (1969) measures state wealth as per capita personal income and finds that
wealthier states are more likely to adopt an array of policies. Tropman and Gordon (1978)
investigate the relationship between state demographics and public welfare activity and ascertain
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that per capita income, serving as a proxy for state wealth, explains 60% of the variance in their
model. The model reveals that there is a link between the wealth of a state and the number of
individuals who are covered by Medicaid services, and wealthier states tend to provide more
state welfare coverage. Buchanan, Cappelleri, and Ohsfeldt (1991) also use per capita personal
income as a measure for state wealth and find that economic factors are more significant than
political forces when examining state spending levels on Medicaid. Grogan and Rigby (2009)
study the effect of partisan conflict on the enactment of the State Children’s Health Insurance
Program (SCHIP) and report that per capita income is significant when predicting the design of
the SCHIP program, but it is not important when predicting SCHIP program eligibility. Other
measures of state wealth, such as, the cost of living are associated with higher eligibility levels.
Grogan and Rigby’s (2009) findings provide mixed results with partisan factors being more
prevalent than state resources, benefits, and costs in eligibility setting, but not important in
regards to choice of program design.
For this study, we will examine state wealth using two indicators that are popular within
the literature on Medicaid policy. First, we will analyze per capita income as a measure of state
wealth. Then, we will assess the effect of tax effort on Medicaid expansion. Per capita income
is used in many studies and research on state wealth demonstrates a consistent link between the
adoption of a policy and the wealth of a state (Grogan & Rigby, 2009; Satterthwaite, 2002;
Tropman & Gordon, 1978; Volden, 2006; Walker, 1969). Based on previous research, we
expect to see a positive relationship between states with high per capita income and the
expansion of Medicaid.
H5: States with a high level of per capita income are more likely to expand Medicaid.
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While the literature on state wealth mainly uses per capita income as a measure, more
studies are using tax effort or tax capacity as an indicator of state wealth. The importance of tax
effort is evident when considering the function of taxation. When state revenues are low, states
must choose to either limit state spending or raise taxes (Grogan, 1999). In the context of
Medicaid, state dollars for Medicaid are drawn from the total revenue of state budgets and even
if the tax base is reduced, states must account for rising medical costs (Grogan, 1999).
Satterthwaite (2002) notes, “wealthier states…have a greater capacity to deal with fiscal stress
because of their ability to generate new revenue through taxation” (p.199). In a study examining
inequalities across state-level welfare policies on U.S. immigrants, Graefe, De Jong, Hall,
Sturgeon, and Van Eerden (2008) find that smaller states with reduced tax capacity have
stringent eligibility rules.
Many scholars utilize either tax effort or tax capacity to assess state-level policy
decisions or choices. Tax capacity measures the amount of income a state could generate
through taxation; while tax effort measures the “extent to which [state governments] utilizes its
tax capacity” (Berry & Fording, 1997, p. 158). More specifically, tax effort represents the
amount of taxes that states collect from residents. We are particularly interested in tax effort
because it captures the actual revenue of state governments derived from common state tax
collections. Tax capacity is not a desirable measure for this study because the decision to expand
Medicaid by states is optional and the federal government covers 100% of expansion costs for
the first 3 years from 2014-2016. Then federal funds for Medicaid expansion slowly decrease
over the next few years, but by the year 2020 and after, the government covers 90% of program
costs related to Medicaid expansion (Angeles, 2012). Due to the financial federal scheme of
Medicaid expansion, tax capacity is not as important as tax effort. When states have a sufficient
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amount of funds and resources through the collection of taxes, they are able to experiment and
take risks with slack resources (Satterthwaite, 2002). An accurate account of available state
funds enables states to make action-oriented policy decisions when making the decision to
expand Medicaid. We expect to observe states opting to expand Medicaid when tax efforts are
high.
H6: As tax efforts increase, states are more likely to expand Medicaid.
State Budget
State governments are responsible for balancing their budgets. As budgets become
constrained, state legislators will often cut Medicaid benefits and fees to providers (Olson, 2012).
Budgetary considerations for Medicaid reveal differences in benefits, prices, fiscal capacity,
political ideology, and reimbursement policy leading to wide variations across states (Boyd,
2003). In a study analyzing the decision making process of state budget cuts and Medicaid
programs, Hoadley, Cunningham, and McHugh (2004) find that states contain costs by reducing
provider payments, imposing cost-sharing plans, limiting or eliminating eligibility for some
recipient groups, and choosing to indefinitely cancel plans to expand Medicaid services.
Additionally, some states reduce enrollment by reducing outreach efforts, putting a freeze on
enrollment, and instituting administrative barriers. While analyzing the ACA’s impact on
Medicaid participation rates, Sonier, Boudreaux, and Blewett (2013) find that states with a low
baseline participation rate could experience a large woodwork effect (meaning a sizeable influx
of new enrollees) with the expansion of Medicaid thus negatively affecting state budgets.
This study will use state budget shortfalls to assess the likelihood of Medicaid expansion
among states. Budget shortfalls represent “the extent to which states’ revenues fall[s] short of
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the cost of providing services” (Oliff, Mai, & Palacios, 2012, p. 2). This measure provides a
realistic depiction of the financial health of states because the size of the budget shortfall is an
indicator of how well states are managing their financial resources. Therefore, we expect states
to decline Medicaid expansion when state budget shortfalls are copious.
H7: The larger a state’s budget shortfall, the less likely they are to expand Medicaid.
Health Care Expenditures
Medicaid expenditures account for a large portion of state expenditures and policymakers
respond to rising costs through adjusting Medicaid policies and benefits (Lukens, 2014). As
Grannemann and Pauly (2010) note, analyzing health care expenditures is a reflection of “the
overall level of resources a state devotes annually to meeting the needs of a typical low-income
person” (p. 55). Colby, Lipson, and Turchin (2012) declare that Medicaid spending on children
is a predictor of health insurance adequacy, where adequacy represents access to health care,
covered benefits, and preventative services. For the most part, these authors find that states with
high Medicaid expenditures provide children with better insurance adequacy. However, there
are six states with lower than average health care expenditures that provided adequate health
insurance: Alabama, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, South Carolina, and Tennessee (Colby, Lipson,
& Turchin, 2012). Although these states are outliers, the relative growth of health care
expenditures affects states negatively in a multitude of ways.
Patrick and Freed (2012) investigate the relative growth of Medicaid health care
expenditures in adults and children from 1991 to 2005 and discover that, although disabled
individuals make up a small fraction of Medicaid recipients, Medicaid spending for this
population accounts for 43% of total Medicaid expenditures. The next largest group of high
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utilizers of medical care is long-term care patients with expenses accruing up to 31% of
Medicaid costs. Patrick and Freed (2012) argue that the cost of Medicaid programs is straining
states and opportunities to institute cost-saving strategies. States are struggling to implement case
management programs, control fraud and abuse, reduce long-term care payments, and Medicaid
benefits are becoming scarce or limited. In a similar study on state Medicaid spending trends
from 1992 to 2009, Cantor, Thompson, and Farnham (2013) find that Medicaid expenditures
have increased annually at a rate of 3%. They suggest that countervailing factors such as fiscal
stress, political forces, and Medicaid spending that interfere with other investments (e.g.,
education) may contribute to the reluctance of state policymakers to expand Medicaid.
The cost of health care services is a real concern for many states. When making
decisions in regards to Medicaid policies, states consider the cost of the program, the benefits of
the program, and the population of people who will receive the benefits (Kim & Jennings, 2012).
These considerations are based on the projected cost of Medicaid expenditures. State budgets
are negatively affected when Medicaid expenditures are high, thus leading to less monetary
funds for other investments (Cantor, Thompson, & Farnham, 2013). Therefore, we expect to
observe a positive effect on Medicaid expansion with the presence of low Medicaid
expenditures.
H8: States with a low level of Medicaid expenditures are more likely to expand Medicaid.
Federal Aid
Federal governments influence policy by requiring states to implement national initiatives
or by enticing states to establish programs with financial incentives (Adler, 2011). In a study
examining state variation and the expansion of Medicaid, Jacobs and Callaghan (2013) contend
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that federal funding may persuade states to adopt new Medicaid programs when states are facing
economic uncertainty, thus suggesting that less affluent states will opt to receive federal
matching funds to expand Medicaid. Satterthwaite (2002) also analyzed the effect of federal
contributions on Medicaid using the federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP), which is the
federal share of monetary assistance given to states to expand and/or operate Medicaid.
Satterthwaite’s (2002) results reveal that states with a low FMAP rate are less likely to adopt
new Medicaid programs. Conversely, states with high FMAP rates are more likely to adopt new
innovations.
The FMAP is a formula-based schema that governs the federal portion of funds dedicated
to Medicaid state programs. The federal government covers 50% or more of Medicaid costs
depending on the established FMAP rate for each state (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the
Uninsured, 2012). The dissemination of federal funds is more inclined to benefit states
experiencing economic hardship in addition to states that dedicate additional efforts to provide
more services for Medicaid (Dinan & Gamkhar, 2009). Therefore, we expect states with a high
FMAP rate to expand Medicaid.
H9: States with high Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) rates are more
likely to expand Medicaid.

Needs-Based Model
The needs-based model assumes that policy action at the state-level is more likely to
occur following the presence or the severity of a problem. In a problem environment, there is
usually the existence of a gap between expectations and actual conditions (Nice, 1994).
Research has shown that the existence of a problem influences the decisions of policymakers
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(Anakwenze & Zuberi, 2013; Nice, 1994; Routhe, Jones, & Feldman, 2005; Shaxon, 2009).
Problems may become worse over time or current programs or policies may no longer be
effective (Nice, 1994). The severity of a problem serves as an impetus for change (Sapat, 2004).
As an explanation of state policy choice and decision making, the common thought is that as
problems become more severe, state policymakers will most likely respond to resolve the
issue(s) (Olive, Gunasekara, Raymond, 2012). Through the passing of new legislation, the needs
of states are expressed (Satterthwaite, 2002). States expressions are assessed through the needsbased model, which includes variables that states monitor to ascertain the needs of its population.
The variables are poverty rates, the percentage of the elderly in states, unemployment rates,
uninsured rates, and health status. Figure 2.4 illustrates the needs-based model below.

Figure 2.4. Needs-Based Model
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Poverty Rate
With a large proportion of individuals living in poverty, there is a need for an expanded
system of Medicaid (Kousser, 2002). Poverty is an indicator that signifies a demand for
Medicaid services (Miller, Harrington, Ramsland, & Goldstein, 2002). The decision to decline
Medicaid expansion by states places additional burdens on many individuals living in poverty
(Antos, 2013). Frakt and Carroll note, “it is the poorest of the poor--- those with incomes below
100 percent of the FPL [Federal Poverty Level] ---whose access to affordable insurance is most
at risk” (p. 173).
Rom et al.’s (1998) research on welfare policy and interstate competition confirms
previous research that demonstrates a correlation between low benefit levels and high poverty
rates. However, Rom et al. (1998) note that interactions between per capita income and the
proportion of African-Americans in a state —in addition to poverty rates— may have obscured
the effects of each individual variable. Although Kousser (2002) views poverty rate as a
demographic variable, the author asserts that there is a need for expanded Medicaid systems
when states have a high proportion of poor people. Moreover, while examining state
discretionary spending, Kousser (2002) discovers that poverty is a driver of program size and
total Medicaid expenditures per capita.
In a study analyzing the effect of Medicaid on poverty, Sommers and Oellerich (2013)
find that Medicaid reduces poverty rates by 2.2% for disabled individuals and 1.0% for children.
The authors conclude that Medicaid has kept 2.1 million adults, children, disabled, and elderly
persons out of poverty. Furthermore, Sommers and Oellerich (2013) suggest that Medicaid cuts
and the elimination of benefits may result in further health care issues and an increase in poverty
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rates. In fact, Richardson and Yilmazer (2013) explore the impact of health care reform on states
and find that in states opting out of Medicaid expansion, 4-10% of adults living in poverty will
not have insurance. Richardson and Yilmazer’s (2013) model also demonstrates that states with
generous benefits will encounter a small growth in added Medicaid beneficiaries with Medicaid
expansion. On the other hand, states with high poverty rates will experience elevated levels of
new Medicaid enrollees.
Although there is a line of thought that presumes that state policymakers respond to the
needs of its citizens, research demonstrates that states with high poverty rates offer limited
Medicaid benefits and are more likely to opt out of Medicaid expansion (Barrilleaux & Rainey,
2014; Peterson & Rom, 1989; Peltzman, 1980; Rom et al. 1998). Prior research on poverty rates
uses the official poverty measure as a unit of measurement; however, for this study, we will
analyze the effect of poverty using the Census Bureau’s supplemental poverty measure (SPM) as
opposed to the official poverty measure. The official measure of poverty “consists of a set of
thresholds for families of different sizes and compositions that are compared with before-tax
income to determine a family’s poverty status” (Bridges & Gesumaria, 2013, p. 49). On the
other hand, the SPM consists of “thresholds [that] are based on a broad measure of necessary
expenditures (food, clothing, shelter, and utilities” (Bridges & Gesumaria, 2013, p.50).
Additionally, the SPM takes into account cash income, government benefits, and geographical
variations in relation to the cost of living (Bridges & Gesumaria, 2013). We believe that the
SPM provides a more accurate portrayal of poverty and we expect states to expand Medicaid
when they have high rates of poverty using the SPM.
H10: States with higher supplemental poverty measure (SPM) rates are more likely to
expand Medicaid.
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The Elderly
Ailments are a multifaceted burden affecting many elderly persons. Additionally,
chronic illnesses, which are more prevalent among the elderly, require increased use of medical
services and ongoing health care expenditures. The elderly are eligible for Medicaid services if
they are categorically eligible or medically eligible (Rowland & Lyons, 1996). In 2009,
Medicaid services were provided to 70% of nursing home seniors and total Medicaid
expenditures on the elderly equaled $75 billion in 2008 (De Nardi, French, Jones, Gooptu, 2012).
While Medicaid financially protects low-income persons who are elderly, the scope of available
services is limited. Although each state determines eligibility standards, the amount and type of
health care services, reimbursement rates, and the scope of services, some elderly persons aged
65 and older qualify for Medicaid coverage. Moreover, under Medicaid, dual eligible and
Medicare advantage beneficiaries are eligible to receive home health care services, outpatient
care, durable medical equipment, physician services, and preventative care (Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services, 2016). The problems faced by the elderly include complex enrollment
issues, negative social stigmas associated with welfare programs, and lack of understanding and
awareness of Medicaid services (Rowland & Lyons, 1996).
While examining the effects of state policy on elderly Medicaid beneficiaries, Pezzin and
Kasper (2002) also find that almost 50% of elderly persons meeting federal poverty levels at or
below 100% are not enrolled in Medicaid. Moreover, they find that states with generous homeand community-based services have more Medicaid enrollees versus states with less generous
Medicaid policies. The authors suggest that not only do state policies influence participation in
Medicaid; they may also shed light on the success or failure of Medicaid programs and whether
the intended purposes are served. In a similar albeit qualitative study exploring expanded
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coverage for low-income elderly persons, Lamphere and Rosenbach (2000) acknowledge that the
cost of medical care is a problem for individuals aged 65 and over and the low-income elderly
account for a large proportion of state populations. They note that a common problem that exists
between the states and the federal government involves joint responsibility such as financial
conflicts and confusion regarding mandated policies for the elderly with low-incomes.
Moreover, Lamphere and Rosenbach (2000) argue that rising health care costs have “left federal
and state policy makers wary of actions that commit the public sector to further underwriting
health entitlements” (p. 216). Furthermore, Kousser (2002) contends that policymakers must
decide on a trade-off between serving the needs of the state or supply funds for the health care of
many seniors with exacerbated health care costs.
As medical technology advances and citizens live longer, the population of elderly
persons on Medicaid will be a topic of central concern in Medicaid policy. While Medicare
provides medical care to individuals age 65 and older, Medicaid acts as a safety net for lowincome and disabled elderly adults (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid Facts, 2010). As of 2011,
adults aged 65 and older account for 9% of the total Medicaid population (68 million) and 21%
of Medicaid expenditures while overall Medicaid expenses total $397.6 billion (Paradise, 2015).
Even though the elderly population is very small in comparison to other groups (children, adults,
and the disabled), this population is a high consumer of medical services. Moreover, the elderly
have Medicare coverage, and knowledge of this fact could give states the impression that
expanded services under Medicaid are not a necessity. Therefore, we expect states with a large
population of individuals age 65 and older to reject the expansion of Medicaid.
H11: States with a high proportion of elderly persons are less likely to expand Medicaid.
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The Unemployed
State action in relation to Medicaid policies can be influenced by fluctuations in the rate
of unemployment. For instance, Grogan (1999) hypothesizes that as the rate of unemployment
rises, the number of eligible persons for Medicaid increases along with program costs, which
serves as a catalyst for states to respond by reducing Medicaid benefits. However, Grogan’s
(1999) research produces mixed results, revealing that an increase in unemployment leads to
stricter state eligibility policies, but also unexpectedly leads to a positive effect on benefit
policies. Soss et al. (2001) also study the effect of the unemployed while recognizing that
welfare systems and policies function to meet the societal needs of states under a labor-market
hypothesis. The authors predict that, “states with lower unemployment rates will adopt more
restrictive TANF policies” (p. 383). They find that the chances that a state will adopt work
requirements increases when unemployment rates decrease. Soss et al. (2001) conclude that
lawmakers use work requirements as a way of controlling the poor instead of outright denying
benefits.
The rate of unemployment can reflect a greater issue that is present in state economies.
High unemployment rates signal higher incidences of poverty, divorce, physical and mental
health issues, and long-term earnings loss and instability (Schmitt & Jones, 2012). On the other
hand, low unemployment rates tend to be associated with reduced poverty rates, an expanded
labor force, and reductions in welfare caseloads (Blank, 2000; Schoeni & Blank, 2000).
Previous research demonstrates that high rates of unemployment are associated with a plethora
of problems and states respond to this policy problem with restrictive welfare benefits (Grogan,
1999; Schmitt & Jones, 2012; Soss, Schram, Vartanian, & O’Brien, 2001). Since most private
and public organizations offer insurance to their employees, we expect states to expand Medicaid
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when the unemployment rate is low because the gainfully employed are less likely to sign up or
meet eligibility standards for Medicaid.
H12: States with low unemployment rates are more likely to expand Medicaid.
The Uninsured
Many individuals lack health insurance and this can be problematic for several reasons:
(a) Health status and outcomes are typically poor for this population; (b) there are financial
implications for both states and the uninsured when health services are needed due to the rising
costs of health care; and (c) hospitals are burdened with uncompensated care because they treat
individuals without health insurance (Frakt & Carroll, 2013). The barriers to care affecting the
uninsured are getting and maintaining health insurance, meeting restrictive requirements to
obtain Medicaid services, and finding providers that will accept Medicaid (DeVoe, Baez, Angier,
Krois, Edlund, & Carney, 2007). As DeVoe et al. (2007) note, unmet health needs have
contributed to high medical expenditures, which are not affordable for the uninsured.
Just as there are individual barriers to health care for the uninsured, there are barriers that
limit the ability of states to address the problem which are political, financial, and legal in nature.
States may not have the support of the public on policies aimed at reducing the uninsured rate;
the cost of insuring the uninsured may not be conducive to state budgets; and federal mandates
may coincide with proposed health reforms at the state-level to reduce the number of uninsured
individuals (Barrilleaux & Brace, 2007; Skocpol, 1993). While analyzing state policy strategies
to reduce the proportion of uninsured persons, Barrilleaux and Brace (2007) find that as the rate
of the uninsured rises, the adoption of state policies aimed at reducing the uninsured decreases.
The authors suggest that “heightened demand for relief may have the perverse effect of leading
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state governments to enact policies that attempt to shift the problem to the market place”
(Barrilleaux & Brace, 2007, p. 673).
In a study analyzing the decisions of governors and Medicaid expansion, Barrilleaux and
Rainey (2014) argued that there was an expectation from policy makers that states would adopt
Medicaid expansion because many states had mission statements and strategic plans to reduce
the rate of uninsurance. With the expansion of Medicaid, many parties would benefit from
expansion: managed care organizations, hospitals, clinics, pharmacies, low-income individuals,
physicians, and health care suppliers. This, in turn, would benefit states by addressing a public
need. Although Barrilleaux and Rainey (2014) hypothesized that, “governors are less likely to
oppose the federal Medicaid expansion funds as the percent of uninsured in their state increases”
(p. 444), their results indicated otherwise. They found that regardless of need or the political
party of the governor, as the level of uninsurance increases, the level of opposition also rises. We
will test Barrilleaux and Rainey’s finding to determine if the results can be reproduced.
H13: States with high uninsurance rates are more likely to oppose Medicaid expansion.
Health Status
The health status of states can signal whether a need exists among state populations. With
the provision of health care services and early treatment, major illnesses or chronic diseases can
be prevented. Moreover, early treatment can also reduce expensive health care costs that could
arise later in life (Copeland & Meier, 1987). Hill, Abdus, Hudson, and Selden (2014) suggest
that states expanding Medicaid may not have to deal with issues of adverse selection with new
enrollees meeting the federal eligibility requirements because they are healthier than the typical
Medicaid population. They tested several health indicators, such as mental health, physical
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health, and chronic diseases. The authors conducted sensitivity tests to determine the differences
between pre-ACA enrollees and post-ACA Medicaid beneficiaries.
Grogan (1999) utilizes an index variable to measure the health status of states, which
includes a state’s violent crime rate, death rate, frequency of smoking, and total number of
accidental deaths. While Grogan (1999) assumes that states respond to increasing health service
needs by reducing benefits, the author finds that states respond positively to recognized medical
and health needs. Many scholars utilize infant mortality as an indicator of health, which is what
Satterthwaite (2002) uses in the study examining Medicaid managed care programs. However,
Satterthwaite does not find a statistically significant relationship and concludes that the need for
better health care services does not affect a state’s determination to adopt managed care for
Medicaid.
Barrilleaux and Rainey (2014) measure the health status of states by analyzing low birth
weight, heart disease, death rate, and life expectancy. They discover that all of the health
measures, with the exception of life expectancy, had “little to no effect on governors’ decisions
to support or oppose expansion” (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 2014). Regardless of the level of need,
their analyses reveal that there are other factors, such as politics, that influence governors to
oppose Medicaid expansion (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 2014).
Although states spend a significant amount of money on health care services, a major
concern confronting states, and the nation as a whole, is that the level of spending on health does
not equate to better health outcomes or a qualified health care system. Because of this mismatch
between spending on health and health outcomes, states have opportunities to invest in
prevention programs and to maximize their dollars spent on health care (Wold, 2010).
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Furthermore, knowledge of the health needs and overall health of state residents’ helps states in
determining health-related services and prospective costs when making decisions to expand
Medicaid (Hill, Abdus, Hudson, & Selten, 2014). To measure the health of state residents, we
examine perceptions of overall health status, mental health, and low birth weight. We choose to
measure mental health because there is a growing trend of increased services and expenditures
for this population of Medicaid utilizers that indicates a need for expanded services (Soni, 2015).
We also include overall perceptions of health because we believe that understanding the
perceived health needs of residents can help states develop interventions to address systems and
health-related deficiencies in Medicaid (The Pew Charitable Trusts and John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation, 2014b). Last, we examine low birth weight because this measure
signifies the health and survival of infants. When infants weigh less than 5 pounds 8 ounces,
they are more likely to suffer from chronic illnesses or some form of disability than babies within
average weight limits. States that invest in maternal health and comprehensive prenatal services
can reduce the incidence of low-birth weight babies (The Pew Charitable Trusts and John D. and
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, 2014b). To capture a cumulative measure of health status
we develop an index to test the influence of health status on Medicaid expansion. We choose
indicators relevant to the decision making process of Medicaid policies, and thus expect to
observe states expand Medicaid when its residents are in good health.
H14: States with a high level of residents with good health statuses are more likely to
expand Medicaid.
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State Capacity Model
The state capacity model is based on Bowman and Kearney’s (1988) conception of state
government capability and assumes that states have the capability to respond effectively,
efficiently and responsibly to change, decisions, and conflicts. More specifically, Bowman and
Kearney define state government capability as “three activities that are most salient for state
government: (1) to respond effectively to change; (2) to make decisions efficiently, effectively
(i.e., rationally) and responsively; and (3) to manage conflict” (p. 343). By means of capacity
building, states are able to implement a broad array of initiatives through the selection and
establishment of institutional arrangements, which allows them to be more responsive to the
public (Bowman & Kearney, 1988). The constructs that will represent this model include
legislative professionalism, institutional capacity, and governance. Figure 2.5 presents the state
capacity model

below.
Figure 2.5. State Capacity Model
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Legislative Professionalism
State legislatures have undergone many reforms over the years to increase their capacity
to respond to pressing problems, implement many programs and deliver services (Bowman &
Kearney, 1988). While administrative professionalism within government agencies is
recognized as an indicator affecting performance and decisions, the importance of
professionalism can be difficult to assess at the state level (Sapat, 2004). The Citizens
Conference on State Legislatures (CCSL), which concentrates on the concepts of independence,
representativeness, accountability, functionality, and informedness, created the first evaluative
measure of state legislatures. These concepts are examined in-depth by examining committee
structure, leadership, staffing, rules and procedures, time, facilities, ethics, and size (Bowman &
Kearney, 1988; Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, 1971).
Since the CCSL’s evaluative measure of state legislatures was published, many scholars
have expanded upon the concepts. Grumm (1971) created a professional index with five
indicator variables for legislative professionalism. The measures include length of session, a
legislative service score based on the CCSL report, the number of bills introduced, and
legislative compensation (Bowman & Kearney, 1988). Morehouse (1973) updated Grumm’s
index and substituted the measure on the number of bills introduced with “the average population
per house seat” (Bowman & Kearney, 1988, p. 344).
Over the years, state legislatures became more professional and the development of
administrative capacity led to more responsibilities in a wide range of policy areas, such as
environmental, economic, and social programs (Jenkins, Leicht, & Wendt, 2006). In an article
analyzing the circumstances in which health policy reforms are adopted, Carter and LaPlant

57

(1997) explore the effect of legislative professionalism. The basis for studying legislative
professionalism came out of a concern for criticisms of state governments being repressive and
deficient in professionalism. They assume that the more professional a state legislature became,
the more likely state legislatures were able to manage complex policy problems and adopt health
policy reforms. However, Carter and LaPlant’s (1997) study reveals inconsistent results. They
discover that there is a statistically significant relationship between highly professionalized
legislatures and the adoption of pre-existing condition policies. On the other hand, less
professionalized legislatures are more likely to adopt riskier reforms with less state involvement
(i.e., contracted services with third parties), which could be the result of poor fiscal health.
Barrilleaux and Brace (2007) also study state capacity and the ability of state governments to
address complex problems through policy making in the Medicaid arena. They contend that
“more capable state governments should produce more state center policy solutions, as the
strength of governing institutions is an important determinant of both what polities do and how
they do it” (Barrilleaux & Brace, 2007, p. 668). They analyze the strength of state legislatures
using the following indicators: salaries of public personnel, publications authored by public
employees, staff education, the size of staff, and the proportion of protected civil service
employees. These authors find that increased state capacity led to few policy adoptions, more
reliance on state-based policies, and less dependence on market-based strategies. The authors’
findings are unique because prior scholarship on state capacity associated highly
professionalized legislatures with heightened government activity. Although Barrilleaux and
Brace (2007) refer to legislative professionalism as institutional capacity, they admit in their
study that their measure is based on Bowman and Kearney’s (1988) legislative professionalism
construct.
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The reformation of state legislatures over the years has led to improvements in
addressing complex policy problems, the administration and delivery of state services, and
conflict resolution skills (Bowman & Kearney, 1988; Jones, 1994). Professional state
legislatures are known to have long-term appointments, high salaries, and adequate support staff.
They also tend to support progressive policies (Brace & Ward, 1999; Finegold & Skocpol, 1995;
Jenkins, Leicht, Wendt, 2006). Thus, we expect states with a high level of professionalism to
expand Medicaid.
H15: States with a high degree of legislative professionalism are more likely to adopt
Medicaid expansion.
Institutional Capacity
Institutional capacity refers to organizational structures and processes, which give state
legislatures the ability to carry out a wide range of activities. This definition of institutional
capacity is quite different from legislative professionalism, which focuses on societal traits of the
legislative body culturally accepted as professional (Bowman & Kearney, 1988). In reference to
the distinction between professional and institutional capacity, LeLoup (1978) states that
“professionalism appears to be something that the wealthier states can afford, but many reforms,
structures, and procedures that make legislatures more capable are not bound by high monetary
costs… [which] suggest[s] that professionalism and capability are empirically distinguishable”
(p. 618). With this distinction in mind, this research will focus on organizational and
administrative traits to assess institutional capacity.
Prior studies exploring institutional capacity in Medicaid programs focus on identifying
administrative issues. Gold, Sparer, and Chu (1996) realize that states need to concentrate on
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oversight and observe the following: There is a lack of policies and procedures guiding health
plans; administrative tasks are fragmented and decentralized causing increased administrative
costs; there is a shortage of resources and staff, and states are lacking in information technology
to track and monitor Medicaid trends and patterns. Gold et al. (1996) suggest that while states
need to tailor their methods of managing Medicaid, they should also consider the following: (a)
investing in administrative infrastructure that allows states to meet program demands, (b) design
policies that are comprehendible for their servicing population, (c) develop strategic plans that
allow program growth and are compatible with existing plans, and (d) dedicate an adequate
amount of time and resources to implement new systems and programs. While examining the
experiences of states and Medicaid managed care, Holahan, Zuckerman, Evans, and Rangarajan
(1998) also find that complex administrative issues affect many facets of service. Many states
engage in negotiations, competitive bidding, and rate setting, which require a certain level of
capacity building to ensure low risks, the protection of state funds and Medicaid beneficiaries,
and mutually satisfying contracts between providers and states.
More recent studies have analyzed and operationalized institutional capacity at the statelevel. Through the devolution of services and programs created at the national level, states are
compelled to manage many government programs, which require the development and
succession of administrative capacity (Bowling & Wright, 1998). To assess institutional
capacity, many scholars have used the Government Performance Project which was created in
1996 to better understand the functions of state governments in respect to management and
performance (Barrett & Greene, 2008). Coggburn and Schneider (2003) analyze state
managerial capacity using data from the Maxwell School’s Government Performance Project
(GPP), which provides letter grades in the areas of human resources management, capacity
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management, information technology, managing for results, and financial management. These
components are converted to a grade point average scale and serve as a proxy to measure
managerial capacity. Coggburn and Schneider (2003) find that management capacity not only
influences state priorities but also shapes the outcomes of programs. They conclude that states
with a high level of management capacity make decisions or choose policy alternatives that
benefit the majority.
Fossett and Thompson (2006) also use the GPP to measure administrative capacity with
the inclusion of other indicators (i.e., performance, information technology) known to affect the
adoption of administrative orientations. However, they do not find administrative capacity
predictive of best practices related to administrative responsiveness to the disadvantaged (ARD).
While they admit that half of the variance of their study is not explained, they suggest that
certain characteristics of “administrative agents” may not have been captured in their study
(Fossett & Thompson, 2006). However, their qualitative analysis reveals that there is concern
among administrators in regards to the high rates of enrollment and having the administrative
capacity to deal with new enrollees for the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP)
program (Fossett & Thompson, 2006). In a study analyzing the impact of internal state
characteristics on the extensiveness of managed Medicaid programs, Kim and Jennings (2012)
also use the GPP to measure management capacity. They use data from 2001 and 1998 and
average the scores from the areas of financial management, human resource management,
information technology, capital management, and management for results. While they expected
a positive relationship between the adoption of risk-based program enrollment and management
capacity and a negative relationship between the adoption of primary care case management and
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management capacity, the results of their analysis was not statistically significant (Kim &
Jennings, 2012).
With inconsistent and inadequate measures of administrative capacity, the most recent
scholarship on administrative capacity focuses on the development of a new measure to assess
this construct. Jacobs and Callaghan (2013) develop a composite measure that includes
insurance oversight, the prevention of fraud, and expanding high-risk pools to eligible persons.
They find that there is a great deal of variation among the states, and states with a lower level of
administrative capacity are slower to adopt or establish health care reforms. In a later study,
Callaghan and Jacobs (2014) use the same measure for administrative capacity with slight
modifications to study the progress of implementation of Medicaid expansion. Their findings are
insignificant and they suggest that financial incentives and institutional resources, which are
drivers of vertical federalism, could be at odds with administrative capacity.
Although some studies on institutional capacity produce insignificant results, we suspect
that there is a connection between the expansion of state programs and the ability of states to
implement such services (Callaghan & Jacobs, 2014; Fossett & Thompson, 2006; Kim &
Jennings, 2012). As scholars experiment and test new measures, there is always the chance that
a variable does not measure the intended concept or construct. These issues may be indicative of
measurement validity such as content validity, face validity, or perhaps construct validity. To
test the influence of institutional capacity on Medicaid expansion, we will use Coggburn and
Schneider’s (2003) grade point average scoring system to assess institutional capacity. We
expect states to support Medicaid expansion when they have a high level of institutional
capacity.
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H16: States with a high level of institutional capacity will be more likely to expand
Medicaid.
Governance
Governance arrangements have yet to be studied in Medicaid policy. Much of the
literature on governance focuses on the role of states, governments, agencies, providers, and
individuals (Freeman, 2000; Kettl, 2000; Morgan & Campbell, 2011; Rowland & Tallon, 2003).
However, there is one article by Plein (2004) that examines the role of administrative structures
for SCHIP programs. This study explores administrative arrangements by assessing SCHIP
programs by determining whether the program is a stand-alone entity, combined, subsists within
an existing Medicaid bureaucracy, or exists aside from an existing Medicaid agency. While this
study captures certain elements of governance within one aspect of Medicaid policy, it would be
difficult to measure this administrative typology because the study is specific to the SCHIP
population. Additionally, this dissertation is different because it is focuses on Medicaid
expansion as a whole rather than on a single program.
While there is a lack of scholarly research on governance structures focusing on
Medicaid, there is a wealth of literature on this subject within the area of postsecondary
education (Delaney & Doyle, 2011; Hearn & Holdsworth, 2002; Mokher & McLendon, 2009;
Tandberg, 2010). McGuinness (1988, 1994) developed a classification system of state structures
that describes how states govern public entities. There are three types of state structures: (a)
consolidated governing boards, where a single entity develops and implements policy,
coordinates responsibilities, allocates resources, and appoints personnel, and governs other
institutions within its own jurisdiction; (b) coordinating boards, which are decentralized and act
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with the authority to serve either as a regulatory entity or an advisory bureau; and (c) planning
agencies, which do not have much authority, but facilitate planning and implementation
functions between selected sectors and institutions (McGuinness, 1994). The state structures
differ in strength. The consolidating and coordinating/regulatory boards are strong in nature,
while the coordinating/advisory and planning boards are weak (McLendon, Heller, & Young,
2005). Although McGuiness’ research focuses on postsecondary education governing boards,
Hearn and Griswold (1994) note that state governing arrangements have been around since the
1950s. However, with the growth of government and the demand for expertise, evaluations, and
the recognition of institutional needs, states have developed governing arrangements to fit their
needs. This research will apply this method of reasoning to Medicaid agencies. Every state has
a Medicaid agency and a corresponding governing board. As a result, we will test McGuinness’
governance typology to determine if the arrangements of Medicaid agencies impact the decision
making process of states.
While McGuiness’ governance typology is based on the governance arrangement of
postsecondary state boards of education, some studies suggest that there is a relationship between
welfare and education programs and that the support and/or expansion of both programs are
indicative of state policy preferences (Hega & Hokenmaier, 2002). While research on higher
education demonstrates a link between consolidated governing boards and expanded educational
programs (McLendon, Hearn, & Mokher, 2009), we expect states to expand Medicaid when a
consolidated governing board governs Medicaid agencies. Following the same line of reasoning
in accordance with research on higher educational governance boards, we also assume that
advisory and planning boards are limited in decisional authority (Callan, 1975; Hearn &
Griswold, 1994; McLendon, Heller, & Young, 2005).
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H17: States with centralized Medicaid governing boards will most likely expand
Medicaid.
State Innovation and Diffusion Model
The state innovation and diffusion model assumes that internal and external dynamics
drive policy adoptions (Berry & Berry, 2007). State actions are the result of policy choices
affected by propensities to innovate (Gray, 1973; Soss et al., 2001). This model accepts Walker’s
(1969) definition of innovation, which is “a program or policy which is new to the states
adopting it, no matter how old the program may be or how many states have adopted it” (p. 881).
Complimentary to Walker’s definition, Roger’s (1983) description of diffusion also guides this
model, which is, “the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels
over time among the members of a social system” (p. 5). Internal determinants are state specific
factors and include social, political, and economic characteristics (Berry & Berry, 2007; Olive,
Gunasekara, & Raymond, 2012). For the purposes of this study, internal determinants will focus
on state actions, which are the result of decisions that encompass social, political and economic
characteristics. External determinants are elements that facilitate the diffusion of policies, such as
the emulation of initiatives from other states, and competition amongst states (Olive,
Gunasekara, & Raymond, 2012). This model will analyze the impact of neighboring states, state
competition, and prior policy adoptions on the expansion of Medicaid. Figure 2.6 embodies the
State Innovation and Diffusion model below.
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Figure 2.6. State Innovation and Diffusion Model
Regional Diffusion
The diffusion of a policy can occur through convergence. Policy convergence is “the
tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes and
performances” (Kerr, 1983, p. 3). Moreover, policy convergence occurs through emulation,
networking from influential leaders in an effort to standardize the implementation of a policy or
to address pressures from interest groups and external actors (Bennett, 1991). Through
empirical testing, scholars in a variety of disciplines have found that neighboring states are
influenced by the policies of their counterparts, thus increasing their motivation to innovate
(Berry & Berry, 1990; Dye, 1966; Glick & Hays, 1991; Mintrom, 1997; Satterthwaite, 2002,
Volden, 2006).
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In the realm of Medicaid policy, scholarly research is emerging on the influence of
neighboring states on policy adoptions. Carter and LaPlant (1997) study regional influences
under the premise that, “policy adoptions in a nearby state can make it easier for politicians to
justify similar adoptions to voters in their own state” (p. 22). They analyze three regions (i.e.,
Northeast, West, South) and use the North Central region as a reference point to test their
premise. They find that while there is some evidence that supports the influence of regional
diffusion, their findings are inconsistent and dependent upon the nature of specific policies. The
authors conclude that their study lacks sufficient evidence to establish a pattern of regional
diffusion in the innovation of health care policies. In a similar study, Kousser (2002) tests the
policy convergence theory noting that state officials make decisions based on shared
circumstances. Kousser (2002) examines subregions (i.e., New England, Mid-Atlantic,
Midwest) using the Statistical Abstract of the United States operating under the assumption that
the New England, Mid-Atlantic, and Midwest regions share a common trait which is high
spending, while Pacific, Southern, and Mountain regions are frugal. Satterthwaite (2002) also
references the policy convergence theory and claims that states seek policy direction from each
other. She finds that the more neighboring states adopt Medicaid managed care, the more likely
it became that a state would adopt the same or similar policy. However, Sattherwaite (2002)
cautions that although regional diffusion occurs, the likelihood of diffusion is dependent upon
certain conditions and/or when other factors such as state wealth are present.
Volden (2006) also examines the effect of state similarities on diffusion and policy
learning and finds that while the relationship is positive, there is not a statistically significant
relationship. Volden (2006) concludes that “an alternative hypothesis to the emulation of policies
of similar states is simply that similar states adopt similar policies, without necessarily relying on
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any learning from other states” (p. 304). Similarly, Kim and Jennings (2012) sought to
distinguish internal learning from external learning by examining state characteristics on
diffusion and program extensiveness of Medicaid managed care. They also presume that states
seek policy directions from each other to assess policy success. However, in contrast to Volden
(2006), Kim and Jennings (2012) find that neighboring states do learn from each other and that
states with extensive Medicaid managed care programs contribute to the adoption of extensive
programs by neighboring states.
The process of diffusion involves an assumption that, when state decision-makers are
confronted with complex policy alternatives, they will take cues from their neighbors to decide
on a course of action (Satterthwaite, 2002; Simon, 1957; Walker, 1969). In relation to Medicaid,
states are more likely to emulate their neighbor by pursuing similar policies. We will gravitate to
previous research that leads us to expect states to emulate their geographic neighbors in the
adoption of Medicaid. This will indicate whether geographic neighbors will emulate each other
based on similar policies.
H18: States are more likely to emulate their geographic neighbors in choosing to adopt
Medicaid expansion.
State Competition
State competition is a construct that differs greatly from regional diffusion. While
regional diffusion assesses the process of diffusion through similar state characteristics, another
school of thought is that the adoption of policies spread through state competition. Dating back
to 1956, Tiebout suggests that states compete for citizens through the provision of public
policies, tax breaks, and program spending. There are two different thought patterns that drive
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state competition. The first pattern suggests that states seek to innovate, emulate each other,
diversify, and experiment to better serve their constituencies (Bailey & Rom, 2004; Dye, 1966;
Lowery, Konda, & Garand 1984). The second thought pattern implies that states manipulate
welfare benefits and policies based on the actions of other states to prevent the occurrence of
becoming a welfare state magnet (Bailey & Rom, 2004; Grogan, 1999; Peterson, 1995). Rom,
Peterson, and Scheve (1998) explains state competition as follows:
The competitive model of interstate relationships…implies that states compete with one
another, that states may pay a penalty if they do not attend to the decisions taken by their
neighbor, and that more than just information is at work. The competitive model also
implies that states, when making decisions, may not be deciding autonomously whether
or not to adopt policies enacted elsewhere. On the contrary, the fact that these policies
have been adopted elsewhere compels the state’s attention. The competitive model also
has more general application than diffusion theory. It applies not just to new proposals
but to any policies pursued by other states, whether these are marginal changes in
existing laws or breathtaking new adventures. (p. 20)
While testing this theory of interstate competition, Rom et al. (1998) find that competition
between states influence welfare policies even when other phenomena such as political,
economic, and demographic factors are controlled.
Similar to the concept of interstate competition and the second school of thought on state
competition, Grogan (1999) hypothesizes that welfare migration takes place when Medicaid
beneficiaries migrate to other states due to a reduction in AFDC payments. This action leads to
higher program costs for the migrated state, which in turn triggers states to lower their welfare
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benefits. This suggests that while states may not compete to provide the best welfare programs,
they could be in competition with each other to lower benefits. Berry and Baybeck (2005) also
examine welfare migration and interstate competition using geographic information systems to
study the propensity of poor individuals relocating to another state for better health benefits. The
authors assume that governors and state legislatures determine welfare policy, and the adoption
of a policy is influenced by state officials’ concerns in regards to the behaviors of state citizens
(i.e., relocating to another state for generous welfare benefits). Berry and Baybeck (2005) find
that states do not compete with each other over welfare benefits, but rather set reasonable benefit
levels according to the benchmarks of neighboring states through policy learning. While Berry
and Baybeck (2005) do not find interstate competition to be a concern for states, they mention
that their research applies to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits and that
tight federal control of the program may account for the lack of competition amongst the states.
On the other hand, the authors also note that the block program under Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) which allows for greater state autonomy and discretion may result in
different findings due to the structure of the TANF block program (Berry & Baybeck, 2005).
Bailey and Rom (2004) analyze the effect of interstate competition on welfare generosity,
and find that there is competition amongst all welfare programs (except Medicare) as a result of
state control over welfare programs. They also find that competition is strongest in AFDC
benefits, providing access to services, regulating Medicaid costs, and determining benefits.
Bailey and Rom (2004) measure state competition by determining whether states are more or less
generous than their peers. De Jong, Graefe, and St. Pierre (2005) take a different approach to
analyzing welfare policy by modeling interstate migration and focusing on migratory behaviors
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of families and the roles of states. They discover that states’ stringent eligibility and
expectations in modifying behavior through policies drive families to move to other states.
Although there are alternative methods to examining state interstate competition, we will
direct our attention to Bailey and Rom’s (2004) measures of state competition because they are
more representative of state-level actions. We will analyze the effect of neighbors, which is “the
percent difference between states’ generosity and its neighbors’ generosity” (Bailey & Rom,
2004, p. 333). This measure assesses the extent states are influenced by the generosity of other
states. Then we will utilize the data derived from the effect of neighbors to determine if states
are competitive with each other based on whether they are more or less generous than their
neighbors. If the thought that states will manipulate benefits and policies to avoid becoming
welfare magnets remains supported, then we expect to observe states opt out of Medicaid
expansion when they have less generous Medicaid policies than their competitive neighbors
(competitive neighbors are also known as contiguous neighbor states).
H19: States with less generous Medicaid policies than their competitive neighbors are
less likely to expand Medicaid.
Prior Policy Adoptions
Policy history is an important component of the diffusion process because the history of
previous policies can constrain or facilitate the policy making process, which in turn, affects the
development and/or implementation of future policies (Kronebusch, 1997). Cowart (1969)
suggests that welfare policies are incremental and new programs are influenced by previous
policies. Additionally, Pierson (2005) notes the following in regards to policy history:
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Studying the present as a ‘snapshot’ of a moment of time can distort what we see and
how we understand it in profound ways. Shifting to a developmental perspective presses
us, even when we are focusing on the present, to pay more attention to the long-term
sources of policy change, to address the central issue of policy sustainability, to consider
the possibilities that in the long run ‘small’ outcomes may end up being very big, while
‘big’ ones end up being small, and to adapt our analyses to the reality of ubiquitous
unintended consequences (p. 48).
Comparative studies on policy history provide insight on the evolving nature of policies and how
problems are addressed through statutory tools. Welfare policies, in particular, are well
documented and they display differences among state policies and divergent methods of tackling
a problem (Baldwin, 2005).
While studying the innovation and diffusion of Medicaid managed care programs,
Satterthwaite (2002) also analyzes the effect of previous policies. To assess policy history she
uses the number of years a health maintenance organization (HMO) has been present in a state
and whether a state has received a Section 1915 trial waiver as proxies to measure policy history.
Section 1915 waivers enable states to require Medicaid beneficiaries to enroll in state-approved
health plans, such as managed care organizations (MCO) and primary care case management
programs (Maglione & Ridgely, 2006; Satterthwaite, 2002). Satterthwaite (2002) finds that
increases in both measures contribute to the adoption of managed care. In a more recent study,
Callaghan and Jacobs (2014) create a policy trajectory measure that takes into account
established SCHIP and Medicaid policies to evaluate policy history. The measure focuses on
program generosity and their study reveals an association between the adoption of Medicaid
expansion under the ACA and previous policy decisions that offer generous welfare benefits.
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Policy history plays a significant role in the adoption of any policy (Kronebusch, 1997;
Satterthwaite, 2002). Welfare policies signify the intentions of state policymakers and provide
material/textual evidence by which to evaluate state Medicaid policies and rules (De Jong,
Graefe, Irving, Pierre, 2006). To observe the influence of policy history on Medicaid expansion,
we will utilize the Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database to assess Medicaid policies on a
lenient to stringent continuum (De Jong, Graefe, Irving, & Pierre, 2006). We believe that the
assessment of documented Medicaid policies is an appropriate measure of policy history because
of its comprehensive nature. Previous studies analyze policy history by focusing on generous
policies or prior Medicaid regulations (Callaghan & Jacobs, 2014; Jacobs & Callaghan, 2013;
Satterthwaite, 2002). Since many studies have found a correlation between liberal Medicaid
policies and the adoption of new programs, we expect states to expand Medicaid when they have
adopted liberal policies in the past.
H20: States that have adopted generous Medicaid policies in the past are more likely adopt
Medicaid expansion.
Chapter Summary
The objectives of this chapter are to shed light on the current state of Medicaid expansion
and to review the extant literature on the adoption of Medicaid policies by states in an effort to
understand what drives states to adopt Medicaid expansion. An exploration of the literature
reveals established explanators of state policy decisions which are then analyzed and fashioned
into five models: the political model, the economic model, the needs-based model, the state
capacity model, and the state innovation and diffusion model. Much of the research that is
presented in each of the models is based on the adoption of previous Medicaid policies, such as
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the SCHIP program, eligibility requirements, and managed care programs by states. While there
is a lack of research overall on the drivers of state decisions on Medicaid expansion, a few
empirical articles have tested some of the factors influencing state decisions in the expansion of
Medicaid (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 2014; Callaghan & Jacobs, 2014; Jacobs & Callaghan, 2013).
These articles conclude that politics trumps some of the drivers raised by this study including
citizen needs, but they lack an all-inclusive set of factors that influence state decisions. This
study is unique because it draws mostly on explanatory factors of prior Medicaid policies and the
current studies on Medicaid expansion to provide a comprehensive picture of the adoption of
Medicaid expansion by states. See Figure 2.7 below.

Figure 2.7. A Model of State Decision making in Medicaid Expansion
A recap of the hypotheses in this study is provided below.
H1: States with a high degree of interparty competition are more likely to adopt Medicaid
expansion.
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H2: States with a low proportion of African-American voters are more likely to reject
Medicaid Expansion.
H3: State governments with a conservative ideology are more likely to oppose Medicaid
expansion.
H4: Governors with a high level of institutional powers are more likely to oppose
Medicaid expansion.
H5: States with a high level of per capita income are more likely to expand Medicaid.
H6: As tax efforts increase, states are more likely to expand Medicaid.
H7: The larger a state’s budget shortfall, the less likely they are to expand Medicaid.
H8: States with a low level of Medicaid expenditures are more likely to expand Medicaid.
H9: States with high Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) rates are more
likely to expand Medicaid.
H10: States with higher supplemental poverty measure (SPM) rates are more likely to
expand Medicaid.
H11: States with a high proportion of elderly persons are less likely to expand Medicaid.
H12: States with low unemployment rates are more likely to expand Medicaid.
H13: States with high uninsurance rates are more likely to oppose Medicaid expansion.
H14: States with a high level of residents with good health statuses are more likely to
expand Medicaid.
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H15: States with a high degree of legislative professionalism are more likely to adopt
Medicaid expansion.
H16: States with a high level of institutional capacity will be more likely to expand
Medicaid.
H17: States with centralized Medicaid governing boards will most likely expand
Medicaid.
H18: States are more likely to emulate their geographic neighbors in choosing to adopt
Medicaid expansion.
H19: States with less generous Medicaid policies than their competitive neighbors are less
likely to expand Medicaid.
H20: States that have adopted generous Medicaid policies in the past are more likely adopt
Medicaid expansion.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

Chapter 1 introduced the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the issue
of Medicaid expansion. An explanation as to the significance and purpose of this study is
offered, which is to examine the influence of multiple factors that affect the adoption of
Medicaid expansion. Chapter 2 provided a review of past research on the adoption of Medicaid
policies and presented a model of state decision making in the adoption of Medicaid expansion
using five models as explanators of state adoption. This chapter will offer an explanation of this
dissertation’s methodology.
This chapter commences with a discussion of the research questions along with the
research design and approach. Then, the variables of interest are defined and displayed in table
form. Subsequently, the method of data analysis is described and limitations are presented.
Last, a summary of this chapter is provided to recapitulate the aims of this research.

Research Questions
The research question underlying this study is as follows: What are the factors that
influence states to adopt Medicaid expansion? The other research questions derived from the
proposed models suggested in this study, include the following: (a) Do political factors influence
the decision of states to adopt Medicaid expansion? (b) Do economic factors influence the
decision of states to adopt Medicaid expansion? (c) Do state population needs influence the
decision of states to adopt Medicaid expansion? (d) Does state capacity influence the decision of
states to adopt Medicaid expansion? (e) Do innovation and diffusion influence the decision of
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states to adopt Medicaid expansion? The examination of these research questions will
contribute to the body of knowledge on health policy and public policy by exploring influential
factors at the decision making stage of policy making. As the implementation of the ACA
continues and the lines of authority between states and the federal government become blurred in
the field of health care, the actions of states are of critical importance as states choose whether to
implement certain aspects of the ACA. While this study focuses on Medicaid expansion, one
aspect of this research agenda is to develop a model that can be replicated in future studies on
Medicaid expansion and adapted to other aspects of health policy making at the state-level.

Research Design and Approach
This study utilizes a state comparative cross-sectional research design to examine the
influence of political, economic, needs-based, state capacity, and innovation and diffusion
factors on Medicaid expansion. We primarily focus on the year 2012 because in the Supreme
Court ruling National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius, the federal
mandate to expand Medicaid was found unconstitutional and states were given the choice to
expand Medicaid. Therefore, the year 2012 represents a turning point for states as they decide
whether to adopt Medicaid expansion. This design is appropriate because there is a wealth of
information at the state level on the factors that play an influential role on Medicaid policy
decisions. The availability of state-wide data and the research design of this dissertation provide
a platform to examine and analyze the research questions in this study. Additionally, a crosssectional design allows for the comparison of a geographically dispersed population and the
collection of data at one point in time. Although changes cannot be measured over time and
causal inferences cannot be deduced, a cross-sectional design enables the researcher to analyze
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multiple outcomes and expose intended and unintended relationships among variables
(O’Sullivan, Rassel, & Berner, 2003; Mann, 2003).
A comparative analysis at the state-level is utilized as a methodological strategy to
inform this research. Comparing and contrasting phenomena with similar and dissimilar
attributes contributes to the interpretation and application of knowledge to complex processes
(Azarian, 2011). Comparative analysis is useful because it can reveal the policy practices of
states and provides insight into how states learn and borrow from each other (May, 2011, p. 249).
This type of analysis helps to understand, explore, and explain divergences across similar cases
(Azarian, 2011). Also, comparative analyses “help us to make sense of the observed variations
and capture the principles of both similarities and differences (Azarian, 2011, p. 118).
Although many studies have utilized a comparative analysis approach to study health care
policies at the state, national, and global level, scholars have questioned the validity of
comparative studies due to observed inconsistencies in regards to the operationalization of
variables (Wenzelburger, Zohlnhöfer, & Wolf, 2013). This dissertation primarily relies on
secondary data collected at the state-level and reported by federal agencies or reputable
Foundations such as the U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, the Federal Register, the Kaiser Family Foundation, or the Pew Research
Center. Considerations for the measurement and selection of every variable are assessed
according to the history of success of established variables, common criticisms associated with
the selection of a variable, and the promising nature of variables. Therefore, we examine
variables that consistently demonstrate an effect on Medicaid policies. We also evaluate
contentious variables and determine the selection of a variable using the literature as a guide and
the availability of data. Last, we examine new concepts in an effort to provide an innovative
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contribution to the body of health and public policy. To ensure transparency and validity, a
description of every variable is provided in this chapter.

Unit of Analysis
States serve as the unit of analysis for this study, and the collection of data are drawn
from a multitude of databases with state-level data. According to Neuman (2002), “the units of
analysis determine how a researcher measures variables or themes. They also correspond loosely
to the level of analysis in an explanation” (p. 156). All of the data for this study correspond to
state-specific characteristics and themes; conclusions will be contextualized accordingly.
Moreover, this study examines the influencers of the adoption of Medicaid expansion at the
macro-level because all 50 states are included in the study.

Dependent Variable
Although some may argue that the U.S. health care system is broken, fragmented, or
unsustainable, there is a lack of consensus on how to remedy the health care problems faced by
American citizens and states (Berwick, Nolan, Whittington, 2008; Chernew, Baicker, & Hsu,
2010). Although the original intention of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)
was to provide affordable health insurance for all U.S. citizens, the decision to expand Medicaid
became a choice for states that is riddled with competing philosophies. To tease out these
competing philosophies, five models are tested (political, economic, needs-based, state capacity,
and state innovation and diffusion) in order to assess the influence of state-level factors on the
adoption of Medicaid expansion. The dependent variable of interest in this study is Medicaid
expansion, more specifically, the actions taken by states in deciding to adopt Medicaid
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expansion. This measure is coded as 0 for states that have chosen to decline Medicaid
expansion, 1 for states that are undecided, 2 for states that have supported Medicaid expansion,
and 3 for states that have decided to adopt Medicaid expansion. Data for this variable is
collected from several sources for the year 2012. To determine whether states declined,
supported, adopted or are undecided about Medicaid expansion, we examine state legislation.
The criteria for demarcating the decisions of states follows: (1) If a state passed a House and
Senate bill in favor of Medicaid expansion and the Governor signed the bill or a Governor issued
an executive order expanding Medicaid, then we count that state as adopting Medicaid
expansion. (2) If a state passed a House and/or Senate bill in favor of Medicaid expansion, then
we count that state as supporting Medicaid expansion. (3) If a state proposed a study to evaluate
Medicaid expansion or a House or Senate bill is tabled or died without a decision being made by
the legislature, then we count that state as undecided. (4) If a state passed a House and/or Senate
bill in opposition of Medicaid expansion, then we count that state as declining Medicaid
expansion. (5) If there is not a bill on file in regards to Medicaid expansion, then we direct our
attention to states that challenged the constitutionality of Medicaid expansion (coded as “decline
Medicaid expansion”), filed amicus briefs in support of Medicaid expansion (coded as “support
Medicaid expansion”), or did not take a legal or formal position on Medicaid expansion (coded
as “undecided”) in the U.S. Supreme Court case National Federation of Independent Business
(NFIB) v. Sebelius to determine the status of state decisions on Medicaid expansion. This
information is reported by the Kaiser Family Foundation for the year 2012. Data for this
variable is displayed in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1
State Decision Status of Medicaid Expansion
State
Alabama

State Decision
Decline Medicaid
Expansion

Value
0

Alaska

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Arizona

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Arkansas

Undecided

1

California

Adopt Medicaid
Expansion
Decline Medicaid
Expansion

3

Adopt Medicaid
Expansion
Support Medicaid
Expansion

3

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Colorado

Connecticut
Delaware

Florida

0

2

Data Source
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Did not take a legal or
formal position on
Medicaid Expansion
State Legislation
SB 853
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
State Legislation
SB 1240
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Filed Amicus Brief
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Filed lawsuit
Challenging the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
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Georgia

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Hawaii

Support Medicaid
Expansion

2

Idaho

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Illinois

Support Medicaid
Expansion

2

Indiana

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Iowa

Undecided

1

Kansas

Decline Medicaid
Expansion
Undecided

0

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Kentucky

Louisiana

1

Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
State Legislation
SB 420
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Filed Amicus Brief
State Legislation
H 555
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Filed Amicus Brief
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Filed Amicus Brief
State Legislation
HR 6011
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Did not take a legal or
formal position on
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
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Maine

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Maryland

Support Medicaid
Expansion

2

Massachusetts

Support Medicaid
Expansion

2

Michigan

Support Medicaid
Expansion

2

Minnesota

Adopt Medicaid
Expansion
Decline Medicaid
Expansion

3

Missouri

Undecided

1

Montana

Undecided

1

Nebraska

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Nevada

Undecided

1

New Hampshire

Undecided

1

Mississippi

0

Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Filed Amicus Brief
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Filed Amicus Brief
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Filed Amicus Brief
Executive Order 11-01
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Did not take a legal or
formal position on
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Did not take a legal or
formal position on
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Did not take a formal
or legal position on
Medicaid Expansion
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New Jersey

Adopt Medicaid
Expansion

3

New Mexico

Support Medicaid
Expansion

2

New York

Support Medicaid
Expansion

2

North Carolina

Undecided

1

North Dakota

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Ohio

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Oklahoma

Undecided

1

Oregon

Support Medicaid
Expansion

2

Pennsylvania

Undecided

1

Rhode Island

Undecided

1

South Carolina

Undecided

1

State Legislation
P.L.2010, CHAPTER
74
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Filed Amicus Brief
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Filed Amicus Brief
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Did not take a legal or
formal position on
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Did not take a legal or
formal position on
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Filed Amicus Brief
State Legislation
H.R. No. 884
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Did not take a legal or
formal position on
Medicaid Expansion
State Legislation
H 3167
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South Dakota

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Tennessee

Undecided

1

Texas

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Utah

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Vermont

Support Medicaid
Expansion

2

Virginia

Decline Medicaid
Expansion
Adopt Medicaid
Expansion
Undecided

0

Wisconsin

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Wyoming

Undecided

1

Washington
West Virginia

3
1

Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Did not take a legal or
formal position on
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Filed Amicus Brief
State Legislation
HB 345
State Legislation
SB5596
State Legislation
SCR No. 80
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Filed lawsuit
challenging the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
State Legislation
SF No. 0034
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Independent Variables
Political Model
Political factors permeate the decision making process of Medicaid policies. State
decision makers affect policies through the identification of problems and facilitation of health
interventions via governmental action (Oliver, 2006). The political model in this study includes
four variables: interparty competition, governor institutional power, African-American voter, and
state government ideology. These variables measure the strength of political parties, the impact
of gubernatorial formal powers, the influence of race, and the ideological leanings of state
governments. A summary of the political variables is provided in Table 3.2.
Interparty Competition. Interparty competition is defined as the degree of competition
amongst elected officials in state legislative elections. This study utilizes Holbrook and Van
Dunk’s index to capture interparty competition with updated data collected from Shufeldt and
Flavin with the aggregated years 1990-1999. Although data for this variable are not available for
the year 2012, Holbrook and Van Dunk’s measure has produced stable results over the last 30
years (Shufeldt & Flavin, 2003).
Governor Institutional Power. Governor institutional power is defined as “powers given
to the governor by the state constitution, state statutes, and the voters when they vote on
constitutions and referenda” (Ferguson, 2013, p. 220). This study uses the index score for each
state for the year 2010 because data for the year 2012 are not available. Data for this variable are
collected from Ferguson (2013) from the Book of States and the election results for the year 2011
(Source: Book of States. [2010, 2011]. Lexington, KY: Council of State Governments).
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African-American Voter. African-American voter is defined as the percentage of AfricanAmerican voters for each state. In an effort to measure the influence of race on Medicaid
expansion, this study utilizes data collected from the U.S. Census Bureau: Current Population
Survey for the year 2012.
Ideology. State government ideology is defined as “the ideological ‘center of gravity’ of
a state’s elected governmental institutions on a liberal-conservative continuum” (Berry, Fording,
Ringquist, Hanson, & Klarner, 2010 p. 1). This study utilizes the state government ideology
score reported for each state for the year 2012. Data for this variable are collected from the
“Updated Citizen and Government Ideology Data, 1960-2013” data file (Fording, 2015).
Table 3.2
Political Model
Variable

Operationalization

Data Source

Inter-party
Competition

Index
Range:
(22.22-66.08)
Percentage of
African-American
voters in each state
Index
Range: (2.58-91.63)
Index
Range: (1.75-5.00)

Shufeldt & Flavin,
2012

African-American
Voter
Ideology
Governor
Institutional Power

Level of
Measurement
Interval

U.S. Census
Bureau: Current
Population Survey
Berry et al. 2015

Ratio

Ferguson, 2013

Interval

Interval
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Economic Model
Economic factors play a critical role in determining the feasibility of adopting a health
policy. Although states consider the cost of operating Medicaid expansion, states also rely on
assumptions of present and future fiscal conditions (Sommers & Epstein, 2010). The economic
model includes five variables: per capita income, tax effort, state budget shortfalls, health care
expenditures, and the federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP) rate. These variables
measure the fiscal condition of states, expenditures incurred by Medicaid beneficiaries, and
federal assistance given to states to operate Medicaid programs. A summary of the economic
variables is provided in Table 3.3.
Per Capita income. Per capita income is defined as the average earned income of
residents for each state. Data for this variable are measured in thousands of dollars for each
state. This information is collected from the U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of
Economic Analysis for the year 2012.
Tax Effort. Tax effort is characterized as the amount of taxes paid to states per capita.
This information is measured in dollars for each state. Data for this variable are collected from
the 2012 Annual Survey of State Government Tax Collections and the U.S. Census Bureau
Population Estimates. This information is obtained by a computation method utilized by the
Kaiser Family Foundation, which calculates state totals for income taxes, property taxes, license
taxes, sales and gross receipts taxes, and unclassified state taxes marked as other for the year
2012.
State Budget Shortfalls. According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, budget
shortfalls are defined as “the extent to which states’ revenues fall short of the cost of providing
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services” (Oliff, Mai, & Palacios, 2012, p. 2). Data for this variable are collected from the
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities using state estimates of budget shortfalls for the year
2012.
Health Care Expenditures. Health care expenditures are defined as spending on health
care by states. This information is collected from the Pew Charitable Trusts and the John D. and
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (2014a) for the year 2012. The data contains aggregated
estimates of state-level spending on health care by services rendered to Medicaid beneficiaries,
administrative costs, disproportionate share hospital payments, and local funding for Medicaid
services.
FMAP Rate. The Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) is classified as the
percentage of medical costs paid by the Federal government for each state for Medicaid
programs (Truffer, Klemm, Wolfe, Rennie, & Shuff, 2012). Data for this variable are collected
from the Federal Register for the year 2012 and reported in percentages.
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Table 3.3
Economic Model
Variable

Operationalization

Data Source

Per Capita Income

Per capita income is
defined as the
average earned
income of residents
for each state
Total amount of
taxes paid to states
per capita

U.S. Department of
Commerce: Bureau
of Economic
Analysis

Tax Effort

State Budget
Shortfall
Health Care
Expenditures

FMAP Rate

Total budget
shortfall reported
for each state
Total amount of
state-funded
Medicaid spending
in each state
Percentage of
Medical costs paid
by the federal
government for
Medicaid Services

Level of
Measurement
Interval

U.S. Census
Bureau: 2012
Annual Survey of
State Government
Tax Collections
Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities

Interval

The Pew Charitable
Trusts and the John
D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur
foundation
U.S. Department of
Health and Human
Services: Federal
Register

Interval

Interval

Ratio

Needs-Based Model
Needs-based factors are an integral component of state decision making. State health
policy priorities are based on the needs of the population. The needs-based model includes five
variables: poverty, the percentage of elderly, the percentage of the unemployed, the percentage
of the uninsured, and health status. These variables measure the prevalence of social conditions
that contribute to poor standards of living and impact of health indicators. A summary of the
needs-based variables is provided in Table 3.4.
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Poverty. This variable is defined as the percentage of people living in poverty during a
given calendar year. Data for this variable are collected from the United States Census Bureau’s
supplemental poverty measure (SPM) for the year 2012. The SPM takes into account cash
resources, noncash benefits, and also subtracts essential expenses such as childcare, health care,
and taxes (United States Census, 2014).
The Elderly. This variable is defined as the percentage of elderly persons aged 65 and
older living in each state. Data for this variable are collected from the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services: Administration on Aging for the year 2012.
Unemployed. This variable is defined as the percentage of the labor force that is
unemployed by state. Data for this variable are collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for
the year 2012.
The Uninsured. The uninsured is defined as the percentage of individuals who did not
have health insurance by state for the year 2012. Data for this variable are collected from the
U.S. Department of Commerce and the U.S. Census Bureau and the by means of the Annual
Social and Economic Supplement and derived from the Current Population Survey.
Health Status/Health Indicators. Health indicators play an important role in the
management of health care services. Klazinga, Stronks, Delnoij, and Verhoeff (2001) state that
“the link between indicators and public health lies in the extent that indicators measure for
management purposes… aimed at preventing disease, prolonging life and promoting health.
Thus, indicators are management tools for health care services and health systems” (p. 433). In
the past, common health indicators, such as life expectancy, infant mortality, and cause-related
mortality have directed population health priorities and assessments of health status (Robine,
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Romieu, & Cambois, 1999). Such indicators do not capture a holistic view of public health
needs. Currently, there is an acknowledgment amongst the healthcare community that measures
of health status should include physical, psychological, and social features of health in addition
to perceptions of well-being (Hennessy, Moriarty, Zack, Scheer, & Backbill, 1994). While there
are some health status measures that include an integrated assessment of health, there is no
measure of health status that is amendable to the Medicaid population. As a result, we create a
health status index that includes health perceptions, the mentally ill, and low birth weight. We
combine the percentages reported for each health indicator and divide the total score by three and
perform an inverse transformation to create a range from low (poor health status) to high (fair or
good health status). This calculation and transformation produces an index score for each state
and treats all indicators equally.
Health Perception. Health perception is defined as the percentage of state residents who
reported an overall health status as either fair or poor. Data for this variable are collected from
the Pew Charitable Trusts and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Tracking
Key Health Indicators (2014b) report for the year 2010 because data for the year 2012 are not
available.
Mentally Ill. Mentally ill is defined as the percentage of persons who have been
diagnosed as having a mental, emotional, or behavioral disorder by state. Data for this variable
are collected from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration using the
National Surveys on Drug Use and Health for the combined years 2009-2010, because data for
the year 2012 are not available.
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Low-birth weight. Low-birth weight is defined as the percentage of babies born in each
state that weigh less than 2,500 grams. Data for this variable are collected from National Vital
Statistics Reports for the year 2010. Although data are available for the year 2012, we will
compile information on this variable for the year 2010 to establish a consistent measure of health
status by collecting data across all of the health indicators for the same year.
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Table 3.4
Needs-Based Model
Variable

Operationalization

Data Source

Poverty

Percentage of state
residents living in
poverty
Percentage of
individuals aged 65
and older

U.S. Census Bureau
Supplemental
poverty measure
U.S. Department of
Health and Human
Services:
Administration on
Aging
U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics

Elderly

Unemployed

Uninsured

Health Status

Percentage of
unemployed state
residents
Percentage of
uninsured state
residents

Index
1) Health Perception
Percentage of state
residents reporting
an overall health
status of poor or fair
2) Mentally Ill
Percentage of state
residents diagnosed
with a mental,
emotional, or
behavioral disorder

U.S. Department of
Commerce and
Census Bureau:
Current Population
Reports

Level of
Measurement
Ratio

Ratio

Ratio

Ratio

Interval
Pew Charitable
Trusts and the John
D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur
Foundation
Substance Abuse
and Mental Health
Services
Administration;
National Surveys on
Drug Use and
Health

3) Low Birth
National Vital
Weight
Statistics Reports
Percentage of babies
born in each state
that weigh less than
2,500 grams
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State Capacity Model
State capacity factors are an essential element of the decision making process of
Medicaid policies. States assess their ability to execute the stated objectives of Medicaid
policies and consider the expertise of individuals in charge of handling complex health policies
(Bowen & Zei, 2005). The variables in the state capacity model include three variables:
Legislative professionalism, institutional capacity, and governance. A summary of these
variables is provided in Table 3.5.
Legislative Professionalism. This variable is defined as state legislative characteristics
that enable states to respond to problems and deliver services. Data for this variable are collected
from Squire’s (2012) state legislative professionalization index for the year 2009 because data
for the year 2012 are not available.
Institutional Capacity. Institutional capacity is defined as organizational structures and
processes that give state legislatures the ability to carry out a wide range of activities.
Institutional capacity is measured using data from the Government Performance Project on
financial management, human resources management, infrastructure, and performance
management for each state. Data for this variable are collected for the year 2008 because data
for the year 2012 are not available. We adopt Coggburn and Schneider’s (2003) method of
measurement by converting the assigned letter grades for each category to a 4.0 grade point
average scale for each state. We also create an index variable by using the average score for each
dimension of institutional capacity (financial management, human resources management,
infrastructure, and performance management) and dividing the total score by four. This
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calculation produces an index score for each state that treats each dimension of institutional
capacity equally.
Governance. Governance is defined as the governance structure (centralized, shared,
decentralized, and mixed) states utilize to manage Medicaid programs. We adopt the 2014
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO) categorization of governance
systems and assign a numerical value to each governing board based on ASTHO’s assessment of
strength. We utilize an ordinal scale with the highest value of 4 representing a consolidated
board (the most powerful arrangement) to the lowest value of 1 representing a planning board
(the weakest arrangement). Data for this variable are collected from the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC, 2016).
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Table 3.5
State Capacity Model
Variable

Operationalization

Data Source

Legislative
Professionalism
Institutional
Capacity

Index
Range: (.031-.606)
Grade point average
of the following:
1) Financial
Management
2) Human
Resources
3) Infrastructure
4) Performance
Management
Range: (1.00-4.00)
Centralized
Governance
Arrangement=4;
Shared Governance
Arrangement=3
Decentralized
Governance
Arrangement=2
Mixed Governance
Arrangement=1

Squire, 2012

Governance

Level of
Measurement
Interval

The Pew Center on
the States’
Government
Performance Project

Interval

Centers for Disease
Control and
Prevention, 2016

Ordinal

State Innovation and Diffusion Model
State innovation and diffusion factors play an important role in the decision making
process of Medicaid policies through emulation. State decision makers approach policy
problems by considering the actions or decisions of other states. The state innovation and
diffusion model includes four variables: geographic neighbor, neighbor effect, state competition,
and policy history. These variables measure the impact of geographic neighbors on Medicaid
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expansion and previous Medicaid policies enacted by states. A summary of each variable is
provided in Table 3.6.
Geographic Neighbor. Geographic neighbor is described as the proportion of a state’s
bordering neighbors that have expanded Medicaid. Data on this variable are collected from state
legislation on Medicaid expansion and the Kaiser Family Foundation (2015) for the year 2012.
Neighbor Effect. Using Bailey and Rom’s (2004) definition of neighbor effect, this
variable is defined as “the percent difference between a states’ generosity and its neighbor’s
generosity” (p. 333). Data for this variable are collected from the Kaiser Family Foundation
using the amount of money a state spends per recipient annually on Medicaid for the year 2011.
This variable is lagged based on the assumption that “a state’s generosity in a given year is
influenced by its peers’ generosity in the previous year” (Bailey & Rom, 2004, p. 334). For the
purposes of this study, we will analyze the differences in state generosity for the year 2011.
Additionally, states are weighted according to the size of their population using the United States
Statistical Abstract. Although we do not directly test the neighbor effect variable in our study,
we created this variable to test the influence of state competition on Medicaid expansion.
State Competition. State competition is defined as whether a state is competitive with its
contiguous states based on generosity. This variable utilizes the neighbor effect variable to
determine the generosity of a state to generate a dichotomous variable using Bailey and Rom’s
(2004) operationalization of “compete,” where a state is assigned a value of 1 if it is more
generous than its contiguous states and 0 if it spends less money on Medicaid enrollees. Data for
this variable are collected from the Kaiser Family Foundation for the year 2011. This variable is
lagged for the same reasons as the neighbor effect variable.
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Policy History. Policy history is defined as previous welfare rules that have been enacted
by states. To measure this variable we develop a coding scheme that assigns a value of 1 if a
state adopted a guideline and 0 if a state had restrictions or did not adopt a guideline. Then a
total count of the adopted guidelines is reported. High scores for this variable indicate that a
state has liberal welfare policies, while low scores signify stringent state policies. Our coding
scheme is loosely based on De Jong et al.’s (2006) welfare policy measure. De Jong et al. (2006)
utilize a lenient-to-stringent coding schema and determine the stringency/leniency of welfare
policies through dichotomous and ordinal measures. Since we are more interested in the factors
that influence states to adopt Medicaid expansion, we assign a value of 1 to states that adopt state
welfare guidelines to observe the prevalence of liberal policies. We also do not utilize the
ordinal component of De Jong et al.’s (2006) policy measure, because our study is not concerned
with multiple levels of stringency and leniency. Thus, we institute a continuous measure to
assess state welfare policies. Data for this variable are collected from the Urban Institute’s Rules
Database for the year 2012.
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Table 3.6
State Innovation and Diffusion Model
Variable

Operationalization

Data Source

Geographic State

Proportion of a
state’s bordering
neighbors that have
adopted Medicaid
expansion
Difference in
generosity between
a state and it’s
neighbors
Competitive=1;
Non-competitive=0

State Legislatures;
Kaiser Family
Foundation

Neighbor Effect

State Competition

Policy History

Total number of
adopted welfare
guidelines

Kaiser Family
Foundation; United
States Statistical
Abstract
Kaiser Family
Foundation; United
States Statistical
Abstract
Urban Institute’s
Welfare Rules
Database

Level of
Measurement
Interval

Interval

Nominal

Interval

Data Analysis
This research seeks to recognize, categorize, and apply meaning to the factors that
influence states to expand Medicaid. We test five research questions proposed by this study and
utilize multinomial logistic regression to analyze each model using the statistical software
program STATA. This method of analysis is appropriate for this study because the dependent
variable is categorical. Moreover, multinomial logistic regression is suitable for our study
because the predictor variables are continuous, categorical, or a combination (Lee & Pradhan,
2007). Our study respects the general assumptions of multinomial logistic regression and
includes the following: (a) the relationship among the variables is not normally distributed, (b)
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Outliers are absent from the model, and (c) there is full model specification (Berman & Wang,
2012).
In addition to multinomial logistic regression and predicted probabilities, descriptive
statistics and cross tabulations will be performed to assure full model specification. We will also
clean the data, check the data for outliers, and create new variables from existing databases to fit
the parameters of our study. Additionally, we will assess the goodness of fit for each model, and
the log likelihood value to evaluate the entire model. Moreover, the Cox & Snell R2 and
Nagelkerke R2 will be analyzed to explain the variance of the model, and the Hosmer and
Lemeshow statistic will be evaluated to analyze how close the observed frequencies and
predicted frequencies match (Bayaga, 2010; Berman & Wang, 2012; Hosmer, Hosmer, Le
Cessie, & Lemeshow, 1997). Each model will be analyzed using this process and then a
comprehensive model will be formed based on the significant factors that influence Medicaid
expansion.

Limitations
Although every effort is made to design this study carefully and methodically, there are
some limitations. This study utilizes a cross-sectional research design, but some of the data that
are used in this study are not available for the year 2012. As a result, we use data in preceding or
latter years to measure certain variables. To avoid using outdated data, we investigate the
stability of the measures over time through literature searches.
Another limitation involves the generalizability of this study. This study is limited to the
United States and the policy issues and propositions that are contained in this study may not be
applicable to other countries. However, this study could be useful to other policy domains
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within the United States. The models comprise factors that affect the decision making process of
states and are derived from a multitude of disciplines.
Summary
This chapter provides an explanatory approach to the research methodology of this study.
A description of the dependent and independent variables were presented along with the data
sources used to collect the information. This study will utilize multinomial logistic regression to
analyze five models (political, economic, needs-based, state capacity, and state innovation and
diffusion) and a resultant comprehensive model of state decision making in the expansion of
Medicaid. This research seeks to understand the factors that influence states to expand Medicaid
and contribute to the academic body of knowledge by offering explanations on dominant state
characteristics and prominent factors influencing Medicaid policy. Chapter 4 presents the
findings of this study in addition to descriptive statistics and the data analyses derived from each
model.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

This chapter presents the descriptive statistics for the data used in this study and the
results of the multinomial regression analysis for each model. The software program utilized to
perform statistical analysis is Stata/IC 12.1. The results are represented in tabular displays and
organized by each model and research question. The chapter commences with a discussion of
the dependent variable and follows with analytic descriptions and analysis of the data and
findings.
Dependent Variable
Descriptive Statistics
The dependent variable is comprised of decisions made by states measured by analyzing
state actions in adopting Medicaid expansion. As discussed in Chapter 3, a coding scheme is
developed to assess and measure the actions of states. The measure is coded as 0 for states that
have chosen to decline Medicaid expansion, 1 for states that are undecided, 2 for states that have
supported Medicaid expansion, and 3 for states that have decided to adopt Medicaid expansion.
The dependent variable is positively skewed to the right and leptokurtic. Table 4.1 represents the
descriptive statistics for Medicaid expansion for all 50 states. Table 4.2 provides the decisions of
states on Medicaid expansion.
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Table 4.1
Descriptive Statistics for Medicaid Expansion for all 50 States
Variable

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

Kurtosis

Range

Medicaid Expansion

1

1.01

0

3

2.2

3

Table 4.2
State Decision Status of Medicaid Expansion
State
Alabama

State Decision
Decline Medicaid
Expansion

Value
0

Alaska

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Arizona

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Arkansas

Undecided

1

California

Adopt Medicaid
Expansion
Decline Medicaid
Expansion

3

Adopt Medicaid
Expansion

3

Colorado

Connecticut

0

Data Source
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Did not take a legal or
formal position on
Medicaid Expansion
State Legislation
SB 853
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
State Legislation
SB 1240
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Delaware

Support Medicaid
Expansion

2

Florida

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Georgia

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Hawaii

Support Medicaid
Expansion

2

Idaho

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Illinois

Support Medicaid
Expansion

2

Indiana

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Iowa

Undecided

1

Kansas

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Kaiser Family
Foundation
Filed Amicus Brief
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Filed lawsuit
Challenging the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion

Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
State Legislation
SB 420
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Filed Amicus Brief
State Legislation
H 555
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Filed Amicus Brief
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion

Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Filed Amicus Brief
State Legislation
HR 6011
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Kentucky

Undecided

1

Louisiana

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Maine

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Maryland

Support Medicaid
Expansion

2

Massachusetts

Support Medicaid
Expansion

2

Michigan

Support Medicaid
Expansion

2

Minnesota

Adopt Medicaid
Expansion
Decline Medicaid
Expansion

3

Missouri

Undecided

1

Montana

Undecided

1

Mississippi

0

Kaiser Family
Foundation
Did not take a legal or
formal position on
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Filed Amicus Brief
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Filed Amicus Brief
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Filed Amicus Brief
Executive Order 11-01
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Did not take a legal or
formal position on
Medicaid Expansion

Kaiser Family
Foundation
Did not take a legal or
formal position on
Medicaid Expansion
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Nebraska

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Nevada

Undecided

1

New Hampshire

Undecided

1

New Jersey

Adopt Medicaid
Expansion
Support Medicaid
Expansion

3

New York

Support Medicaid
Expansion

2

North Carolina

Undecided

1

North Dakota

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Ohio

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Oklahoma

Undecided

1

New Mexico

2

Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Did not take a formal
or legal position on
Medicaid Expansion
State Legislation
P.L.2010, Chapter 74
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Filed Amicus Brief
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Filed Amicus Brief
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Did not take a legal or
formal position on
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Did not take a legal or
formal position on
Medicaid Expansion
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Oregon

Support Medicaid
Expansion

2

Pennsylvania

Undecided

1

Rhode Island

Undecided

1

South Carolina

Undecided

1

South Dakota

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Tennessee

Undecided

1

Texas

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Utah

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Vermont

Support Medicaid
Expansion

2

Virginia

Decline Medicaid
Expansion
Adopt Medicaid
Expansion

0

Washington

3

Kaiser Family
Foundation
Filed Amicus Brief
State Legislation
H.R. No. 884
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Did not take a legal or
formal position on
Medicaid Expansion
State Legislation
H 3167
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Did not take a legal or
formal position on
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion

Kaiser Family
Foundation
Challenged the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Filed Amicus Brief
State Legislation
HB 345
State Legislation
SB5596
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West Virginia

Undecided

1

Wisconsin

Decline Medicaid
Expansion

0

Wyoming

Undecided

1

State Legislation
SCR No. 80
Kaiser Family
Foundation
Filed lawsuit
challenging the
constitutionality of
Medicaid Expansion
State Legislation
SF No. 0034

Political Model
Descriptive Statistics
The political model consists of four variables; interparty competition, African-American
voter, ideology, and governor institutional power. Table 4.3 depicts the descriptive statistics for
all 50 states. The variables interparty competition and African-American voter are negatively
skewed, but interparty competition is leptokurtic while African-American voter is platykurtic.
The variable ideology is positively skewed and leptokurtic. The variable governor institutional
power is positively skewed and bimodal which indicates that two peaks are far apart (Knapp,
2007). An analysis of the descriptive statistics reveals that the data are not normally distributed;
however, multinomial logistic regression does not require nor assume normality, linearity, or
homogeneity for independent variables (Bayaga, 2010; Berman & Wang, 2012). For this reason,
natural log transformations were not performed to normalize the data.
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Table 4.3
Political Model Descriptive Statistics for all 50 States
Variable

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

Kurtosis Range

Inter-Party Competition
African-American Voter
Ideology
Governor Institutional Power

44.40
39.83
41.48
3.26

10.84
29.77
30.32
.48

22.22
0
2.58
2.3

66.08
82
91.63
4.3

2.31
-.49
1.58
2.34

43.86
82
89.05
2

Correlation Analysis
An examination of correlations between the independent and dependent variables is
performed. Table 4.4 illustrates the results for the political model. According to Guilford’s
guidelines for interpreting Pearson r values (Sprinthall, 2012), there is a low negative correlation
between interparty competition and African-American voter (r = -.34, p < .05). Although there
is an assumption that diversity leads to an increase in interparty competition (Hero & Tolbert,
1996), the results of this study can reflect changes in voting patterns and diversity of political
party representation amongst African-American voters (Griffin & Keane, 2006). Moreover,
there is a low positive association between Medicaid expansion and interparty competition
(r = .30, p < .05). This correlation supports the literature that demonstrates that states are more
likely to adopt Medicaid expansion when there is interparty competition (Barrilleaux & Brace,
2007; Bernick, 2011; Soss et al. 2001). Last, there is a moderate positive correlation between
Medicaid expansion and ideology (r = .69, p < .001). Again, the literature shows that liberal
states are more likely to increase Medicaid expansion (Barrilleaux & Miller, 1988; Pracht, 2007;
Schneider, 1993, 1997; Volden, 2006).
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Since interparty competition and African-Americans is negatively correlated and
multinomial logistic regression assumes that multicollinearity is not present, further investigation
is warranted. For linear regression, the variance inflation factor (VIF) is used to assess
multicollinearity. However, the VIF test is not an available function for multinomial regression.
As an alternative method for analyzing multicollinearity, linear regression is performed due to
the composition of the dependent variable to generate VIF values. The mean VIF value for all of
the variables is 1.13, which indicates that multicollinearity is not an issue for the political model
because the threshold for collinearity is 10 and higher (Hair et al., 2010; Institute for Digital
Research and Education, 2016). As a result of the VIF test, all of the variables will remain in the
political model.
Table 4.4
Political Model Correlations for Dependent and Independent Variables
Inter-Party
Competition

Inter-Party Competition
African-American Voter
Ideology
Governor Institutional Power
Medicaid Expansion

1.00
-.34*
.27
.16
.30*

AfricanAmerican
Voter

1.00
-.11
.06
.07

Ideology

1.00
.16
.69***

Governor
Medicaid
Institutional Expansion
Power

1.00
.13

1.00

Note: *Correlation is significant at .05 level, **Correlation is significant at .01 level,
***Correlation is significant at .001 level.
Data Analysis
Multinomial logistic regression is utilized to analyze the political model and to address
the following question: Do political factors influence the decision of states to adopt Medicaid
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expansion? The model is significant with a likelihood ratio chi-square of 56.74 and a p-value of
.0001. Statistical tests to assess goodness of fit are performed and are presented in Table 4.5.
The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test is not an available function with the software
program Stata, however, an alternative test is used that produces the same results (Fagerland &
Hosmer, 2012). Although the Hosmer-Lemshow statistics are reported in the model summary, it
should be noted that this test has limitations and one cannot conclude that the model is poorly
fitted based on the results of one goodness-of-fit test (Fagerland & Hosmer, 2012). The political
model summary results indicate that 73.5% of the variance in state decisions in Medicaid
expansion is explained by the model.
Table 4.5
Political Model Summary
Model/
Significance

McFadden
R2

Cox and
Snell R2

NagelKerke HosmerR2
Lemeshow/
Significance

56.74 (.000)

.443

.678

.735

14.623
(.931)

The results from the multinomial regression analysis for the political model are displayed
in Table 4.6. For the purpose of interpretation, the relative risk ratio is utilized instead of the
coefficients to lend understanding to the variables of interest. Relative risk ratios provide
meaningful applications to public health affairs because calculations are based on a proportional
scale versus an absolute scale (Schechtman, 2002).
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Table 4.6
Political Model Multinomial Regression Analysis
(Base Outcome Group: Undecided)

Decline
Inter-Party Competition
African-American Voter
Ideology
Governor Institutional Power
Constant
Support
Inter-Party Competition
African-American Voter
Ideology
Governor Institutional Power
Constant
Adopt
Inter-Party Competition
African-American Voter
Ideology
Governor Institutional Power
Constant

β

RRR

S.E.

.04
.01
-.04*
2.30*
-7.70

1.04
1.01
.96
10.01
.00

.05
.02
.02
11.26
.00

.04
.00
.06*
3.57*
-17.01

1.05
1.00
1.06
35.37
4.11

.07
.02
.03
54.17
2.66

.28
.05
.07
3.30
-32.88

1.33
1.06
1.08
27.21
5.26

.20
.04
.05
53.09
6.56

Note: *Correlation is significant at .05 level.
There is a wealth of literature that demonstrates that political factors influence Medicaid
policies (Brown, 1995; Kim & Jennings, 2012; Rom, Peterson, & Scheve, 1998). However, for
the political model, only two variables are statistically significant. Hypothesis 1 predicts that
states with a high degree of interparty competition are more likely to adopt Medicaid expansion.
Surprisingly, interparty competition did not have any effect on the decisions of states to expand
Medicaid. Although there is a positive relationship between ideology and Medicaid as expected,
the results are insignificant. An important factor that deserves consideration is the scale of
measurement used to determine interparty competition. The literature on political factors
assessing interparty competition and party control is inundated with multiple scales of
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measurement (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 2014; Callaghan & Jacobs, 2014; Satterwaithe, 2002).
Although the most consistent measure of interparty competition is used in this study, there may
be another measure that appropriately captures the influence of interparty competition on
Medicaid expansion or perhaps Medicaid expansion is an issue that is nonpartisan. The other
variable that does not have an effect on Medicaid expansion is race.
Hypothesis 2 approximates that states with a low proportion of African-American voters
are more likely to reject Medicaid expansion. Research on the influence of racial politics focuses
primarily on welfare benefits (Howard, 1999; Soss, Schram, Vartanian, & O’Brien, 2001).
However, there is a distinct difference between the actions of states on limiting benefits and
implementing a large-scale program. The findings indicate that racial politics in terms of voter
participation does not affect the decisions of states on Medicaid expansion. This finding could
reflect a false notion that “as the number of African-Americans who vote increases, one would
expect government to treat them more favorably” (Filer, Kenny, & Morton, 1991, p. 393). On
the other hand, the results could suggest a difference of representation among African-American
voters. Griffin and Keane’s (2006) study on the composition of African-American voters and
voter turnout reveal that the policy preferences of conservative African-American voters are
considered more than the policy preferences of moderate or liberal African-Americans by
European American members of Congress.
Although interparty competition and race do not have an effect on Medicaid expansion,
ideology and governor institutional power are statistically significant. Hypothesis 3 is supported
by the findings and suggests that state governments with a conservative ideology are more likely
to oppose Medicaid expansion. A one-way table of summary statistics (See Appendix A) reveals
that states that opt to decline Medicaid expansion have an average state government ideology
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score of 19.65. According to Berry et al.’s (1998) measure of state government ideology, low
values on the continuum of state ideology represent conservative governments. Conversely,
ideology is also statistically significant for states that support Medicaid expansion. The
ideological mean score of state governments that support Medicaid expansion is 71.67. This
mean score falls on the high end of the continuum thus indicating that liberal states support
Medicaid expansion. While the findings confirm that conservative governments are declining
Medicaid expansion, we also see that liberal state governments support Medicaid expansion.
Hypothesis 4 proposes that governors with a high level of institutional powers are more
likely to oppose Medicaid expansion. An increase in governor institutional power of one
standard deviation is associated with a 910% greater relative risk of states deciding to decline
Medicaid expansion (RRR = 10.01, p < .01). This finding is consistent with other studies that
find that gubernatorial institutional powers influence policy (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 2014;
Kousser, 2002; Woods, 2004). Unexpectedly, governor institutional capacity is also positively
statistically significant for states that support Medicaid expansion (RRR = 35.37, p < .05). This
finding leads one to suspect that conservative governors with a high level of institutional powers
are more likely to take an affirmative stance on Medicaid expansion than liberal governors with
high levels of institutional power.
A comparison of state decisions using a one-way stable of summary statistics (see
Appendix A) and using the mean score of each variable on Medicaid expansion reveals that
states with a high degree of interparty competition choose to adopt Medicaid expansion versus
decline, support, or are undecided on Medicaid expansion. States that choose to support
Medicaid expansion have a moderate degree of interparty competition. States that decline or are
undecided on Medicaid expansion have a low degree of interparty competition. These findings

116

support the literature on interparty competition, which demonstrates a link between the adoption
of Medicaid policies when states have a high degree of interparty competition and the nonadoption of Medicaid policies when states have a low degree of interparty competition
(Barrilleaux & Brace, 2007; Bernick, 2011).
An analysis of state decisions on the effect of African American voters on Medicaid
expansion shows that states that choose to adopt Medicaid expansion have a higher percentage of
African-American voters than states that choose to decline, support, or are undecided on
Medicaid expansion. For states that choose to decline Medicaid expansion, there are a moderate
percentage of African-American voters. There is not much of a difference between states that
support or are undecided in regards to the influence of African-American voters on Medicaid
expansion. The states are similar in terms of the average population of African-American voters.
This finding indicates that states with a lower population of African-American voters are more
likely to support or are undecided on Medicaid expansion.
For ideology, an examination of state decisions on Medicaid expansion demonstrates that
conservative states are more likely to decline Medicaid expansion. Conversely, liberal states are
more likely to support and adopt Medicaid expansion. This finding indicates that the defining
characteristic that leads states to adopt or support Medicaid expansion is liberalism. On the
conservative to liberal continuum, states that are undecided fall in the middle. This outcome
provides additional evidence that Medicaid expansion may be nonpartisan.
A review of the effect of governor institutional power on state decisions on Medicaid
expansion discloses that governors with higher than average institutional powers are more likely
to support and adopt Medicaid expansion. On the other hand, governors with slightly higher
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than average institutional powers are more likely to decline Medicaid expansion. These findings
suggest that governors with high institutional powers exercise their rights to make affirmative
decisions. For states that are undecided on Medicaid expansion, the findings reveal that
governors have low institutional powers. This result alludes to the fact that states are slower to
act on a decision when governors have a low degree of institutional power.
The decisions of states on Medicaid expansion in relation to political factors are varied,
with the exception of governor institutional power. The adoption of Medicaid expansion is
associated with high percentages of African-Americans and high levels of governor institutional
power, state government, and interparty competition. However, for states that decide to decline,
support, or are undecided on Medicaid expansion, the political factors do not display a pattern
amongst each dimension. Figure 4.1 represents the influence of political factors on Medicaid
expansion in graphical form.
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Figure 4.1. Pivot table displaying the effect of political factors on Medicaid expansion using
mean values of the variables African-American voter, governor institutional power, ideology,
and interparty competition in relation to the decision of states on Medicaid expansion.

Economic Model
Descriptive Statistics
The economic model consists of five variables; per capita income, tax effort, state budget
shortfall, health care experiences, and federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP) rates.
Table 4.7 illustrates the descriptive statistics for all 50 states. All of the variables are skewed to
the right and leptokurtic. The numerical value of the variables per capita income, tax effort, state
budget shortfall, and health care expenditures are reduced for interpretational purposes. The
reduction of the data partially reflects the schema of government data reports. For example, 1.5
billion represents a value of 1.5; 700 million denotes 0.7; 115 million signifies 0.115; 11 million
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indicates 0.011; 6 million conveys .006; and 62 thousand refers to .000062. This study focuses
on the relative size of each variable.
Table 4.7
Economic Model Descriptive Statistics for all 50 States
Variable

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

Kurtosis Range

Per Capita Income
Tax Effort
State Budget Shortfall
Healthcare Expenditures
FMAP Rate

0.0000432
0.01592
2.14
3.616
59.42

6.72
0.02
4.03
5.28
7.96

0.000033
0.002
0
0.3
50.00

0.000062
0.115
23.9
26.3
74.18

2.95
15.75
18.71
13.85
13.85

0.000029
0.113
23.9
26
24.18

Correlation Analysis
Correlations between the dependent and independent variables are performed. Table 4.8
depicts the results for the economic model. Using Guilford’s guidelines for interpreting Pearson
r values (Sprinthall, 2012), there is a low positive correlation between per capita income and
state budget shortfall (r = .29, p < .05). This is consistent with the findings of other studies that
show that states with great wealth have greater government expenditures (Baqir, 2002;
Buchanan, Cappelleri, & Ohsfeldt, 1991; Gray, 1973). Additionally, there is a negative high
correlation between per capita income and FMAP rates (r = -.87, p < .0001) and a positive
moderate correlation between per capita income and Medicaid expansion (r = .42, p <.01). The
negative correlation between per capita income and FMAP rates is due to the financing structure
of the Medicaid program in which the federal government contributes less monetary funds to
states with high per capita income (Hoffman, Klees, & Curtis, 2000). The correlation between
per capita income and Medicaid expansion is also indicative of the literature, which shows that
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states with great wealth have a propensity to adopt Medicaid expansion (Grogan & Rigby, 2009;
Satterthwaite, 2002; Walker, 1969).
Tax effort is significantly correlated with four variables. The results indicate that there is
a very high positive correlation between tax effort and health expenditures (r = .94, p <.0001), a
negative low correlation between tax effort and FMAP rates (r = -.31, p < .05), a very high
positive correlation between tax effort and state budget shortfalls (r = .96, p < .0001), and a
positive low correlation between tax effort and Medicaid expansion (r = .34, p < .05). The
positive correlations between tax effort and health care expenditures, state budget shortfalls, and
Medicaid expansion represent the “economic reach of governments” and the capacity of state
governments (Arbetman-Rabinowitz & Johnson, 2007, p. 2). When states draw dollars from
state government taxes, they can spend more money on health care, government expenditures,
and expanded Medicaid programs. The negative correlation between tax effort and FMAP rates
is also indicative of the financing scheme of the Medicaid program (Hoffman, Klees, & Curtis,
2000). States that receive fewer funds in taxes from state residents are most likely to have a low
level of per capita income. In such a case, a state thus qualifies for a high FMAP rate.
State budget shortfalls and health care expenditures are also significantly correlated with
multiple variables. The correlation analysis indicates that there is a positive high correlation
between state budget shortfall and health care expenditures (r = .87, p <.0001), a negative low
correlation between state budget shortfall and FMAP rates (r = -.36, p < .05), and a positive
moderate correlation between state budget shortfall and Medicaid expansion (r = .42, p <.01).
The correlation between state budget shortfall and health expenditures is most likely due to the
cost of health care and its effect on state government budgets, such as creating large deficits
(Bodenheimer, 2005). The association between state budget shortfall and Medicaid expansion
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might signify that states need to expand Medicaid because of large state government
expenditures.
Since many of the variables in the economic model are correlated, a VIF test is utilized to
assess multicollinearity. The mean value for all of the variables is 13.93, thus signaling an issue
of multicollinearity. As a result, the variables tax effort and state budget shortfalls are excluded
from the multinomial regression analysis. Since governments have reactive tendencies
(Haveman, 1994), we assume that states are more likely to make policy decisions in relation to
Medicaid based on rising health care costs than tax effort and state budget shortfalls. Health care
expenditures have contributed significantly to state government deficits and many states are
reluctant to increase taxes for state residents during times of economic uncertainty (Osborne,
1993). Moreover, health care expenditures remain in the economic model because the literature
on indicators that impact Medicaid policies is slanted more towards the influence of health care
expenditures rather than state budget shortfalls and tax effort.
Table 4.8
Economic Model Correlations for Dependent and Independent Variables
Per
Tax
Capita Effort
Income

Per Capita Income
Tax Effort
State Budget Shortfall
Health Care Expenditures
FMAP Rate
Medicaid Expansion

1.00
.23
.29*
.27***

1.00
.94***
.96***
-.87*** -.31*
.42**
.34*

State
Budget
Shortfall

1.00
.87***
-.36**
.42**

Health Care FMAP
Expenditures Rate

Medicaid
Expansion

1.00
-.32*
.33*

1.00

1.00
-.42**

Note: *Correlation is significant at .05 level, **Correlation is significant at .01 level,
***Correlation is significant at .001 level.
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Data Analysis
Multinomial logistic regression is utilized to address the following question: Do
economic factors influence the decision of states to adopt Medicaid expansion? The economic
model in this study failed to achieve convergence. To identify and address issues of
convergence, Long (1997) suggests the following: (a) Data should be checked for incorrect
variables, (b) convergence problems can occur when the proportion of observations in relation to
the number of variables is large, (c) large differences in regards to the standard deviation among
the variables can contribute to convergence failures, and (d) the distribution of the outcome
variable and the number of cases that fall within each category can produce convergence
problems. An assessment of each suggestion offered by Long (1997) reveals that the economic
model does not violate the common issues associated with convergence failure. As a result, we
utilize Allison’s (2008) approach for dealing with convergence failures; we report the results and
notate the offending variables with an infinity sign. Allison (2008) argues that, “if one leaves the
offending variables in the model, the coefficients, standards errors, and test statistics for the
remaining variables are still valid maximum likelihood estimates” (p. 8).
The model summary is presented in Table 4.9. Statistical tests are performed to assess
goodness of fit; however, an error message occurred that indicates that convergence is not
achieved. The model is significant, with a likelihood ratio chi-square of 22.12 and a p-value of
.01. The Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic is not reported for this model because it could not be
estimated with the alternative test offered by Fagerland, Hosmer, and Bofin (Fagerland &
Hosmer, 2012). The results from the economic model summary suggest that 38.7% of the
variance in state decisions in Medicaid expansion is explained by the model.
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Table 4.9
Economic Model Summary
Model/
Significance

McFadden
R2

Cox and
Snell R2

NagelKerke HosmerR2
Lemeshow/
Significance

22.12(.003)

.173

.357

.387

n/a

The results from the multinomial regression analysis for the economic model are
displayed in Table 4.10. Relative risk ratios are reported for interpretation purposes. Again, the
model did not achieve convergence and the infinity sign symbolizes offending variables and
missing maximum likelihood estimates.
Table 4.10
Economic Multinomial Regression Analysis
(Base Outcome Group: Undecided)

Decline
Per Capita Income
Health Care Expenditure
FMAP Rate
Constant
Support
Per Capita Income
Health Care Expenditure
FMAP Rate
Constant
Adopt
Per Capita Income
Health Care Expenditure
FMAP Rate
Constant

β

RRR

S.E.

-20568.93
.08
-.03
2.56

0.00
1.09
0.97
12.90

0.00
0.16
.10
138.72

-4378.52
.17
-.10
5.14

0.00
1.19
.91
171.33

0.00
0.18
0.10
2028.99

754.97
.17
-22.79***
∞

∞
1.19
1.27
∞

∞
0.19
2.06
∞

Note: ***Correlation is significant at .001 level.
∞: Maximum likelihood estimates do not exist.
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For the economic model, one variable out of three is statistically significant. Hypothesis
5 specifies that states with a high level of per capita income are more likely to expand Medicaid.
Although many studies find that per capita income has an effect on the adoption of Medicaid
policies (Grogan & Ribgy, 2009; Satterthwaite, 2002; Volden, 2006), per capita income is not
statistically significant in this study. Hypotheses 6 and 7 are omitted from the analysis due to
issues of multicollinearity. Nor are health care expenditures statistically significant. Hypothesis
8 suggests that states with a low level of Medicaid expenditures are more likely to expand
Medicaid. Surprisingly, health care expenditures did not have an effect on the adoption of
Medicaid expansion. Again, the results of the economic model are affected by convergence
failure.
The only significant variable in the economic model is FMAP rate. Hypothesis 9
proposes that states with high FMAP rates are more likely to expand Medicaid. The findings
indicate that a one standard deviation in FMAP rate is associated with a 27% greater relative risk
of states adopting Medicaid expansion. Unexpectedly, the results indicate that although this
variable is significant, it is significant in the opposite direction. This finding runs counter to
Satterthwaite’s (2002) study in which the results demonstrate that states with low FMAP rates
are more likely to forgo new Medicaid programs while states with high FMAP rates were more
likely to adopt innovative Medicaid programs. This counterintuitive finding could result from
changing economic conditions. In 2002 many states were facing budget deficits and FMAP rates
were declining because the formula was based on data from times of economic prosperity. As
states were struggling to pay for Medicaid programs with fewer federal funds, the Greater
Access to Pharmaceutical Act was passed to provide an increase in matching funds for a
temporary period of time (Ku, Ross, & Nathanson, 2002).
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A comparison of state decisions using a one-way stable of summary statistics (see
Appendix B) and using the mean score of each variable on the influence of per capita income on
Medicaid expansion reveals that states that choose to decline or are undecided on Medicaid
expansion have lower than average per capita income. This finding could signal that states are
unwilling to expand Medicaid when they cannot draw a substantial amount of tax dollars from
per capita income. On the other hand, states that choose to support or adopt Medicaid expansion
have higher than average per capita income. This finding confirms the notion that states that
have great wealth are more likely to experiment or adopt new programs (Gray, 1973,
Satterthwaite, 2002; Walker, 1969).
An analysis of states decisions on the effect of health care expenditures on Medicaid
expansion shows that states that support or adopt Medicaid expansion have higher than average
health care expenditures. This finding indicates that these states have a vested interest in
expanding Medicaid due to the amount of state dollars that are spent on health care expenditures
for Medicaid recipients. Conversely, states that choose to decline or are undecided on expanding
Medicaid have lower than average health care expenditures. This discovery contradicts the
proposed hypothesis, H8, that states with a low level of health care expenditures are more likely
to expand Medicaid. Although states assess their Medicaid programs and make policy decisions
as a result of program expenditures (Kim & Jennings, 2012; Cantor, Thompson & Farnham,
2013), the findings suggest that states are risk-averse.
An examination of FMAP rates in relation to the decisions of states in Medicaid
expansion demonstrates that states that chose to decline or are undecided on Medicaid expansion
have higher than average FMAP rates. This finding indicates that these states are receiving a
substantial amount of funding from the federal government based on the federal guidelines
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formula for matching funds (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2012).
Moreover, the results of this study indicates that there is little incentive for these states to expand
Medicaid because they have low health care expenditures and the government subsidies a
substantial portion of the Medicaid program. In contrast, states that choose to adopt or support
Medicaid expansion have low FMAP rates. Again, the results demonstrate that states have a
vested interest in expanding Medicaid because they are receiving fewer funds from the federal
government to operate the current Medicaid program.
Overall, the economic model shows diverse patterns amongst the states in regards to their
decisions on Medicaid expansion. However, the difference between states that adopt and decline
Medicaid expansion is conversely related. States that opt to adopt Medicaid expansion have low
FMAP rates, high health care expenditures, and high per capita income, while states that decide
to decline Medicaid expansion have high FMAP rates, low health care expenditures, and low per
capita income. Figure 4.2 represents the influence of economic factors on Medicaid expansion in
graphical form. The variables health care expenditures and per capita income are transformed to
reflect whole numbers.
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Figure 4.2. Pivot table displaying the effect of economic factors on Medicaid expansion using
mean values of the variables FMAP rate, health care expenditures, and per capita income in
relation to the decision of states on Medicaid expansion.

Needs-Based Model
Descriptive Statistics
The needs-based model consists of five variables; poverty, the percentage of the elderly,
the percentage of the unemployed, the percentage of the uninsured, and health status. Table 4.11
depicts the descriptive statistics for all 50 states. The variables poverty and the percentage of
uninsured are positively skewed and leptokurtic. Alternatively, the variables percentage of the
elderly, percentage of the unemployed, and health status are negatively skewed and leptokurtic.
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Table 4.11
Needs-Based Model Descriptive Statistics for all 50 States
Variable

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

Kurtosis Range

Poverty
% Elderly
% Unemployed
% Uninsured
Health Status

13.87
14.03
7.34
13.61
.07

3.15
1.68
1.71
4.14
.01

8.6
8.5
3.1
3.9
.06

23.8
18.2
11.2
22.5
.09

3.60
5.22
2.81
2.59
2.63

15.2
9.7
8.1
18.6
0.03

Correlation Analysis
Correlations are performed between the dependent and independent variables. Table 4.12
depicts the results for the needs-based model. The percentage of uninsured is correlated with all
of the other variables at a significant level. Moreover, there is a low negative correlation between
Medicaid expansion and the percentage of uninsured (r = -.33, p <.05). This correlation
demonstrates that states are not expanding Medicaid when they have a high proportion of
uninsured individuals. There is also a moderate positive correlation between poverty and the
percentage of the uninsured (r = .52, p < .001). This association may be the result of increases in
part-time employees and minimum wage positions (Wilensky, 1988). A moderate negative
correlation between health status and poverty (r = -.45, p < .01), implies that people who have
poor health also live in poverty.
Since many of the variables in the needs-based model are moderately correlated, a VIF
test is utilized to assess multicollinearity. The mean VIF value for all of the variables is 1.82.
The VIF test did not signal a need to account for an issue of multicollinearity, because the
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threshold for collinearity does not exceed a mean value of 10. As a result, all of the variables
remain in the needs-based model.
Table 4.12
Needs-Based Model Correlations for Dependent and Independent Variables
Poverty %Elderly %Unemployed %Uninsured Health Medicaid
Status Expansion

Poverty
%Elderly
%Unemployed
%Uninsured
Health Status
Medicaid Expansion

1.00
-.10
.69***
.52***
-.45**
.12

1.00
-.01
-.37**
-.48**
.24

1.00
.37**
-.48**
.24

1.00
-.50**
-.33*

1.00
.15

1.00

Note: *Correlation is significant at .05 level, **Correlation is significant at .01 level,
***Correlation is significant at .001 level.
Data Analysis
To analyze the needs-based model, multinomial logistic regression is utilized to address
the following question: Do state population needs influence the decision of states to adopt
Medicaid expansion? The model is significant with a likelihood ratio chi-square of 49.90 and a
p-value of .0001. Table 4.13 provides the results of the statistical tests used to examine goodness
of fit. The results indicate that 68.4% of the variance in state decisions on Medicaid expansion is
explained by the model.
Table 4.13
Needs-Based Model Summary
Model/
Significance

McFadden
R2

Cox and
Snell R2

NagelKerke HosmerR2
Lemeshow/
Significance

49.90(.000)

.390

.631

.684

37.56(.038)
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The findings from the multinomial regression analysis for the needs-based model are
displayed in Table 4.14. Four variables are significant. The relative risk ratio for health status is
not reported due to estimation limitations, but the multinomial regression analysis reveals that
health status is statistically significant.
Table 4.14
Needs-Based Multinomial Regression Analysis
(Base Outcome Group: Undecided)

Decline
Poverty
%Elderly
%Unemployed
%Uninsured
Health Status
Constant
Support
Poverty
%Elderly
%Unemployed
%Uninsured
Health Status
Constant
Adopt
Poverty
%Elderly
%Unemployed
%Uninsured
Health Status
Constant

β

RRR

S.E.

.67*
-.69*
-.58
-.22
121.28
-.40

1.96
.50
.56
.81
4.68
.67

.63
.17
.22
.16
3.48
5.55

1.13**
-.58
-.10
-.83**
168.20
-8.10

3.11
.56
.91
.43
1.12
.00

1.30
.27
.47
.13
1.33
.00

.95*
-1.05
1.53
-.72*
741.62*
-58.01

2.59
.35
4.63
.49
∞
6.43

1.16
.23
4.55
.17
0
2.28

Note: *Correlation is significant at .05 level, **Correlation is significant at .01 level.
∞: Maximum likelihood estimate do not exist.
For the needs-based model, four variables out of five are statistically significant.
Hypothesis 10 suggests that states with higher supplemental poverty measure rates are more
likely to expand Medicaid. Although the findings produce mixed results, the findings suggest
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that states are responsive to actualized needs and they are more apt to support (RRR = 1.96, p <
.01) or adopt (RRR = 3.11, p < .05) Medicaid expansion rather than decline (RRR = 2.59, p < .05)
Medicaid expansion. The percentage of the elderly population is also significant in the expected
direction. Hypothesis 11 postulates that states with a high proportion of elderly persons are less
likely to expand Medicaid expansion. A one standard deviation increase in the percentage of the
elderly is associated with a 50% lower relative risk that states will decline Medicaid expansion
relative to the undecided referent group (RRR = .50, p < .05). This finding supports the literature
that states are less inclined to expand Medicaid services when there are a high proportion of
elderly residents (Kousser, 2000; Lamphere & Rosenbach, 2000).
The only variable that is not statistically significant in the needs-based model is the
percentage of the unemployed. Hypothesis 12 proposes that states with low unemployment rates
are more likely to expand Medicaid expansion. Although prior research demonstrates a link
between the rate of unemployment and restrictive welfare benefits, mixed results have been
reported on the effect of unemployment rates on different types of Medicaid policies (Grogan,
1999; Soss et al. 2001). This model also produces mixed results on the effect of unemployment
rates on Medicaid expansion. The results indicate that states are more likely to adopt Medicaid
expansion when unemployment rates are high. However, there is a negative relationship between
states that support and decline Medicaid expansion and the percentage of unemployed
individuals. Although there is no clear explanation to account for the mixed results, possible
reasons could be the cost of expanding Medicaid or political opposition.
While the percentage of the unemployed does not have an effect on Medicaid expansion,
the last two variables (percentage of uninsured and health status) in the needs-based model are
positively significant. Hypothesis 13 estimates that states with high uninsurance rates are more
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likely to oppose Medicaid expansion. Contrary to the hypothesized direction for the percentage
of the uninsured, states are more inclined to support (RRR = .43, p < .01) or adopt (RRR = .49, p
< .05) Medicaid expansion when the uninsured rate increases. This finding implies that states are
more apt to adopt Medicaid expansion when there is a real need as suggested for the case on
poverty.
Hypothesis 14 postulates that states with a high level of residents with good health are
more likely to expand Medicaid. Although the relative risk ratio for health status is not
estimated, the findings support Hypothesis 14 with a significance level of p < .05. This finding
supports Grogan’s (1999) conclusion that states respond positively to recognized medical and
health needs. Moreover, the results from this study on health status also lend support to Hill et
al.’s (2014) arguments that knowledge of overall state health needs aid states in determining
prospective costs and expanding Medicaid.
A comparison of state decisions using a one-way table of summary statistics (see
Appendix C), and using the mean score of each variable on the effect of poverty on Medicaid
expansion reveals, that states that choose to adopt or support Medicaid expansion have higher
than average state residents living in poverty. This finding is surprising because these states also
have higher than average per capita income. On the other hand, states that chose to decline or
are undecided on Medicaid expansion have a lower than average proportion of state residents
living in poverty. These results speak to the issues of income disparities and economic
inequalities throughout the United States. A study examining economic inequality trends in
industrialized countries found that “a low-income American at the 10th percentile in 2000 had an
income that is only 39 percent of median income, whereas a high-income American in the 90th
percentile had an income that is 210 percent of the median” (Smeeding, 2005, p. 959).
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An analysis of the influence of the percentage of the elderly population on state decisions
on Medicaid expansion demonstrates that states that choose to support or are undecided on
Medicaid expansion have a higher than average population of elderly persons. On the contrary,
states that choose to decline or adopt Medicaid expansion have a lower than average elderly
population. For states that decline Medicaid expansion, these findings show that expanding
Medicaid would not be as expensive compared to other states with a high population of elderly
persons.
An evaluation of the impact of the percentage of unemployed persons on Medicaid
expansion reveals that states that choose to adopt, support or are undecided on Medicaid
expansion have a higher than average population of unemployed individuals. This finding
suggests that the employment status of state residents is a motivational force in state decisions on
expanding Medicaid. Alternatively, states that chose to decline Medicaid expansion have a
lower population of state residents who are unemployed.
An investigation of the effect of health status on state decisions on Medicaid expansion
shows that states that choose to decline, support, or adopt Medicaid expansion have state
residents with good health statuses. This finding indicates that while states are more inclined to
adopt or support Medicaid expansion when they have healthy residents; some states do not
consider the overall health status of state residents to be a driving force in expanding Medicaid.
An examination of the influence of the percentage of uninsured of state decisions on
Medicaid expansion reveals that states that choose to decline or are undecided on Medicaid
expansion have a higher than average percentage of uninsured individuals. This finding suggests
these states are risk-averse to expanding Medicaid. On the other hand, states that adopt or
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support Medicaid expansion have a lower than average population of uninsured individuals.
This result implies that these states are more inclined to expand Medicaid because there are
fewer people to insure.
The decisions of states on Medicaid expansion in relation to need-based factors show
marginal differences amongst the states with the exception of the uninsured. The variable health
status is transformed to reflect a whole number. Figure 4.3 illustrates the impact of needs-based
factors on Medicaid expansion in graphical form.

Figure 4.3. Pivot table displaying the effect of needs-based factors on Medicaid expansion using
mean values of the variables percentage of the elderly, health status, poverty, the percentage of
the unemployed, and the percentage of the uninsured in relation to the decision of states on
Medicaid expansion.
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State Capacity Model
Descriptive Statistics
The state capacity model consists of three variables: legislative professionalism,
institutional capacity, and governance. Table 4.15 illustrates the descriptive statistics for all 50
states. All of the variables are positively skewed and leptokurtic.
Table 4.15
State Capacity Model Descriptive Statistics for all 50 States
Variable

Mean

Legislative Professionalism .19
Institutional Capacity
2.60
Governance
2.48

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

Kurtosis Range

.12
.53
1.01

0.031
1.325
1

0.606
3.825
4

6.30
2.95
1.96

0.575
2.5
3

Correlation Analysis
An examination of correlations between the dependent and independent variables is
performed. Using Guilford’s guidelines for assessing Pearson r values (Sprinthall, 2012), the
correlation analysis indicates that there is a low negative correlation between governance and
legislative professionalism (r = -.29, p < .05). This relationship may result from differences in
legislative values and institutional objectives when formulating and implementing public service
initiatives. Issues of contention revolve around power constraints, representation, leadership,
responsiveness, efficiency and effectiveness, and autonomy (Bourdeaux & Chiukoto, 2008).
Moreover, there is a positive low correlation between Medicaid expansion and legislative
professionalism (r = .35, p < .05). This association supports the literature that professional
legislatures are more likely to shape and adopt public policies (Boushey & McGrath, 2015;

136

Brace & Ward, 1999; Finegold & Skocpol, 1995; Jenkins, Leicht, & Wendt, 2006). A VIF test is
performed to examine and identify issues relating to multicollinearity. The mean VIF value for
all of the variables is 1.06, thus signifying that multicollinarity is not a problem for the state
capacity model. Table 4.16 depicts the results for the state capacity model.
Table 4.16
State Capacity Model Correlations for Dependent and Independent Variables
Legislative
Institutional Governance Medicaid
Professionalism Capacity
Expansion
Legislative Professionalism
Institutional Capacity
Governance
Medicaid Expansion

1.00
.01
-.29*
.35**

1.00
-.05
-.11

1.00
-.02**

1.00

Note: *Correlation is significant at .05 level, **Correlation is significant at .01 level.
Data Analysis
Multinomial logistic regression is utilized to analyze the state capacity model and to
address the following question: Does state capacity influence the decision of states to adopt
Medicaid expansion? The model is significant with a likelihood ratio chi-square of 17.60 and a
p-value of .05. The statistical tests utilized to evaluate goodness of fit are presented in Table
4.17. The results indicate that 32.2% of the variance in state decisions is explained by the model.
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Table 4.17
State Capacity Model Summary
Model/
Significance

McFadden
R2

Cox and
Snell R2

NagelKerke HosmerR2
Lemeshow/
Significance

17.60(.040)

.138

.297

.322

19.159(.743)

The results from the multinomial regression analysis for the state capacity model are
displayed in Table 4.18. Two variables have an effect on Medicaid expansion: legislative
professionalism and governance. Relative risk ratios are reported for purposes of interpretation.
Table 4.18
State Capacity Multinomial Regression Analysis
(Base Outcome Group: Undecided)

Decline
Legislative Professionalism
Institutional Capacity
Governance
Constant
Support
Legislative Professionalism
Institutional Capacity
Governance
Constant
Adopt
Legislative Professionalism
Institutional Capacity
Governance
Constant

β

RRR

S.E.

1.21
1.03
.22
-3.11

3.36
2.81
1.25
.04

16.00
1.99
.46
.10

12.50*
.40
1.22*
-7.14

268141.3
1.49
3.39
.00

1437493
1.33
1.86
.00

9.27
.74
-.15
-4.53

10666.63
2.10
.86
.01

56817.92
2.35
.62
.04

Note: *Correlation is significant at .05 level.
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For the state capacity model, the relationship between legislative professionalism and
Medicaid expansion indicates that states are more likely to support Medicaid expansion as the
degree of legislative professionalism increases relative to the referent group, undecided (RRR =
268141.3, p < .05). The findings demonstrate that Hypothesis 15 is not supported, which
postulates that states with a high degree of legislative professionalism are more likely to adopt
Medicaid expansion. This finding should be understood in the environmental context of
Medicaid expansion. In June of 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that compelling states to expand
Medicaid is unconstitutional (Jost & Rosenbaum, 2012). As a result, many states did not
formally adopt Medicaid expansion until the following year or years after. Although many states
did not formally adopt Medicaid expansion, the results demonstrate that there is a positive
relationship between highly professionalized legislatures and Medicaid expansion in the
expected direction, but the results do not reach a significant level. Consequently, there is reason
to believe that legislative professionalism will have more predictive power in analyses conducted
for future years to come.
Institutional capacity also did not have an effect on Medicaid expansion. Hypothesis 16
estimates that states with a high level of institutional capacity will be more likely to expand
Medicaid. The insignificant results for institutional capacity could be due to a number of
problems. First, the data used to measure institutional capacity is collected from the year 2008.
Although this information is outdated, there is research that suggests that state characteristics do
not vary much over time (Milward & Provan, 2000; Weaver & Rockman, 1993; West, 2004).
The other issue is that prior studies have measured institutional capacity using multiple methods
(Fossett & Thompson, 2006; Jacobs & Callaghan, 2013; Kim & Jennings, 2012). The
insignificant results could suggest that the method selected for this study may not be the
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appropriate measure to assess institutional capacity. However, the institutional capacity measure
used in this study is comprehensive and has been in existence for 14 years (Barrett & Greene,
2008). Moreover, many studies have reported significant findings using data from the
government performance project (Fossett & Thompson, 2006; Hou, Moynihan, & Ingramham,
2003; King, Zeckhauser, & Kim, 2004), on which this study draws for the institutional capacity
measure.
Surprisingly, the findings indicate that states are more likely to support Medicaid
expansion when Medicaid governance arrangements are centralized (RRR = 3.39, p < .05).
Hypothesis 17 posits that states with centralized Medicaid governing boards will most likely
expand Medicaid and it is unsupported. In contrast, the findings demonstrate that states that
adopt Medicaid expansion are more likely to have a decentralized governance arrangement.
Again, since many states did not formally adopt Medicaid expansion in 2012, there is reason to
believe that governance will have a larger effect on Medicaid expansion in future years.
Nonetheless, the influence of state governance arrangement on Medicaid expansion may vary in
future years because mixed and shared governance arrangements are gaining prominence in
fostering and establishing collaborative partnerships to improve public health initiatives (Beitsch,
Brooks, Grigg, Menachemi, 2006).
A comparison of state decisions using a one-way stable of summary statistics (see
Appendix D) along with using the mean score of each variable on Medicaid expansion reveals
that states that choose to support or adopt Medicaid expansion have higher than average
legislative professionals. This finding supports the literature, which indicates that professional
state legislators support progressive policies (Brace & Ward, 1999; Finegold & Skocpol, 1995;
Jenkins, Leicht, & Wendt, 2006). On the other hand, states that choose to decline or are
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undecided on Medicaid expansion have lower than average legislative professionals. This finding
could indicate that these states do not have the knowledge and skills to effectively manage an
expanded Medicaid program.
An analysis of the effect of institutional capacity of state decisions on Medicaid
expansion reveals that states that choose to decline or adopt Medicaid expansion have higher
than average levels of institutional capacity. This finding demonstrates that although states have
the institutional capacity to expand Medicaid, some states are making the choice to decline
expansion. States that choose to support or are undecided on Medicaid expansion have lower
than average institutional capacity. This outcome suggests that a lack of institutional capacity
may be hindering states from fully adopting Medicaid expansion.
For governance, a chi-square analysis and summary of statistics table (see Appendix D)
shows that there is no difference between a states’ decision to adopt, support, decline or remain
undecided on Medicaid and the governance structure of state Medicaid agencies. The
decentralized governance structure comprises 54% of state Medicaid governance structures. The
findings indicate that most states adopt a decentralized approach to handle the health and welfare
of state residents, but such an approach creates wide variations in health services and outcomes.
Wallis and Oates (1988) maintain that,
the decentralized provision of public services provides a means to increase the level of
economic welfare by differentiating levels of public outputs according to the demands of
local constituencies. The magnitude of the potential gains from such decentralization
depends upon the variation in the optimal levels of public outputs across jurisdictions.
(p. 12)
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The negative consequences of decentralization include inequality amongst communities and
regions and dominance of public policies by the political elite (Fauget, 2004). The results of this
study offer a glimpse of disproportionate effects, such as health outcomes and institutional
capacity, which could stem from a decentralized approach to handling Medicaid policies.
Overall, the state capacity model shows similar patterns amongst the states in regards to
their decisions on Medicaid expansion for governance and institutional capacity. However, the
differences between states that adopt and support Medicaid expansion are more pronounced than
states that decline or are undecided on Medicaid expansion. Figure 4.4 represents the influence
of state capacity factors on Medicaid expansion in graphical form.

Figure 4.4. Pivot table displaying the effect of state capacity factors on Medicaid expansion
using mean values of the variables governance, institutional capacity, and legislative
professionalism in relation to the decision of states on Medicaid expansion.
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State Innovation and Diffusion
Descriptive Statistics
The state innovation and diffusion model consists of three variables: geographic state,
state competition, and policy history. Table 4.19 depicts the descriptive statistics for all 50
states. The variables, geographic state and state competition assumes that all of the states share a
border with another state and that a state is influenced by its border states. Hawaii and Alaska
are the only states that do not share a border with another state. We included these states in our
analysis and assigned them a value of 0 based on the assumption that since they do not share a
border state, they are not influenced by the actions of other states. The policy history variable is
negatively skewed and leptokurtic. On the other hand, the geographic state variable and the state
competition variable are positively skewed and leptokurtic.
Table 4.19
State Innovation and Diffusion Model Descriptive Statistics for all 50 States
Variable

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

Kurtosis Range

Geographic State
State Competition
Policy History

.08
.42
20.70

.12
.50
3.57

0
0
8

0.4
1
27

2.69
1.11
4.75

0.4
1
19

Correlation Analysis
Correlations between the dependent and independent variables are performed. Table 4.20
provides the results of the state innovation and diffusion model. Guildford’s guidelines for
interpreting Pearson r-values are utilized to assess each correlation (Sprinthall, 2012). The
correlation analysis reveals that there is a positive moderate correlation between geographic state
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and Medicaid expansion (r = .46, p < .001). This correlation corroborates the findings of other
studies that demonstrate a positive correlation between geographic neighbors and the adoption of
Medicaid or public policies (Berry & Berry, 1990; Satterthwaite, 2002; Volden, 2006).
Moreover, there is a low positive correlation between geographic state and policy history (r =
.39, p < .01). This correlation suggests that states are influenced by their neighbors and share a
history of adopting similar Medicaid policies from past years. Last, there is a low positive
correlation between policy history and Medicaid expansion (r = .35, p < .05). Again, this
association supports prior studies, which show that states are more likely to adopt Medicaid
expansion when they have a history of adopting previous Medicaid policies (Callaghan &
Jacobs, 2014; Jacobs & Callaghan, 2013; Satterthwaite, 2002). A VIF test produces a mean VIF
value of 1.14, thus indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue for the needs-based model.
Table 4.20
State Innovation and Diffusion Correlations for Dependent and Independent Variables

Geographic State
State Competition
Policy History
Medicaid Expansion

Geographic
State

State
Policy
Competition History

Medicaid
Expansion

1.00
.14
.39**
.46***

1.00
-.01
.00

1.00

1.00
.35**

Note: *Correlation is significant at .05 level, **Correlation is significant at .01 level,
***Correlation is significant at .001 level.
Data Analysis
Multinomial logistic regression is utilized to examine the state innovation and diffusion
model to address the following question: Do innovation and diffusion influence the decision of
states to adopt Medicaid expansion? The model is significant with a likelihood ratio chi-square
of 17.86 and a p-value of .05. Statistical tests to assess goodness of fit are performed and are
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presented in Table 4.21. The state innovation and diffusion model summary results indicate that
32.6% of the variance in state decisions in Medicaid expansion is explained by the model.
Table 4.21
State Innovation and Diffusion Model Summary
Model/
Significance

McFadden
R2

Cox and
Snell R2

NagelKerke HosmerR2
Lemeshow/
Significance

17.86(.037)

.140

.300

.326

11.588(.984)

The results from the multinomial regression analysis for the state innovation and
diffusion model are displayed in Table 4.22. Of the three variables included in this model,
geographic state is statistically significant. The reporting of relative risks is reported to lend
additional understanding to the variable of interest.
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Table 4.22
State Innovation and Diffusion Multinomial Regression Analysis
(Base Outcome Group: Undecided)
β

RRR

S.E.

Geographic State

-.37

.69

2.60

State Competition

-.26

.77

.55

Policy History

.00

1.01

.10

Constant

.32

1.37

2.90

Geographic State

3.48

32.34

128.46

State Competition

-.38

.69

.61

Policy History

.18

1.20

.18

Constant

-4.34

.01

.04

Geographic State

13.35*

626374.8

4035010

State Competition

-1.17

.31

.42

Policy History

.46

1.58

.46

Constant

-13.04

2.17

.00

Decline

Support

Adopt

Note: *Correlation is significant at .05 level.
For the state innovation and diffusion model, there is only one variable that is statistically
significant; the others were surprisingly insignificant. The influence of geographic neighbors on
Medicaid expansion is positively and statistically significant (RRR = 626374, p < .05) and
supports Hypothesis 18, which postulates that states are more likely to emulate their geographic
neighbors in choosing to adopt Medicaid expansion. This finding confirms prior research, which
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theorizes that states are influenced by their neighbors and pursue similar policies (Berry & Berry,
1990; Satterthwaite, 2002; Walker, 1969).
State competition and policy history did not have an effect on Medicaid expansion.
Hypothesis 19 predicts that states with less generous Medicaid policies than their competitive
neighbors are less likely to expand Medicaid. While the findings follow in the expected
direction, the influence of state competition on Medicaid expansion is not powerful.
Countervailing factors that could affect this finding include other policy priorities, such as
education and transportation. The prevalence of other policy priorities could hinder or stall the
expansion of Medicaid (Hoadley, Cunningham, & McHugh, 2004). Hypothesis 20 posits that
states that have adopted generous Medicaid policies in the past are more likely to adopt Medicaid
expansion. Again, the findings follow in the expected direction, but the results are insignificant.
These findings suggest that states are more inclined to learn from each other by pursuing similar
policies than to compete (Berry & Baybeck 2005; Kim & Jennings, 2012). Moreover, the
findings also suggest that prior Medicaid policies have no bearing on the future of welfare
policies.
A comparison of state decisions using a one-way stable of summary statistics (see
Appendix E) and using the mean score of each variable on Medicaid expansion reveals that
states that support or adopt Medicaid expansion are more likely to emulate their neighbor than
states that decline or are undecided on Medicaid expansion. This indicates that policy
convergence is occurring, but only amongst 30% of the states. For states that choose to decline
or are undecided on Medicaid expansion, failure to innovate and diffuse could be the result of a
lack of understanding concerning the impact of expanding Medicaid, incomplete or inaccurate
information, or ingrained beliefs (Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2005).
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An examination of the impact of state competition on state decisions on Medicaid
expansion reveals that states that choose to decline, support, and adopt Medicaid expansion have
lower than average scores for state competition. This indicates that there is not much of a
difference on states decisions for state competition on Medicaid expansion. However, for states
that are undecided on Medicaid expansion, there is a higher than average score on state
competition. This suggests that there is some form of competition going on within undecided
states and it is most likely associated with declining Medicaid expansion since there is a negative
relationship between state competition and Medicaid expansion.
An analysis of state decisions reveals that states that choose to decline or are undecided
on Medicaid expansion adopt fewer prior policies than states that support or adopt Medicaid
expansion. States that decline and are undecided on Medicaid expansion are very similar in
terms of the policies they support and adopt. The findings demonstrate that there is clear line
between states that have liberal Medicaid policies and states that have conservative Medicaid
policies.
In general, the state innovation and diffusion model shows distinct differences amongst
the states in regards to their decisions on Medicaid expansion with the exception of state
competition. Again, for state competition, the findings demonstrate that there is not much a
difference between the states for this variable in relation to Medicaid expansion. Figure 4.5
represents the influence of state innovation and diffusion factors on Medicaid expansion in
graphical form.
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Figure 4.5. Pivot table displaying the effect of state innovation and diffusion on Medicaid
expansion using mean values of the variables geographic state, policy history, and state
competition in relation to the decision of states on Medicaid expansion.

The Model of State Decision Making in Medicaid Expansion
As discussed in Chapter 3, all of the variables that are significant in each model are
included for analysis in a full model of state decision making in Medicaid expansion. The model
consists of ten variables: ideology, governor institutional power, FMAP rate, poverty, percentage
of elderly, percentage of uninsured, health status, legislative professionalism, governance, and
geographic state. Additionally, the model provides results on cross tabulations, goodness of fit
measures, and multinomial regression analysis.
Correlation Analysis
Correlations are performed between the dependent variable and the independent
variables. Table 4.23 depicts the results for the full model of state decision making in Medicaid
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expansion. In view of the fact that many of the variables are correlated, a VIF is utilized to
assess multicollinearity. The mean value of all of the variables is 2.26, thus indicating the VIF
scores are well below 10, which signifies that multicollinearity is not an issue (Hair et al., 2010).
As a result, all of the variables are included in the model
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Table 23
Full Model of State Decision Making in Medicaid Expansion Correlations for Dependent and Independent Variables
Ideology

Ideology

Governor
Instit.
Power

FMAP
Rate

Poverty

Elderly

Health
Status

Legislative
Profess.

Governance

Geographic
State

Uninsured

Medicaid
Expansion

1.00

Governor
Institutional
Power

.16

FMAP Rate

-.44***

1.00

-.29**

1.00

Poverty

.09

-.19

.06

1.00

% Elderly

.16

-.08

.14

-.10

1.00

Health Status

.15

.33

-.64

-.45

-.04

1.00

Legislative
Professionalism
Governance

.20

.23

-.29

.45

-.02

.01

.14

-.10

.11

.18

.17

-.10

%Uninsured

-.38**

Medicaid

.69***

-.38**
.21

.35**
-.42**

.52***
.12

-.37**
.13

-.50***
.15

1.00
-.29**

1.00

-.10

-.09

-.26

1.00

-.02

.46***

-.33*

.36**

Expansion

Note: *Correlation is significant at .05 level, **Correlation is significant at .01 level, ***Correlation is significant at .001 level.

1.00
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Data Analysis
Multinomial regression is utilized to answer the overarching question of this study: What
are the factors that influence states to adopt Medicaid expansion? The model is significant with
a likelihood ratio chi-square of 107.02 and a p-value of .001. The statistical tests used to assess
goodness of fit are presented in Table 4.24.

The Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic did not produce a

chi-squared statistic or a p-value. However, it should be noted that an alternative test is utilized
to generate the Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic and this test is not recommended for model-building
purposes (Fagerland & Hosmer, 2012). The results from the other goodness of fit statistics for
the full model of state decision making indicate; 95.6% of the variance of state decisions is
explained by the model. Governor institutional power, poverty, the elderly population, and
health status significantly contribute to explaining the variance in Medicaid expansion. As a
result of the literature on Medicaid policies and state public policies, the full model sheds light
on the positive and negative effects of influential factors on Medicaid expansion. Overall, the
model shows strong results for factors that influence states to decline Medicaid expansion.
Table 4.24
Full Model of State Decision Making in Medicaid Expansion Summary
Model

McFadden
R2

Cox and
Snell R2

NagelKerke HosmerR2
Lemeshow

107.02(.000)

.836

.882

.956

n/a

The results from the multinomial regression analysis for the state decision making model
are displayed in Table 4.25. The variables health status and percentage of elderly are statistically
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significant at the p = .05 level. Other variables that are significant at the p = .10 level are poverty
and governor institutional power.
Table 4.25
Full Model of State Decision making in Medicaid Expansion Multinomial Regression Analysis
(Base Outcome Group: Undecided)
β

RRR

S.E.

Ideology

-.04

.96

.03

Governor Institutional Power

5.97*

392.75

3.37

FMAP Rate

.21

1.24

.16

Poverty

1.02*

2.76

.53

%Elderly

-.98**

.38

.50

Health Status

364.95**

3.10

184.42

Legislative Professionalism

-7.0

.00

8.93

Governance

.01

1.01

.65

Geographic State

-7.40

.00

8.70

%Uninsured

-.41

.66

.31

Constant

-48.51

8.59

27.06

72.57

1684.61

Decline

Support
Ideology

4.28

Governor Institutional Power

110.50

9.80

51322.42

FMAP Rate

14.10

1333149

11070.48

Poverty

.51

1.66

45714.8

%Elderly

-8.37

.00

24369.93

Health Status

11929.87

∞

9517423

Legislative Professionalism

882.43

∞

676444.1
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Governance

28.94

3.71

79209.46

Geographic State

188.78

9.64

202969.4

%Uninsured

7.60

2004.38

25578.99

Constant

-2591.71

0

1389524

Ideology

.43

1.53

5285.44

Governor Institutional Power

36.60

7.82

96720.09

FMAP Rate

-6.09

.00

14988.62

Poverty

25.30

9.68

27882.14

%Elderly

-20.07

1.92

125306.3

Health Status

6330.32

∞

Legislative Professionalism

201.06

2.09

413092.7

Governance

-25.69

6.94

87878.68

Geographic State

661.85

2.70

940983.2

%Uninsured

-8.69

.00

57359.77

Constant

-367.64

2.20

4311921

Adopt

2.98

Note: *Correlation is significant at .10 level, **Correlation is significant at .05 level.
∞: Maximum likelihood estimate do not exist.
This study assumes that states make decisions based on political, economic, needs-based,
state capacity, and state innovation and diffusion factors. Again, the overarching research
question driving this research is “What are the factors that influence states to adopt Medicaid?”
The results from the full model of state decision making demonstrate that, as a whole, most of
the factors do not have a significant effect on states decisions on adopting Medicaid expansion,
but rather declining Medicaid expansion. However, the model sheds light on an unexpected
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result. There are two variables that are statistically significant and they are the percentage of
elderly (RRR = .38, p < .05) and health status (RRR = 3.1, p < .05). A one standard deviation
increase in the percentage of elderly is associated with a 62% lower relative risk of states
declining Medicaid expansion. However, a one-way table of summary statistics (See Appendix
F) reveals that the percentage of elderly mean score of states that chose to decline Medicaid
expansion is 13.45. This indicates that the majority of states that are declining Medicaid
expansion have a moderate population of elderly persons.
The results from the full model of state decision making took a surprising turn for the
variable of health status. The individual model on state health needs shows that states are more
likely to adopt Medicaid expansion when state residents have good health status. However, a
one standard increase in health status is associated with a 210% greater relative risk of states
declining Medicaid expansion. Moreover, a one-way table of summary statistics (See Appendix
F) reveals a health status mean score of .07 for states that chose to decline Medicaid expansion.
This statistic also indicates that states are choosing to decline Medicaid expansion even when
state residents have good health status. Overall, contrary to the literature on Medicaid expansion
and the overriding influence of political factors (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 2014; Brown, 1995;
Kousser, 2002; Jacobs & Callaghan, 2013), the findings from this study reveal that state health
needs trumps politics.

Chapter Summary
This chapter provides descriptive statistics, cross tabulations, model summaries, and
regression analyses of the following models: political, economic, needs-based, state capacity,
and state innovation and diffusion. Multinomial regression analysis is used to analyze each
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model. A resultant model, the state decision making in Medicaid expansion, is developed based
on the significant indicators that have an impact on Medicaid expansion.
The overall results of this study indicate that state health needs are more influential than
politics, economics, state capacity, and state innovation and diffusion. Of the individual models,
politics has the most explanatory power. The factors, ideology and governor institutional power,
have a considerable effect on Medicaid expansion. Although the economic model fails to reach
convergence, the findings reveal that states with a low federal medical percentage rate (FMAP)
are more likely to adopt Medicaid expansion. The findings also reveal that the needs-based
model has the most variables that have a significant effect on Medicaid expansion. The state
capacity model does not have a large effect on Medicaid expansion, but there is reason to believe
that changes over time in Medicaid expansion will produce different results. Similarly, the state
innovation and diffusion model does not have a large effect on Medicaid expansion. In sum, the
findings indicate that states do not compete with each other and past policies do not affect state
decisions in Medicaid expansion.
The variance in the full model explains 95.6% of state decisions on Medicaid expansion.
Such a large variance provides robust explanatory power for the full model of state decision
making in Medicaid expansion and aligns with the literature on state health and public policies.
Moreover, the results of this study demonstrate the utility and predictive power of each variable
on Medicaid expansion. Furthermore, this study provides insight into the complexities of
Medicaid expansion and explains the differences between states when deciding to adopt, decline,
support, or are undecided on expanding Medicaid.
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This study engages in hypothesis testing. Twenty hypotheses are derived from the
literature and examined using multinomial regression. However, due to issues of
multicollinearity, only 18 hypotheses are tested. Figure 4.6 displays the expected direction of
each concept in relation to each hypothesis.

Figure 4.6. A Model of State Decision Making in Medicaid Expansion
Of the hypotheses tested for the full model of state decisions on Medicaid expansion, this
study confirms the influence and effect of ideology, governorship, poverty, percentage of the
elderly, the percentage of the uninsured, health status, and regional diffusion on Medicaid
expansion. The findings on FMAP rates runs counter to the literature on governance structures
and the adoption of state policies is not supported by this study. Figure 4.7 provides the end
results of this study.
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Figure 4.7. A Model of Best Fit of State Decision Making in Medicaid Expansion
Each model offers substantial insight into the prominent factors that affect the decisions
of states in Medicaid policy. This study demonstrates that political, economic, needs-based, state
capacity, and state innovation and diffusion factors play an important role in the adoption of
Medicaid policies. Moreover, the full model of state decision making in Medicaid expansion
uncovers an essential set of needs-based factors that play a large role in the decision making
process of states that is often neglected in the literature on Medicaid expansion.

158

CHAPTER 5
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter recapitulates the findings from this study as set forth in Chapters 3 and 4.
Then, the theoretical and policy contributions and implications are discussed. Next, study
limitations and delimitations are offered to address the flaws inherent in this research. Finally,
areas of future research and a concluding section are presented to explicate the utility of this
study.

Summary of the Research
The purpose of this study is to explore instrumental factors that influence states to adopt
Medicaid expansion. This research is informed by a vast array of literature from multiple
disciplines; five models that drive policy decisions at the state-level are identified and tested.
This study is important because there is a gap in scholarly research on state-level decision
making indicators that influence policy adoptions. Moreover, this study fills the gap by
introducing a comprehensive model of state decision making in Medicaid expansion that can be
adapted and modified to apply to other policy arenas.
A state comparative cross-sectional research design governs this study; the relationship
between Medicaid expansion and the influence of political, economic, needs-based, state
capacity, and innovation and diffusion factors is examined. The primary research question that
guides this study is “What are the factors that influence states to adopt Medicaid expansion?”
Secondary data are collected at the state level and multinomial regression is utilized to analyze
the five models identified from the literature review and the comprehensive model of state
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decision making in Medicaid expansion. The results from this study are summarized and
organized by research question in the proceeding section.

Research Questions
The first research question pertains to the political model and asks the question: “Do
political factors influence the decision of states to adopt Medicaid?” The significant factors in
the political model are state government ideology and governor institutional power. The data
analysis supports Hypotheses 3 and 4 that conservative state governments and governors with
high institutional powers are more likely to decline Medicaid expansion. The results of the
analysis also reveal that liberal state governments and governors with high institutional powers
are more likely to support Medicaid expansion. The insignificant variables are AfricanAmerican voters and interparty competition. None of the variables have an effect on the
decisions of states to adopt Medicaid expansion. This finding supports the literature on
Medicaid expansion, which demonstrates that political factors have an overwhelming influence
on the decisions of states to decline Medicaid expansion (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 2014; Jacobs &
Callaghan, 2013). In contrast, the results of this study in terms of the comprehensive model
reveal that the decisions of states to adopt Medicaid expansion are not influenced by political
factors. However, the support of Medicaid expansion by states is influenced by ideology and
gubernatorial institutional powers. Likewise, the declination of Medicaid expansion by states is
also influenced by gubernatorial institutional powers and ideology.
The second research question is related to the economic model and asks: “Do economic
factors influence the decision of states to adopt Medicaid expansion?” This model failed to
reach convergence and some of the variables were omitted because they were highly correlated.
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The federal medical assistance percentage rate (FMAP) appears to be a significant factor that
affects the decisions of states to adopt Medicaid expansion. This finding runs contrary to the
hypothesized direction, but the results indicate that states are more likely to adopt Medicaid
expansion when FMAP rates are low. The other variables (per capita income and health care
expenditures) do not have an effect on the decision of states to expand Medicaid. Although per
capita income and health care expenditures do not have an effect on the decisions of states to
adopt, support, or decline Medicaid expansion, this study demonstrates that FMAP rates have
considerable influence on state decisions to adopt Medicaid. However, it should be noted that
the results of this model should be interpreted with caution due to convergence failure.
The third research question is connected to the needs-based model and follows: “Do state
population needs influence the decision of states to adopt Medicaid expansion?” All of the
variables with the exception of the percentage of employed are statistically significant. The
poverty variable produced mixed results. The results reveal that states with a moderate
population of people living in poverty are opting to decline and support Medicaid expansion.
The findings also show that states are more apt to decline Medicaid expansion when there is a
moderate population of elderly persons. This could suggest that states are not willing invest in
Medicaid expansion when they know that a certain population of high utilizers of health care
services will increase health care costs and decrease state resources in relation to the provision of
health care services.
Unpredictably, the results reveal that states with a moderate level of uninsured persons
are more likely to adopt Medicaid expansion. Moreover, Hypothesis 14 is supported by the
analysis and states with residents that have good health statuses are more likely to adopt
Medicaid expansion. This model suggests that states are responsive to some state population
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needs. In response to the third research question, the results indicate that poverty, the percentage
of the uninsured, and health status influence states to adopt Medicaid expansion. In contrast, the
decision to decline Medicaid expansion by states is affected by poverty and high populations of
elderly persons. Last, states that support Medicaid expansion are influenced by poverty and high
populations of uninsured individuals.
The fourth research question concerns the state capacity model and reads: “Does state
capacity influence the decision of states to adopt Medicaid expansion?” Legislative
professionalism is a statistically significant variable in the state capacity model and the results
indicate that states with a high degree of legislative professionalism are more likely to support
rather than decline or adopt Medicaid expansion. Governance is the other statistically significant
variable and this variable does not have an effect on the decisions of states to adopt Medicaid
expansion as hypothesized, but instead is significant for the decisions of states in supporting
Medicaid expansion. Institutional capacity did not have an effect at all on the decisions of states
to expand Medicaid. The findings from the state capacity model suggest that the variables will
have more predictive power in the future because states did not formally decide to take a position
on Medicaid expansion until after the year 2012. In conclusion, state capacity factors do not
influence states to adopt Medicaid expansion. Moreover, these factors do not have an effect on
the decisions of states that decline Medicaid expansion as well. However, the results indicate
that states that support Medicaid expansion are influenced by legislative professionalism and
governance arrangements.
The fifth research question involves the state innovation and diffusion model: “Do
innovation and diffusion influence the decision of states to adopt Medicaid expansion?” The
variable geographic state is significant and supports Hypothesis 18, which indicates that states
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are more likely to emulate their geographic neighbors in choosing to adopt Medicaid expansion.
The other variables (state competition and policy history) are insignificant and do not have an
effect on the decisions of states to expand Medicaid. This model suggests that states are not
influenced by past policy preferences and states are not competing with each other on any level
in relation to Medicaid expansion. In accordance with Question 5, the results indicate that states
are influenced by their geographic neighbor. The others factors that comprise the state
innovation and diffusion model do not wield a significant amount of influence on state decisions
to adopt Medicaid expansion. For states that decline or support Medicaid expansion, the findings
reveal that geographic neighbors, policy history and state competition do not influence state
decisions.
Last, we revisit the overarching question guiding this study that relates to the full model
of state decision making in Medicaid expansion: “What are the factors that influence states to
adopt Medicaid expansion?” Although 10 variables are included in the model, only 2 variables
are statistically significant with a p-value of .05. The two variables are the percentage of elderly
and health status. Poverty and governor institutional power are also significant with a p-value of
.10. The findings indicate that states are more likely to decline Medicaid expansion when they
have a moderate population of elderly persons. Additionally, the results reveal that states are
also more likely to decline Medicaid expansion when residents have good health statuses. The
other variables in the model do not have a significant effect on Medicaid expansion. Moreover,
of the variables that comprise the full model of state decision making in Medicaid expansion,
none of them show influential power in states choosing to adopt Medicaid expansion.
Surprisingly, this model suggests that in relation to Medicaid expansion state population needs
are more influential than political factors.
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Theoretical Contributions and Implications
The literature on Medicaid expansion and Medicaid policy does not acknowledge the
different dimensions of influential factors that affect the decision making process of states, which
in turn affect public health policies. There is a gap in the literature that fails to connect why
states make decisions and the implications that follow when states choose to adopt or refuse to
adopt a given policy. The empirical findings from this study demonstrate that each model of
prominent factors that influence state decisions in Medicaid expansion are important as they
stand alone, but they also interact differently when combined.
The development of a comprehensive model for state decision making in Medicaid
expansion is the first major contribution to this study. The variance of this model explains
95.6% of state decisions in Medicaid expansion. Although high values for the coefficient of
determination (r2) is uncommon in the field of social sciences, the full model is based on an
interdisciplinary literature search that focuses on state-level factors that influence state decisions
in public policy. The drivers of state decision making fall under the following individual
models; political, economic, needs-based, state capacity, and state innovation and diffusion.
These factors comprise essential elements of the policy adoption stage of state decision making
in public policies.
The model of state decision making in Medicaid expansion can assist theorists in building
knowledge and addressing additional gaps in research and practice. Replication studies and
model modifications can advance the field of public policy and health policy over time by
lending consistency and reliability in the measures used to analyze the model. Furthermore, the
model can assist theorists in improving the decision making process of states by identifying
problem areas through quantitative and analytical processes to inform practice on state policy
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directives and management practices. State-level policy directives and management practices
include, but are not limited to, factors involving resource management, issue management, and
financial management.
The second major contribution of this study involves revelatory insight. Corley and
Gioia (2011) maintain that a significant theoretical contribution “rests in the idea that
contribution arises when theory reveals what we otherwise had not seen, known, or conceived”
(p. 17). This study identifies and illuminates the driving factors of state responses to policy
adoption. Until this study, research on state decision making in any arena does not encompass a
wide-ranging model of influential factors that affect policy adoptions. Moreover, this study
reveals that state needs are just as important as politics, and this discovery is largely ignored or
not fully explored in the literature on Medicaid expansion since the passage of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 2014; Brown, 1995; Jacobs &
Callaghan, 2013). This finding suggests that there should to be more emphasis on understanding
issue definition in the context of Medicaid expansion. Issue definition relates to the process by
which the initial stage of policy development shapes policy deliberations, and certain interests
are deemed important for policy decisions (Burgess, 2005). Moreover, Mooney (1999)
acknowledges that “issue definition is central to determining the politics of the policy making
process. Even a small change in this definition can affect the extent to which the process is
driven” (p. 678). When issue definition is understood, decision-makers can adequately assess
constraints, examine alternatives, and direct and implement judicial decisions and agency policy
directives (Stankey, Hendee, & Clark, 1975). This study demonstrates how state concerns can be
sorted based on an understanding of the drivers of state decisions.
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Policy Contributions and Implications
States play an important role in the adoption and implementation of Medicaid policy. A
review of the literature (see Chapter 2) reveals that political, economic, needs-based, state
capacity, and innovation and diffusion influences the adoption of state policies. The results of
this study indicate that policy adoption at the state level is influenced by a multitude of
competing factors, but when all of the factors are combined, states are more inclined to respond
negatively to state needs. Although Medicaid expansion provides an opportunity to improve the
health status of state residents, eliminate gaps in coverage, and control variations in health
outcomes across states (Crowley & Golden, 2014; Jacobs & Callaghan, 2013; Richardson &
Yilmazer, 2013), the far-reaching benefits of implementing Medicaid expansion are null if states
do not adopt Medicaid expansion. This research contributes to the fields of health policy and
public policy in four ways.
First, an understanding of the factors that influence state policies and the problem that
governs Medicaid expansion can provide a starting point for meaningful and factual discourse.
Understanding the issues that affect Medicaid expansion can assist policymakers and policy
advocates with demystifying inaccurate claims and personal biases by reframing policy
problems. Schon and Rein (1994) refer to reframing as a deliberative process that is based on
evidence and policy debates that encourage participants to seriously reflect and adjust their
original framing of the policy issue. This process involves a paradigm shift of the policy
problem. In addition to recasting and reframing policy issues, rhetoric could also induce policy
change. To reorient policy problems through rhetoric, Gottweis (2007) suggests
“conceptualiz[ing] these elements [emotions, virtue, trust, ethos, and feelings] in policy making
not as expressions of irrationality but as inseparable from the operation of reason” (p. 248).
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A simplistic form of using rhetoric in relation to this study would be to appeal to the
public and lawmakers using reason and emotion to persuade states to adopt Medicaid expansion.
A case could be presented where a healthy person who does not have health insurance lives in a
state that is declining Medicaid expansion and cannot access affordable care. A situation occurs
where the healthy person neglects getting care and ends up in the hospital and costs the state
thousands of dollars in uncompensated care. Then, research into the cause of illness reveals that
the illness could have been prevented by one trip to a primary care physician and medication that
costs less than $25 with health insurance. Soon after, a study is conducted using the model of
state decision making in Medicaid expansion and the results of this study is confirmed and states
are still declining Medicaid expansion when they have a high population of healthy residents.
Further analyses of economic factors and forecasting reveal that states will save money if they
expand Medicaid. This case represents how lawmakers, researchers, policy entrepreneurs,
interest groups, and public health advocates can use rhetoric and reason to influence policy
adoption.
Second, history demonstrates that states respond to financial inducements (Brecher &
Rose, 2013; Pollack, 2013). The findings from this study show that states are more likely to
expand Medicaid when FMAP rates are low. This suggests that states that are receiving more
financial assistance are declining Medicaid expansion. Although the federal government will
fund Medicaid expansion at 100% from 2014 to 2016 and 90% thereafter, there is speculation
that states are declining Medicaid expansion because they are afraid that future changes in the
law or administration will shift the burden from the federal government to the states (Angeles,
2012; Antos, 2013). This highlights a need to understand and research the interplay between
trust in government and the adoption of Medicaid policies as well as public health and public

167

policies. The influence of financial inducements or federal aid should be examined in more depth
through qualitative inquiry.
Third, the exploration of trend analysis can lend additional understanding to policy
adoption in Medicaid expansion. This study serves as a baseline design for decision making at
the state level and can assist analysts in predicting what will happen in the future with Medicaid
expansion. Moreover, researchers and practitioners can use trend analysis as a strategic tool to
identify common trends and pattern changes over time. Additionally, the impact of Medicaid
expansion and policy shifts can be evaluated. Furthermore, targeted studies can assess and
compare the relationship between Medicaid expansion and the predictor variables according to
geographic areas and ideological stances over time.
Fourth, practical application of this study may be guided through evidence-informed
policy, which involves gathering contextual based evidence from a variety of sources. Then, the
evidence should be continuously assessed and research should be understood by the way the
problem is framed, the interpretation of the research is analyzed, and the application is prioritized
and effective. Last, capacity should be assessed and determined to implement policies based on
evidence (Bowen & Zwi, 2005). Gambrill (2006) suggests that in order to employ an evidenceinformed approach to policy, practitioners should acquire information science skills, incorporate
feedback in decisions, and have access to decisional tools, resources, and training to improve the
quality of health care decisions. However, Bowen and Zwi (2005) note that “the starting point
for navigating the use of evidence in policy and practice is understanding diffusion (how ideas
spread throughout systems), how decisions are made, how policy is developed, and how capacity
is required to effectively use evidence in this process” (p. e166). By examining Medicaid
expansion through an evidence-informed approach, researchers and practitioners can better
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understand state factors on a contextual level and determine the appropriate strategy to adopt and
implement Medicaid expansion.
The implications of this study are far-reaching. States can use the model of state decision
making in Medicaid expansion to assess political support for new and expanded programs and
evaluate economic conditions that can impact the implementation of new initiatives. States can
also examine the needs of its constituents and provide services or expand programs that serve the
welfare of the public. Moreover, states can assess their capacity to implement new programs and
learn from each other through innovation and diffusion.
Practitioners can utilize the findings from this study by understanding the factors that
affect state decisions in Medicaid expansion and assisting with the development of new policies
to remedy policy problems. Practitioners can also serve as health policy advocates and provide
evidence-based research on the impact of health care policies on vulnerable populations.
Likewise, policymakers can use the results of this study to champion new or expanded services.
This study provides statistics for each state and policymakers can use the data from this study to
identify problems and suggest a course of action. Through active engagement and evidenceinformed policy, policymakers, practitioners, and states have the power to transform the delivery
and service of health care.

Study Limitations and Delimitations
There are several limitations pertaining to this study. First, this research provides a
foundational model that allows researchers to evaluate and test prominent factors at the state
level that affect state decisions on Medicaid expansion. Some of the factors are context specific
and generalizations may not extend to others areas of Medicaid policy or other policy arenas.
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This limitation can be managed by understanding the rationalization of state decision making and
comprehending the context for each model and variable. Furthermore, it should be noted that
Medicaid expansion and the ACA is evolving and this study examines initial state policy choices
and early-stage adoption in Medicaid expansion. As implementation of the ACA continues,
additional studies will need to be conducted to account for changes in state and federal laws as
well as changes in state characteristics.
The second limitation involves data limitations and data choices. The selection of data
for this study is based on literature reviews and cross comparisons from other fields. This study
utilizes a cross-sectional research design for the year 2012, but some of the data are unavailable
for various reasons. As result, this study uses data for prior years or proceeding years for
variables that could not be obtained for the year 2012.
The third limitation concerns multiple methods of measurement. The literature on some
of the variables in this study utilizes different measures to analyze various phenomena, such as
party control and interparty competition (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 2014; Jacobs & Callaghan, 2013;
Shufeldt & Flavin, 2011). To mitigate this limitation, this study uses consistent or time-tested
measures and also acknowledges that state characteristics do not vary a great deal over time
(Weaver & Rockman, 1993; West, 2004). Moreover, the selection of each variable is based on
the availability of the data and prior research that demonstrates a consistent effect on the state
decision making process.
The fourth litigation relates to model estimation errors. The economic model failed to
achieve convergence and goodness of fit measures could not be estimated. To address these
limitations, a literature review search on multinomial regression from experts in the field guided
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the process on how to deal with model estimation errors and data reporting (Allison, 2008;
Fagerland, Hosmer, & Bofin, 2008; Long, 1997).

Future Research
This research examines dominant factors that influence the decisions of states to adopt
Medicaid expansion. Data from all 50 states for the cross-sectional year 2012 are utilized to
inform the study on which factors have an effect on Medicaid expansion. Now that a model of
state decision making on Medicaid expansion is created and time has passed and more data will
be accessible, the opportunity to examine this study through a time series analysis can offer
insight on changes over time and also future trends can be forecasted (O’Sullivan, Rassel, &
Berner, 2003).
Another line of future research is employing a multiple case study approach. An
understanding of state decisions among states with similar characteristics may provide insightful
information on significant factors that influence the decision making process. A mixed methods
study may also add value to this line of research by gaining a deeper understanding of not only
the influential factors used in this study, but other factors that may be revealed such as the
influence of interest groups. The influence of interest groups is difficult to measure, but a mixed
methods study may uncover an important factor that has an effect on Medicaid expansion.
The most important line of research involves improving upon the model of state decision
making in Medicaid expansion. The findings indicate that the economic model needs to be
revisited and modified. Once the model is reevaluated, replication studies can be conducted for
other cross-sectional years and different policy arenas. Additionally, the data limitations will
also need to be revisited. As implementation of the ACA moves along, data on state factors that
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comprise the full model will become available and readily accessible for future studies.
Moreover, the issues involving multiple methods of measurement will need to be addressed via
statistical methods such as factor analysis or an in-depth meta-analysis. Although the limitations
will need to be remedied, researchers from other policy arenas can and should modify some of
the variables in each model to substantiate the phenomenon of interest.

Conclusion
This study explores and examines the effect of political, economic, needs-based, state
capacity, and state innovation and diffusion factors at the state level on Medicaid expansion. A
number of hypotheses are tested using multinomial regression and state decisions on Medicaid
expansion are analyzed in accordance with the influential factors of policy making and policy
adoption. This research is important because it addresses a gap in the literature and offers a
model of state decision making in Medicaid expansion by which researchers can explain policy
decisions and apply to other policy settings.
The results of this study indicate that when all significant factors of state decision making
are considered, state needs are more influential than politics— contrary to the literature on
Medicaid expansion post the ACA (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 2014; Jacobs & Callaghan, 2013).
The results also offer an explanation for why states decline Medicaid expansion more so than
adopt Medicaid expansion. However, when the individual models are analyzed separately we
see more variation in state decisions and the findings indicate that states are more inclined to
support Medicaid expansion rather than adopt expansion. Moreover, the overall findings of this
study should be understood in the context of (a) the time period in which the data are collected
and (b) the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the ACA (see Chapter 2).
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The utility of this research are manifest. This study provides a foundational path for
researchers to explore the adoption of health and public policies at the state level. This study
also investigates an unexplored phenomenon and that is the effect of governance structures in
health policy. While the findings indicate that there is an association between governance
arrangements and states supporting Medicaid expansion, further research will need to be
conducted to evaluate the true impact of governance structures on Medicaid expansion decisions
in future years. Last, this research has the potential to transform policy making in the area of
adoption at the theoretical and policy level. An understanding of drivers of state decisions at the
theoretical level will help inform policy and practice. This study identifies state concerns and
policy preferences; knowledge of why states make decisions gives researchers and lawmakers
the ability to strategically address policy issues and facilitate policy adoption.
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APPENDIX D: STATE CAPACITY SUMMARY OF STATISTICS
. tabulate med_exp, summarize (leg_pro)
Summary of Legislative
Professionalism
Mean
Std. Dev.

Medicaid
Expansion

Freq.

Decline
Undecided
Support
Adopt

.1608
.15413333
.263
.27439999

.08089148
.10116667
.15946369
.17286496

20
15
10
5

Total

.1906

.12299295

50

. summarize leg_pro
Variable

Obs

Mean

leg_pro

50

.1906

Std. Dev.
.1229929

Min

Max

.031

.606

Min

Max

1.325

3.825

. tabulate med_exp, summarize (inst_cap)
Medicaid
Expansion

Summary of Institutional Capacity
Mean
Std. Dev.
Freq.

Decline
Undecided
Support
Adopt

2.725
2.4516667
2.53
2.64

.5364356
.51888159
.48229776
.67235594

20
15
10
5

Total

2.5955

.53140386

50

. summarize inst_cap
Variable

Obs

Mean

inst_cap

50

2.5955

Std. Dev.
.5314039
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. tabulate med_exp, summarize (gov)
Medicaid
Expansion

Summary of Governance
Mean
Std. Dev.

Freq.

Decline
Undecided
Support
Adopt

2.5
2.3333333
2.9
2

1
1.1751393
.99442893
0

20
15
10
5

Total

2.48

1.0149897

50

. summarize gov
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

gov

50

2.48

1.01499

Min

Max

1

4

214

APPENDIX E: STATE INNOVATION AND DIFFUSION SUMMARY OF STATISTICS

215

216

Tiffany Henley
Curriculum Vitae

Email: Thenl002@odu.edu

EDUCATION
Old Dominion University
Norfolk, VA
Ph.D. in Public Administration and Urban Policy
August, 2016
Concentration: Public Policy
Cognate Area: Health Policy
Dissertation Title: Medicaid Expansion in the United States: A State Comparative Study Examining Factors
that Influence State Decision-Making. Chair: Dr. John C. Morris. (Expected date of graduation, August
2016).
Regent University
Master’s Degree of Arts in Government
Concentration: Public Administration
American Government
Certificate: Law and Public Policy
University of Rhode Island
Bachelor of Arts and Sciences (Cum Laude)
Major: Psychology

Virginia Beach, VA
May, 2011

Kingston, RI
May, 2006

CURRENT AREAS OF RESEARCH INTEREST
Public Policy
Health Policy
Organizational Theory
Collaboration
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE
Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA
August 2015-Present
Graduate Research Assistant
• Create and maintain data and documentation as needed for academic affairs.
• Develop methodologies for using data analytics tools and manage reporting,
visualizations, and statistical graphs to illustrate findings.
• Collaborate with teams and committees to prepare internal reports for the Southern
Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges accreditation requirements.
• Arrange meetings with faculty to understand data opportunities and needs to drive data
quality improvement.

217
•

Analyze financial information and report discrepancies to assist in effective business
decisions.

Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA
September 2011-May 2015
Graduate Research Assistant
• Edited manuscripts for conferences and publication purposes.
• Conducted literature reviews on corruption and state capture and other research-related
activities.
• Assisted advisor on teacher-related duties.
• Prepared handouts and provided supplemental reading material for a doctoral level
course PAUP 803 Multivariate Quantitative Analysis for Public Administration.
• Trained students on analyzing, performing, and interpreting statistical techniques using
Stata software.
TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA
October 2012-December 2014
Guest Lecturer
• Provided a lecture on administrative reform detailing various strategies that the United
States has implemented over time.
• Lectured on accountability in nonprofits and engaged the students in an activity that
allowed them to evaluate mission statements, fiscal duties, and operating budgets
among other items to determine if nonprofits were meeting established best practices.
• Prepared and presented two lectures on public administration theories, public trust,
ethics, and the future of public administration.
Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA
January 2013- May 2013
Instructor
• Taught an intermediate-level course on ethics, governance, and accountability online.
• Integrated case studies, wiki assignments, blogs, discussion board posts, and video
presentations.
• Effectively encouraged growth and improvement through providing thorough feedback to
students (Average enrollment=30).
Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA
September 2012- December 2014
Graduate Teaching Assistant
• Assisted in developing PAS 301: Ethics, governance, and accountability by recording
lectures, creating deadlines for assignments, and inputting information in Blackboard.
• Contributed to the development of PAS 410 Public and Nonprofit Organization by creating
PowerPoint slides, developing test questions, course objectives, and homework
assignments.
• Collaboratively worked with professors to develop and assist in teaching a Masters level
online course for PADM 734 Negotiation and Dispute Resolution by organizing and
entering the course content in Blackboard and Personal Learning Environment (PLE) and
facilitating online interactions with students.

218
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
Amerigroup Corporation, Virginia Beach, VA
March 2007-August 2011
Care Services Technician II
• Performed telephonic outreach efforts related to the Medicaid population
• Worked closely with members, providers, and community agencies to proactively
coordinate and resolve issues involving access to health care services.
• Coordinated, authorized, fulfilled, monitored, and tracked health care services
• Worked collaboratively with departments within the health plans; which include but are
not limited to, utilization management and case management.
Virginia Beach Psychiatric Center, Virginia Beach, VA
July 2006 – March 2007
Mental Health Counselor
 Provided counseling to adults and children’s with serious mental illness.

Performed technical nursing assignments; taking vital signs, weights, and
laboratory specimens.
 Facilitated and monitored therapeutic groups.
 Trained and educated new hires on various policies and procedures on selected units.
Rhode Island Department of Corrections, Cranston, RI
September 2005-December 2005
Therapeutic Assistant (Volunteer)
• Co-facilitated therapeutic and education sessions/ groups
• Monitored female offenders while they nurtured their children
• Coordinated meetings, conferences, and morale related events
Perspectives Corporation, Youth and Family Services, Wakefield, RI
March 2005– June 2005
Behavioral Specialist
 Worked individually with children on developmental issues and anger management
techniques.
 Arranged daily activity schedules for children.
 Monitored behavior and activity by maintaining thorough records and worksheets.
 Independently supervised and taught social skills to youth.
CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS
Henley, T. (October, 2013). Citizen Perceptions: Do they Influence the Economic Condition? Paper
presented at the annual conference of the Southeastern Conference for Public Administration (SECoPA),
Coral Springs, FL.
Henley, T., & Miller-Stevens, K. (November, 2013). The Massachusetts Health Connector: A Trailblazer in
the Transformation of Healthcare Reform. Paper presented at the annual conference of the Northeastern
Political Science Association (NPSA), Philadelphia, PA.
Henley, T. (April, 2014). An Exploration and Emancipation for Workplace Complexity: Delving in the Lives
of Nonprofit Employees. Paper presented at the annual conference of the Midwest Political Science
Association (MPSA), Chicago, IL.

219
Henley, T. (October, 2014). Value-Based Services: Is it Achievable, Operational, or Practical. Paper
presented at the annual conference Southeastern Conference for Public Administration (SECoPA), Atlanta,
GA.
Henley, T. (October, 2015). Health Care Policy from a Public Administration Perspective. Poster
presented at Commonwealth Graduate Education Day, Richmond, VA.
Henley, T. (April, 2016). Health Care Policy from a Public Administration Perspective. Invited poster
presentation at Old Dominion University Graduate Research Achievement Day, Norfolk, VA.
PUBLISHED WORKS

Book Chapter
Miller-Stevens, K., Henley, T.*, & Diaz-Kope, L.* (2015). A new model of collaborative federalism through
a governance perspective. In J.C. Morris & K. Miller-Stevens (Eds.) Advancing collaboration theory: New
models and typologies. London, UK: Routledge Publishing.

Peer-Reviewed Publication
Henley, T., & Boshier, M. (2015). The future of health care services for Native Americans in the United
States: An analysis of policy options using a multiple streams approach. Journal of Health Economics,
Policy and Law, available on CJO2016. Doi: 10.1017/S1744133116000141.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Morris, J.C., & Miller-Stevens, K. (2015). Advancing collaboration theory: New models and typologies.
(Eds.). London, UK: Routledge Publishing.

RESEARCH AND MANUSCRIPTS IN PROGRESS
Henley, T. Value-based services: Is it achievable, operational, or practical.
Henley, T. & De Leo, G. Early-stage prostate cancer: Proceed with caution.
Henley, T. Collaboration meets accountable care organizations: Developing a framework for mental

health collaboratives.
Henley, T & Miller-Stevens, K. An exploration and emancipation of workplace complexity: Delving into the

lives of nonprofit employees.
GRANT AWARDED

Co-Principal Investigators: Gordon, SB., Klinger, R., Henley, T., Cotterrell, P, Mengistu, M.
(September 2015). Stakeholder Perspectives of the Needed and Actual Competencies, Values,

220

and Attitudes of City and County Government Procurement Officials. Funded by NIGP,
$20,000.
CERTIFICATES
Foundational Strategies for Effective Online Teaching, 2014
Preparing Future Faculty, On-going
HONORS/ACTIVITIES



















Member, Phi Kappa Phi Honor Society, Present
Member, Pi Alpha Alpha Honor Society, Present
Member, Political Science Association
Member, American Society for Public Administration
Member, Onyx Senior Honor Society, Present
Faculty Summer Institute Workshop on Diversity, 2016
Panelist, Commonwealth Graduate Education Day, 2015
Faculty Summer Institute Workshop on Teaching and Learning, 2013
President, Public Administration and Urban Policy Ph.D. Student Organization, 2012-2013
Panelist, New Graduate Student Orientation, 2012
Vice President, Public Administration and Urban Policy Ph.D. Student Organization, 2011
Student Alumni Ambassador, 2011
Volunteer, Amerigroup Real Caring Volunteers, 2007-2011
Volunteer, Women Helping Women, Present
Dean’s Marshall, 2010
Bachelor of Arts, Cum Laude, 2006
Education Chair, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 2006
Recipient, Academic Achievement Award, American International College, 2003

